

# States of Jersey Police

An inspection of the States of Jersey Police

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## Summary

In this report, we consider the efficiency and effectiveness of the States of Jersey Police (SOJP) and how well it is equipped to meet its strategic priorities and deal with risks.

Our inspection took place at a challenging time for the SOJP. Between 2017 and 2018, a chief officer (the force's equivalent to a chief constable) retired and their successor died in service. At the time of the inspection, there had not been a chief officer in post for 18 months, and this role had been filled successively by two deputy chief officers. Less than a month before our inspection, the force had implemented a major restructure to operate within a reduced budget that government cuts to public spending had brought about.

Overall, however, we found the police force served the Bailiwick of Jersey's population well in terms of crime scene attendance, the investigation of crime and financial investigation.

The SOJP has improved the way it assesses demand, but it is hampered by a lack of accurate and comparable data. As part of the major restructuring programme, Project Horizon, it tried to match demand to resources. But it did not include a wide enough range of data in its analysis.

The force needs to develop a more sophisticated understanding of its workforce's capabilities. It has not done a skills audit, so it doesn't know which skills are available to it, or where its skills gaps are. This means it can't recruit to fill gaps, or plan for how its services may need to change in future.

The force has not yet begun to explore the way crime is changing, or the impact of hidden crimes, such as modern slavery and human trafficking. It lacks business support in areas including ICT, performance analysis, demand analysis, independent HR and financial management. The senior leadership team has no access to either independent HR advice or independent financial advice.

The force also needs to do more to attract staff from under-represented groups.

The force's governance and financial management arrangements are complex and opaque, and financial planning is not as effective as it should be.

We agree with the 2018 report from the comptroller and auditor general of the Government of Jersey, which made specific recommendations about how the force should be governed and managed. It is disappointing that the Government of Jersey has not yet acted on these recommendations.

We are concerned that a proposed restructure, which will bring the SOJP into a new Justice and Home Affairs Directorate, potentially makes this governance situation worse by compromising the operational independence of the chief of police.

The force has no medium-term financial plan and tends to design its planning mainly to match the available annual budget. As a result, the force cannot be certain its operating structure is affordable or sustainable.

The force needs to do more to make sure that staff are aware of its policing plan.

## **Developing an ethical culture**

The force's senior leadership is committed to developing an ethical culture. Interviewees told us that senior leaders set a good example. Although the force's senior leaders did not adequately consult the workforce when they developed Project Horizon, they have learned from this, and consultation on recent shift changes has been much more effective.

Senior leaders could do more, however, to reinforce ethical decision-making across the force. For example, ethical decision-making should be included in the annual performance review. The force should also consider establishing a network of ethics champions, representing each department.

## **The force's treatment of its staff**

Staff surveys conducted in 2018 showed that less than a third of SOJP respondents felt valued for what they could offer the States of Jersey; less than half felt safe to speak out and question the way things are done in the force; and less than two-thirds felt treated with respect where they work. These figures were lower than across the whole Government of Jersey, and far lower than among the UK public services.

The force has responded by trying to engage more with its workforce. Interviewees told us that staff morale is now better. People feel included and able to raise concerns in the new organisational culture.

The force has started to collect more information on issues that may affect staff perceptions of fairness and respect. It now holds exit interviews with staff who are leaving the force and analyses a range of data, including sickness rates.

The current deputy chief officer has listed 'improving wellbeing' as one of his five key commitments. But the SOJP does not do enough to identify and understand the wellbeing needs of its workforce. The force should routinely collect and monitor a suite of management information to understand the workforce's wellbeing needs.

Occupational health services are provided through a contract between the Government of Jersey and a UK-based private company, but this is not working well

and officers have been delayed in their return to work. The Government of Jersey is also responsible for providing mental health support services, but these are insufficient.

The SOJP's senior leadership team should produce clear guidance for supervisors and managers about when they should conduct stress management debriefs with officers. All staff in high-risk posts, including those in the Public Protection Unit (PPU), should undergo psychological screening and have mandatory annual appointments with the force welfare officer.

There are further problems around individual performance management. The SOJP's performance review assessment process (PRA) is ineffective. SOJP policy is that PRAs should take place every year, but the reality is that few officers have a current assessment, and some have not received one in years. The consensus among interviewees of all ranks was that the process is not fit for purpose.

## **Community policing**

The SOJP currently lacks an effective approach to community policing. Its community policing team was disbanded in early 2018 in response to budget cuts. The leadership realised this had created a gap, and in late 2018, under Project Horizon, uniformed policing was reintroduced.

However, at the time of our inspection, the new structure was far from effective as it was not supported by the necessary policies and plans. The senior leadership team is aware of these problems and is committed to resolving them. But it will take months to put the required policies, planning and training in place.

The force makes good use of social media, which was recognised with a cross-Channel Islands customer service award and a national police Twitter award in 2017. But it needs to do more to engage with rural parishes. We believe the potential exists for closer work between the SOJP and Jersey's parish-based Honorary Police forces.

The SOJP does not have a clear strategy for crime prevention. Its website provides advice, and it uses technological solutions to prevent and deter crime, such as town centre closed-circuit television (CCTV) and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR). But there is little in the way of more sophisticated prevention activity, and the force has not yet adopted problem-solving policing.

## **Investigating crimes and preventing re-offending**

The SOJP responds to incidents quickly and generally investigates crimes well. However, the cases we audited dated from before Project Horizon was implemented. The force adopted the new structure before response officers could receive investigation training. Most have had no recent training on conducting investigations and some have no investigation training at all.

The force should improve the way response officers hand over cases to specialist units. It should ensure that supervisors sign off quality first investigation (QFI) checklists before they hand cases over to specialist investigators.

The force's serious crime unit has the skills and resources it needs to conduct its role, and its investigators have training that is appropriate to the cases they handle. However, we did not find evidence that supervisors and managers provide direction for investigations.

The victim care that the SOJP provides is unstructured and needs to be improved.

In terms of preventing re-offending, the SOJP actively seeks to arrest suspects. Our audit showed that, routinely, arrests were made rapidly, and voluntary interviews were conducted instead of arrest when appropriate. But the force does not have an integrated offender management (IOM) programme, which is an initiative used in England and Wales to reduce re-offending.

## **Disrupting, responding to and preventing serious and organised crime**

The SOJP lacks a comprehensive understanding of serious and organised crime (SOC) in Jersey. It has focused on drug trafficking, and lacks information about other SOC threats, such as modern slavery and child sexual exploitation. It does not have an intelligence collection plan, and uniformed officers are not kept informed about local organised crime groups (OCGs). This represents a missed opportunity to gather intelligence on the ground, and to prevent people being drawn into SOC.

The SOJP does not follow the '4P' approach (prevent, pursue, protect and prepare) that forces across England and Wales have adopted, and it would benefit from doing so. The force also lacks the legal tools that police forces in England and Wales use to monitor convicted OCG members and prevent them from re-offending. The SOJP's senior leadership team and the Government of Jersey Home Affairs Department should evaluate whether to introduce Serious Crime Prevention Orders and civil orders.

## Identifying and safeguarding vulnerable people

The States of Jersey Police could do more to understand the nature and scale of vulnerability. It receives data on domestic abuse from partner agencies, but this is not the case for other types of vulnerability.

The force has introduced the THRIVE (threat, harm, risk, investigative opportunity, vulnerability and engagement) assessment tool to help call handlers risk-assess incidents. However, it does not conduct these assessments for 999 emergency calls. The force should thoroughly assess all calls for vulnerability and ensure that these assessments are recorded on the command and control system and used when grading all calls.

Officers and staff largely understand their responsibility to protect people from harm. However, the force should ensure that response officers conduct thorough risk assessments for all incidents involving vulnerable people.

The force's immediate safeguarding actions are effective. Officers understand their safeguarding responsibilities to victims of domestic abuse and other vulnerable people. They take positive action<sup>1</sup> when attending domestic abuse incidents to help and protect victims and any others present, including children. The SOJP uses body-worn video cameras where appropriate.

Since 2010, police officers in England and Wales have had additional powers to protect victims of domestic abuse, but there is no equivalent in Jersey law. Because of this, the SOJP and the courts are unable to provide victims of domestic violence in Jersey with the level of protection they would receive elsewhere.

The force's crime allocation processes are appropriate. Cases concerning vulnerable victims and high-risk crimes involving sexual offences are allocated to the PPU, where officers have received the training they need to handle such investigations. However, the unit is currently not fully staffed.

The SOJP has been instrumental in establishing an independent domestic violence advocate (IDVA) service in Jersey. Between 2016 and 2018, the number of reported medium and high-risk domestic abuse incidents increased by 134 percent. If this upward trend continues, the Government of Jersey should increase the number of IDVAs.

The force's investigations of missing children are thorough and well supervised.

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<sup>1</sup> The first priority of the police is to make people safe. At domestic abuse incidents it is particularly important that officers take positive action to make the victim and any children safe. This may mean arresting a person suspected of an offence, where the power to arrest exists, or taking other positive steps to ensure safety, such as organising refuge accommodation or organising the fitting of a panic alarm.



The SOJP has a good understanding of its role in supporting people with mental health problems. The senior leadership team is aware of the shortcomings of the current multi-agency response to people with mental health problems and is working to improve this. Responding to pressure from the SOJP, the Government of Jersey is now looking at creating a place of safety for people in mental health crisis.

In 2018, Jersey health and social services and the SOJP piloted a mental health triage service for six months, but it was discontinued due to a lack of funding. During the inspection, we were told of plans to revive the scheme. Given the success of similar schemes in England and Wales, we would welcome this development.

# Introduction

## Our commission

We conduct statutory inspections of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in England and Wales. We also inspect law enforcement arrangements in British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies upon invitation from the relevant government.

In 2018, the Jersey Police Authority (JPA) invited us to inspect the States of Jersey Police. The Bailiwick of Jersey is a Crown Dependency comprising the island of Jersey along with surrounding uninhabited islands and rocks. It covers an area of just over 118 square kilometres. The resident population is about 104,000. The island's government, administration and administrative agencies are collectively called the Government of Jersey.

## About the States of Jersey Police

The States of Jersey Police (SOJP) is the official Jersey-wide police service. It shares responsibility for policing the island with 12 Honorary Police forces. These parish-based voluntary forces perform a variety of roles, including dealing with minor offences, traffic control and maintaining public order at large events. They are wholly independent of the SOJP and are responsible to the Attorney General.

Our inspection took place at a challenging time for the force. Between 2017 and 2018, a chief officer (the force's equivalent to a chief constable) retired and their successor died in service. At the time of the inspection, there had not been a chief officer in post for 18 months, and this role had been filled successively by two deputy chief officers.

Between January 2010 and December 2018, the SOJP's budget was reduced by 20 percent. The previous deputy chief officer, who was appointed in 2017, instigated Project Horizon, a far-reaching programme to restructure the force and deliver policing within the new funding settlement. The new structure started less than a month before our fieldwork and was not fully established.

## Our findings

Overall, we found the force serves the Bailiwick of Jersey's population well in terms of crime scene attendance, the investigation of crime and financial investigation. We have identified areas in which there is scope to improve, and in some cases, we have made specific recommendations. Our report highlights 24 areas for improvement and makes 18 recommendations. These are listed in Annex B and Annex C respectively.

## **Our terms of reference**

Our terms of reference for this inspection were wide-ranging. They amounted to an examination of most aspects of the SOJP's operations and its governance arrangements. The terms of reference are reproduced in full at Annex A.

We have addressed our terms of reference within a structure that resembles our PEEL inspection reports of forces in England and Wales. In doing this, however, we have also considered the unique context in which the SOJP operates.

## **Our methodology and approach to this inspection**

We conducted fieldwork for this inspection in December 2018 and January 2019. We interviewed SOJP personnel at all levels of the organisation and observed a series of management meetings. We consulted other law enforcement and criminal justice organisations. We analysed data and documents, including a self-assessment provided by the SOJP. We also audited a series of SOJP's crime investigation files and reviewed calls from the control room.

In reaching our judgments we have, where appropriate, made comparisons with police and border practices in other Crown Dependencies and in England and Wales. We have also drawn on the College of Policing's guidance to police forces ('authorised professional practice') and we have referred to our findings from our other inspection reports.

## Understanding and managing demand

We assess the force's ability to understand and manage demand below.

### Assessing current demand

All police forces need to have a comprehensive understanding of the demands they face, so that they can allocate their resources to best effect and ensure an appropriate response to the public.

The SOJP has recognised the need to understand its demands and has improved the way it analyses information about current demand. Several challenges existed for the force in attempting to obtain accurate and comparable demand data. Reliable non-emergency call data prior to early 2016 does not exist. Putting a new telephony system into operation in early January 2016 was a step forward. However, the transition from the staffed switchboard in 2016 to the automated switchboard (which centralised most non-emergency calls) in early 2017 has made it difficult to accurately compare call data between 2016 and 2017. The new system does, however, routinely monitor all calls for service received and categorises them according to the type of incident. This will provide a sounder basis for future analysis.

In 2018, the SOJP instigated Project Horizon, a restructuring process aimed at delivering a new operating model that was affordable within the 2018/19 budget. To inform this, the force developed sophisticated techniques to assess both the volume of demand and, in some areas, the costs. This has enabled it to identify when and where volume demand is highest and develop a resourcing model to match this demand. This detailed work has focused mainly on response and public contact demand. This represents the greatest proportion of demand but does not give the full picture.

A significant proportion of demand (around 40 percent of total police officer resource) has not undergone review and detailed analysis. For example, the force's current analysis of demand does not include the crime services unit (CSU), which deals with all serious criminal investigations, or its PPU, which deals with safeguarding and investigating crimes against vulnerable victims. The force has some evidence that these teams are comparatively well resourced compared with similar services in other forces, but this has not been subject to proper analysis. Without detailed analysis, the force cannot be certain that it is operating as efficiently as possible, or that it has the right people with the right skills in the right place across its operations. The force recognises this omission and plans to extend its review of demand to include the serious crime unit and public protection.

### **Area for improvement 1**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should extend the scope of its review of demand to include the serious crime and public protection units, to ensure it is making most effective use of all its policing resources.

The force does not routinely include data from partner organisations and from other Government of Jersey departments in its demand analysis. Better information sharing could help the force and its partners understand and tackle common problems.

### **Area for improvement 2**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that its analysis of current and future demand uses all available sources of information including data from partner organisations.

We saw evidence that the force has been improving its efficiency through demand analysis. For example, it found that demand was at its lowest in the early mornings and responded by cutting the number of officers on duty at that time. Some of the savings were put into community policing, focusing on local problems such as anti-social behaviour. The force cannot yet evaluate whether this has reduced demand, as the new model has only been in place since October 2018.

### **Understanding factors that influence demand**

The force has sought to increase the efficiency of its working practices. It has examined the processes that take up the most police time and analysed each stage to identify any potential wasted effort or duplication. This has identified a series of short, medium and long-term solutions that would improve efficiency, but again, it is too early to evaluate the benefits of this approach.

The force has taken a similar approach to adopting new technology. It identified the 12 most frequently used operational processes, broke them down into measurable steps and analysed the time spent on each step. This has helped it to invest in the most efficient mobile devices and applications. For example, officers can now complete an electronic domestic abuse risk assessment. They can submit this directly to the specialist officer, and safeguarding information also goes to partner organisations. This means that officers do not need to return to the station to manually upload the information. Consequently, victims are likely to get a better, swifter service, and police officers are more visible in their communities.

## **Innovation and new opportunities**

We found evidence that the force has been committed to learning from good practice elsewhere and that it is open to challenge and support from peers and experts from other forces. For example, it is working with Avon and Somerset Constabulary to develop better ways to contact the public, and with Norfolk Constabulary on improving its learning and development programmes so that it has the appropriately skilled staff to manage demand.

## **Investment and benefits**

The force has taken an innovative approach to the use of new technology. For a small force, it has made a significant investment in ICT to supply all frontline officers with mobile devices with access to the full range of police IT systems. Each officer has either a smartphone or a tablet with an extensive range of apps aimed at carrying out routine police work. There is a continuing programme to develop more of these apps so officers can complete operational and administrative processes away from the police station.

The force predicts that once the full range of apps is in use, the savings in police time will equate to £500,000 per year. This technology has already enabled the force to reduce its numbers by nine officers. Staff have received the devices positively and use them widely. But the force is not yet able to fully evaluate whether officer productivity has increased as it expected, or whether there have been any unintended consequences.

It is too early to evaluate the implementation of Project Horizon. The force plans to do this later in 2019.

## **Prioritising different types of demand**

Reported crime is comparatively low in Jersey. On a typical day, the force receives 50 incident reports, with nine of these being recorded as crimes. It has recently introduced a systematic approach to risk-assessing all calls for service, which helps determine its response.

The force introduced its new operating model in October 2018. This had some impact on the shift patterns of its response and community officers. A dedicated referred investigation unit (RIU) used to complete initial investigations, but response officers have taken over this duty. This means that more officers can be available for proactive and preventative community policing during times of lower response demand.

At the same time, the change has sought to ensure that a small team of response staff, comprising four officers, should always be available, with the community teams providing further support at times of peak demand. But because the initial assessment did not include specialist investigative units, which represent around 40

percent of force resources, the force cannot show it has best allocated resources to match demand across all its operations.

### **Workforce capabilities**

The SOJP does not have a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of its workforce's capabilities. It has not done a skills audit, so beyond tactical and operational elements such as authorised firearms capabilities, it doesn't know which skills are available to it. For example, the force has not collected information about its staff's academic qualifications or transferable skills from their earlier occupations. Neither can it assess how its capabilities might need to change in the future.

The force has access to limited independent HR support. The force has done no meaningful succession planning and no formal talent management approaches are in place. Police recruitment tends to depend on available funding, rather than need, so vacancies are held open until the next year to balance the budget.

The force understands it needs to improve in this area, but it is hard to make significant progress with the limited amount of business support available. The need to fall in line with the Government of Jersey's approaches makes faster progress difficult.

### **Understanding costs of activity**

The force has made a good start at improving its understanding of costs of uniform policing. It monitors demand closely. Because it deals with a small number of incidents, even a small fluctuation can result in a significant percentage change. The force has identified upper and lower cost thresholds for each incident type. If this is exceeded, it triggers further analysis, known as a 'deep dive', to understand what lies behind the change.

## **Assessing future demand for services**

The SOJP has made some progress in assessing future demand for its services, but it has more work to do. The force has not yet begun to explore the way crime is changing, or the impact of hidden crimes, such as modern slavery and human trafficking. Although the force has done some good joint work with local agencies and organisations to protect vulnerable people, it does not make full use of data from its partners.

Because of these limitations, the force cannot be sure its financial, workforce and training and development plans will enable it to manage future demand. It is also held back by a lack of capacity and capability in business support in areas that include ICT, performance analysis, demand analysis, HR and financial management. This is limiting the pace and scale of the force's progress in several areas. In addition, the senior leadership team has no access to strategic independent advice in either HR or finance, which would assist in driving forward improvement.

### **Area for improvement 3**

The SOJP's senior leadership and the Government of Jersey should ensure the force's business support functions are fit for purpose, with clear specifications for required support, with robust monitoring and evaluation in place to maintain an effective level of HR, finance and ICT services to meet the police's needs.

### **Future workforce**

The force does not have a comprehensive workforce plan due to its limited HR capacity. Planning in this area has focused on the number of police officers, rather than on the skills, rank mix and capabilities needed to manage future demand. Planning has not considered police staff enough.

The transfer of the force's own HR staff to the Government of Jersey's HR hub has proved problematic for the force. The transfer was designed to provide managers with easier access to transactional HR support, such as payroll, and so reduce the demand on HR staff. But the limited understanding of staff in the hub have added to the burden on the remaining HR support staff. This has hindered progress on improving strategic HR requirements. The proposed merger of SOJP with other law enforcement agencies (see below) is likely to reduce independent HR support even further.

The force is working with Norfolk Constabulary to draw up a training and development plan. But this has largely focused on tactical and operational competencies, and only focuses on police officers and not other staff.

### **Area for improvement 4**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should develop its workforce plans to fully identify its future workforce capabilities and improve analysis of future demand. This will ensure that the force can develop medium-term plans that are aligned effectively and efficiently to future demand.

In terms of recruitment, the force has not really begun to think about how its workforce might better represent the population. Recent recruitment exercises have not aimed to attract candidates from under-represented groups.



## Governance and performance management

We assess the force's governance and performance management below.

### Financial management arrangements

The governance and financial management arrangements for the SOJP are complex and opaque. At the time of the inspection, the force formed part of the Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs (DCCA)<sup>2</sup>. Various leadership and governance functions are split between the SOJP's chief officer, the JPA, the minister for Community and Constitutional Affairs<sup>3</sup>, the Government of Jersey's employment board and others.

The States of Jersey Government sets a three-year [medium-term financial plan](#). The current plan was developed in 2015.<sup>4</sup> It covers the period 2016–19, and aims to balance the government's budget. The plan allocates an annual budget to the DCCA, a proportion of which is allocated to the police. It is not clear on what basis the budget is allocated to the police or how resources are linked to policing priorities.

The SOJP's chief officer is personally accountable for financial management and specifically for keeping spending within the annual budget. The police authority is responsible for providing effective and efficient policing but is not involved in the overall allocation of resources to policing or in setting the budget. The high-level statutory duties imposed on the police authority are more demanding than those of comparable bodies in larger jurisdictions. It has wide-ranging powers and a responsibility for achieving the aims and objectives of the SOJP. However, it has very limited resources at its disposal to carry out those duties.

The comptroller and auditor general of the Jersey Audit Office's 2018 review of police governance<sup>5</sup> found that, given its powers and resources, the police authority cannot reasonably be expected to carry out its responsibilities effectively. It also found that the minister's powers over policing are more extensive than in other jurisdictions, which may not be consistent with the operational independence of the SOJP. For example, the minister determines the numbers of each junior rank

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<sup>2</sup> Since our inspection, the DCCA has been replaced by a new Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) department.

<sup>3</sup> With the creation of JHA, the role formerly undertaken by the minister for Community and Constitutional Affairs falls within the remit of the minister for Justice and Home Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> It covers the period 2016–19 and was updated in 2016 by MTFP2a which covers the period 2017–19.

<sup>5</sup> [Governance of the States of Jersey Police](#), Jersey Audit Office: Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, 2018.

that may be appointed. The minister also appoints the SOJP's deputy chief officer and is not required to consult the force's chief officer on the appointment.

## **Finance plans**

The governance structure prevents the SOJP and the police authority from having a meaningful role in financial planning. This means that planning is not as effective as it should be. The comptroller and auditor general identified this in her recent report on police governance.<sup>6</sup> She also noted a fundamental weakness in the accountability arrangements for the use of resources by the SOJP.

One medium-term financial plan (MTFP) for the Government of Jersey covers all departments. Each year, the police service receives a total budget from the DCCA budget,<sup>7</sup> but neither the force nor the police authority is routinely involved in the budget allocation process.

The government-wide three-year MTFP gives some indication of future resources but the force and the police authority are not routinely involved in advising on this. The force's own risk register recognises the risk of poor decision-making due to poor financial management practices and processes. We support the comptroller and auditor general's recommendations that:

“... the MTPF should identify the revenue allocation to the Government of Jersey separately. It is disappointing that the recommendation has not been acted on. The report made its recommendations almost a year ago (March 2018) and the Government has accepted them in full.”

Although the force's financial year runs from January to the end of December, at the time of our inspection (end of January 2019), there was not yet an agreed detailed budget in place for policing for 2019. This means the force cannot properly align its service planning with the financial plans.

The JPA has a statutory duty, after consulting the SOJP's chief officer, to prepare an annual policing plan. Given the adoption of multi-year financial planning through the MTFP, it would seem sensible for the authority to have a similar planning horizon so that plans could be less reactive and better aligned. We agree with the comptroller and auditor general's recommendations that: the resources allocated to the SOJP should be separately identified in the Government's MTFP; that the JPA should have a routine role in advising ministers in respect of the budget for the SOJP; and that service and financial planning for the SOJP should be aligned by moving to a multi-year policing plan.

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<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pages 12–14.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, page 16.

## **Recommendation 1**

In order to enable proper accountability, oversight and governance, by 1 May 2020, the Government of Jersey should ensure that the annual revenue allocation to policing should be clearly and separately identified in the medium-term financial plan, and financial planning and decision making should include appropriate input from both the chief officer of the States of Jersey Police as the accountable officer and the police authority.

## **Prospects for improvement**

While the force's leadership does not lack ambition to improve, its planning has focused on the short term. Most changes have been reactive and designed mainly to match the available annual budget. This has impeded comprehensive demand-led improvements and the force's capability to change to meet changing demands.

The development of Project Horizon's operating model is an example of this reactive planning. The force was aware of the financial implications of the medium-term financial plan from 2016, however a service review conducted to respond to this failed to realise any tangible saving. Therefore, by mid-2017 the force still faced pressing financial challenges for the 2018 financial year and needed to quickly develop a model that would enable it to make the required savings. The model was developed and put into operation within a few months. The force had insufficient time to fully engage the workforce and other partner organisations, and it imposed the change from the top down. The organisational review did not cover all police operations and may have missed opportunities to maximise both efficiencies and improvements to services.

Without a medium-term policing plan, a workforce plan, or a comprehensive understanding of current skills or changes in future demand, the force cannot be certain its operating model is affordable or sustainable.

At the time of the inspection, the Government of Jersey was proposing to reorganise its departmental structure to create a Justice and Home Affairs Directorate. This would bring together the police, immigration and border services under a single head of law and border enforcement. The post holder would be accountable to the police authority but will also report to the group director for public protection and law enforcement, who also has responsibility for fire and ambulance services.

We are concerned that this restructure potentially compromises the operational independence of the chief of police. The proposed move is also at odds with the findings of the comptroller and auditor general in her recent report on police governance:

“In my view, it is timely to take further steps to enhance the accountability and operational independence of the States of Jersey Police by: ... establishing and documenting revised non-statutory arrangements for the governance of the States of Jersey Police, including replacing the role of the Chief Executive as line manager of the Chief of Police and enhancing the role of the Police Authority.”<sup>8</sup>

The report identified that:

“there is no statutory basis and no documented framework for line management of the Chief of Police by the Chief Executive. Such a model is not adopted in either Scotland or Ireland and could be a threat to operational independence.”<sup>9</sup>

It suggested that reporting should be made to a strengthened and enhanced police authority. It is disappointing to note that the current proposals do not comply with the comptroller and auditor general’s recommendations and, in fact, present a retrograde step in terms of police independence.

## **Recommendation 2**

By 1 May 2020, the Minister for Justice and Home Affairs, in consultation with the Director General Justice and Home Affairs, the Jersey Police Authority and the Chief Officer of Police should design, publish, and subsequently operate in accordance with, a document that clarifies each party's responsibilities for (as a minimum):

- objective and priority setting;
- strategic governance and oversight;
- operational direction and control;
- independence; and
- provision of performance information for governance purposes.

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<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, page 15.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, page 9.

## **Policing priorities and performance management**

The SOJP's priorities are set out in its biennial [Policing Plan](#), as are a list of actions the force intends to take to meet them. We were encouraged to find that the public have a role in determining these priorities through the biennial [Jersey Opinions and Lifestyle Survey](#).

We found that while the force has a policing plan in place, it needs to do more to ensure that this drives operational activity. Aside from senior leaders, most interviewees have little knowledge of the policing plan or the priorities it sets out. Moreover, while the force holds performance meetings at various levels, performance is not routinely assessed against the policing plan priorities and activities; comparable performance data is largely absent.

### **Area for improvement 5**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should communicate the force's policing priorities across its workforce.

### **Area for improvement 6**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should establish a performance management structure that assesses performance against the policing priorities and activities set out in its policing plan.

The police authority provides external governance. It works closely with the SOJP's leadership team, and there are quarterly performance meetings to discuss progress on policing plan objectives. This will be enhanced by a recent decision to provide the police authority's executive officer with access to the SOJP's IT network. However, we found that the police authority was not always informed about force initiatives. For example, it did not know about Project Horizon until after it was initiated.

## Developing an ethical culture

Research shows that the best way to prevent wrongdoing is to create an ethical culture. Police leaders need to promote ethical principles and behaviour and act as role models, in line with the Code of Ethics. Officers and staff should feel confident about applying these principles to their decision making.

We assess the force's ability to develop an ethical culture below.

### Leaders as ethical role models

The force's senior leadership is committed to developing an ethical culture. Interviewees told us that senior leaders set a good example. Chief inspectors convene regular briefings and question-and-answer sessions, during which senior leaders are open to feedback and challenge. Senior leaders also advise staff on ethical issues, such as on avoiding the use of warrant cards to access sports events.

The deputy chief officer has stressed the importance of the Code of Ethics and has worked to create an ethical culture. The Code of Ethics forms part of the self-defence and decision-making courses as well as probationer training.

Building restrictions prevent the display of posters about acceptable and unacceptable standards of behaviour on the walls of police headquarters. But the force has bought television screens, which it plans to use to present rolling messages.

### Ethical decision making

Leaders in the SOJP consider the ethical implications of their actions. Daily management meetings review decisions and take corrective action where necessary. We also saw ethical behaviour being considered at senior leadership team meetings, particularly decisions concerning staff. The managers we spoke to were aware of the Code of Ethics, but some constables were less so.

The force's senior leaders did not consult the workforce widely when they developed Project Horizon and the new operating model. However, they have learned from this, and now recognise the importance of doing so. The workforce is well informed about the financial outlook for the next five years. The force informed officers about the change in shift pattern and asked about their preferred working hours and shifts. They could also appeal the changes. Communication about the changes appears to have been good, involving focus groups, workshops and briefings.

Senior leaders could still do more to reinforce ethical decision making across the force. The force's annual performance review promotion processes do not

specifically seek evidence of ethical decision making. Including this as an integral part of these processes could help promote ethical behaviour at all levels.

#### **Area for improvement 7**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should amend the force's annual performance review and promotion processes so that they record evidence of ethical decision making.

The force should also consider establishing a network of ethics champions, representing each department, who would meet to share learning.

#### **Area for improvement 8**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should consider establishing a network of ethics champions, representing each department, who would meet to share learning.

## The force's treatment of its staff

A workforce that feels its employers treat it fairly and with respect is more likely to identify with the organisation and treat the public in a similarly fair and respectful way. Conversely, perceived unfairness within police organisations can have a detrimental effect on the attitudes and behaviours of officers and staff. We focused on how well the SOJP identifies these perceptions within its workforce and acts on these findings. We looked at the extent to which organisational fairness is reflected in the way the force manages individual performance and how 'organisational respect' is reflected through how the SOJP provides for the wellbeing of the workforce, particularly through preventative and early action.

Research suggests that staff have better perceptions of their employers when forces involve officers and staff in decision-making processes, listen to their concerns, act on them, and are open about how and why decisions were reached.<sup>10</sup> On this basis, we assessed how well the force engages with its staff to identify and understand the issues that affect them, and how well it acts on these issues and demonstrates it has done so.

We assess the force's ability to treat its workforce fairly and respectfully below.

### Identifying and understanding the issues

In the months before our inspection, the SOJP launched new processes to help it understand which issues most affect its workforce's perceptions of fair and respectful treatment. Before this, it relied on surveys; the workforce participated in surveys twice in early 2018, once by the Jersey Police Association and once as part of the Government of Jersey-wide One Voice survey. Both surveys highlighted low staff morale and a range of factors contributing to this.

The One Voice survey, completed by 73 percent of the workforce, showed that the leadership needed to engage more with its employees. The survey's principal measure, the 'employee engagement score', was considerably lower among SOJP respondents than among the Government of Jersey's workforce as a whole. Less than a third of SOJP respondents felt valued for what they could offer the States of Jersey; less than half felt safe to speak out and question the way things are done in the force; and less than two-thirds felt treated with respect where they work. Compared with other organisations, these figures were lower than across the whole Government of Jersey, and far lower than among the UK public services.

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<sup>10</sup> [Fair cop 2: Organisational justice, behaviour and ethical policing](#), College of Policing, 2015, page 11.



It was notable also that less than a third of SOJP respondents to the One Voice survey felt the force was good at managing change. The Project Horizon team conducted some consultation with the wider workforce, appointed change champions and convened focus groups and workshops. However, due to tight time frames, the project was still mainly imposed from the top down.

The surveys were done before the current deputy chief officer was appointed. Since the results were published, the leadership has engaged more with the workforce. Chief inspectors conduct regular question-and-answer sessions with staff from each shift where people can air concerns. The deputy chief officer regularly visits departments and circulates a fortnightly newsletter that updates the workforce on developments. He also holds meetings with officers of inspector rank to get their feedback and that of their staff. Interviewees told us that staff morale is now better, and people feel included and able to raise concerns in the new organisational culture.

Following the surveys, the force has started to collect more information on issues that may affect staff perceptions of fairness and respect. It now holds exit interviews with staff who are leaving the force, and analyses a range of metrics, including sickness rates. However, we saw no analysis of workforce diversity, or of complaints and grievances.

### **Making improvements and demonstrating effectiveness**

Less than one-fifth of survey respondents believed that the force's senior management would act on the results of One Voice. However, the force's leadership has showed it is committed to doing so. After receiving the survey's feedback, the deputy chief officer created an action plan to address the findings. He chairs the One Voice Board. This board, which includes representatives from across the force, aims to address the issues the survey raised across four work streams.

The development of the One Voice Board, greater engagement with staff and the change in organisational structure are welcome developments. However, many interviewees are unaware of the One Voice Board or its activity.

#### **Area for improvement 9**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that it communicates more effectively with the workforce to inform them about action taken to address their concerns.

## Supporting workforce wellbeing

A happy and healthy workforce is likely to be a more productive one, as people take fewer sick days and feel more invested in what they do.<sup>11</sup> We assessed how well the SOJP promotes staff wellbeing, understands the needs of its workforce and acts to minimise the greatest risks.

### Understanding and valuing wellbeing

The SOJP's senior leadership team understands and values the importance of workforce wellbeing. Until recently, the force has not made wellbeing a priority to the same extent as forces in England and Wales. The current deputy chief officer has listed 'improving wellbeing' as one of his five key commitments.

But although it has made some progress, the force's leadership acknowledges that it has much more to do to develop structures to support staff wellbeing. The wellbeing strategy was still in the drafting stage at the time of the inspection, but a wellbeing governance structure was in place. The deputy chief officer chairs a wellbeing committee, comprising representatives from the police association, civil service employees and from across officer ranks. With a senior figure chairing the committee, it can act on wellbeing issues without having to escalate them. Members of the committee also include the force's welfare officer and wellbeing advisers who have been appointed in each of its departments.

The SOJP depends on the Government of Jersey for broader wellbeing and health and safety support. A wellbeing manager is responsible for the SOJP and follows the States of Jersey's wellbeing policy.

### Identifying the workforce's wellbeing needs

The SOJP could do more to proactively identify and understand the wellbeing needs of its workforce. We were pleased that the force is committed to assessing itself against the College of Policing's [Blue Light Wellbeing Framework](#). It has worked with MIND Jersey and other partner agencies to develop a version of this framework that is specific to Jersey. Completion was due shortly after our inspection ended. We welcome this development as it should give the force more insight into wellbeing issues that affect its staff.

In 2017, the force collected a wide range of management information linked to sickness levels and this formed part of the Force Management Statement (FMS) that it submitted to us. The most common injuries to members of the workforce were musculoskeletal and those resulting from handling prisoners. The data also

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<sup>11</sup> ['Wellbeing and engagement in policing: the key to unlocking discretionary effort?'](#), Ian Hesketh, Cary Cooper and Jonathan Ivy, *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 2016, pages 1–12.

contained long-term sickness rates and the number of rest days in lieu. The welfare officer uses this to understand the workforce's wellbeing needs.

However, much of the management information compiled for the FMS, including data on the most common injuries and rest days in lieu, is not collected regularly. As a result, the information that the welfare officer has used is out of date.

#### **Area for improvement 10**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that the force collects and regularly monitors a suite of management information to understand the workforce's wellbeing needs. This should include data about sickness levels and their causes, long-term sickness rates and the number of rest days in lieu.

Unlike most forces, the SOJP does not identify and monitor which officers accrue the most overtime or those who work their rest days in lieu. Conducting such analysis could help prevent wellbeing problems.

#### **Area for improvement 11**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure the force routinely monitors which officers accrue the most overtime, or those who work their rest days in lieu.

In the absence of data-driven analysis of wellbeing issues, the welfare committee engages directly with the workforce to understand wellbeing concerns. Through this, the force identified some processes that were affecting officer wellbeing.

#### **Taking preventative and early action to improve wellbeing**

The SOJP takes some preventative and early action to improve workforce wellbeing, although senior leaders are aware that the force could do more.

The force has put into practice some measures to prevent staff from suffering physical harm. They include flu jabs, body armour fitting sessions and yoga classes. It has also made the fitness test compulsory. It is disappointing, however, that the force has not developed a plan to prevent injuries occurring from prisoner handling or other musculoskeletal injuries, although these are the most common.

During spring and autumn 2018, the force arranged a series of lunchtime wellbeing sessions open to all staff. These covered issues including posture, holistic therapies and 'knowing your body'. They were well received and well attended, despite not being advertised widely and being held at times when it was difficult for frontline officers to attend. The force would benefit from recording any future sessions and putting them on the intranet for staff to watch at their convenience.

Staff can self-refer to support services, or managers can refer them. The workforce understands these processes and they work well. We found that most supervisors recognise their wellbeing responsibilities. We heard of examples where they had provided good support. But the level of wellbeing support from supervisors is inconsistent, which is not surprising as they have not been trained to provide such support for their staff.

### **Area for improvement 12**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that supervisors are trained to provide wellbeing support for their staff.

As well as training supervisors and managers on wellbeing, the force could do more to help them support their staff. Sergeants and inspectors do not have access to staff records, which the Government of Jersey's central HR hub maintains. This undermines the ability of inspectors to monitor sickness and manage staff wellbeing.

Despite the relative success of the wellbeing sessions, the force could do more to promote wellbeing. It has not provided wellbeing training for the workforce. Although a range of advice is available on the force's intranet, most interviewees told us they were unaware of it.

### **Recommendation 3**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that the workforce is provided with wellbeing training and guidance.

## **Occupational health**

The SOJP's occupational health support service is provided through a contract between the Government of Jersey and a UK-based private company. Aspects of this service are not working well and we were told that it often delays staff returning to work.

Those referred for occupational health must travel to the UK for triage. Initially, triage meetings were held within about two weeks of a request being made, but by the time of our inspection, this had increased to an average of two months. In some cases, officers remain on restricted duties for longer than they need to while waiting for their appointment. We were told that in one case a consultant told an officer they were fit to return to active duty, but the officer had to wait a further three months for an appointment with the occupational health provider to confirm this.

### **Area for improvement 13**

The Government of Jersey should ensure that the SOJP's workforce has access to timely support from occupational health support services.

The force lacks a robust return-to-work policy or processes to ensure supervisors agree a formal return-to-work programme with staff. It is left to the individual supervisor to arrange this rather than the welfare officer.

### **Area for improvement 14**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should develop a robust return-to-work policy and ensure supervisors agree a formal return-to-work programme with staff.

## **Mental health**

The force recognises the importance of mental health. It has some processes in place to help prevent mental ill health and provide mental health first aid, but as with other areas of wellbeing, it could do more.

The SOJP used to have its own mental health first aid capacity. It now uses psychologists that the Government of Jersey provides. At the time of the inspection, broader mental health provision was not fully operational. The Government of Jersey's 'talking services' is not yet up and running, and the counselling service, provided by a UK company, is not fully staffed. This limits the range of provision available and means that officers must wait to get help.

### **Area for improvement 15**

The Government of Jersey should ensure that the SOJP's workforce has access to timely mental health first aid.

We were pleased that the force has a critical incident stress management policy. Some supervisors have received stress management debrief training to enable them to support officers after a critical incident and spot the early signs of trauma. A senior officer oversees this debrief process and sets out any follow-up actions. We heard examples of this being used in a timely, effective way. However, supervisors use their judgement about who to debrief as they lack guidance about when the process should be used.

### **Area for improvement 16**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should produce clear guidance for supervisors and managers that outlines when they should conduct stress management debriefs with officers.

Staff in some high-risk posts, including firearms officers and those in the force's high-risk crime unit, undergo psychological screening. However, this has not been extended to other high-risk units, including the PPU. Officers in some roles are encouraged to have annual appointments with the welfare officer, but this is not mandatory as he is not independent of the police.

### **Area for improvement 17**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure all staff in high-risk posts, including those in the Public Protection Unit, undergo psychological screening and have mandatory annual appointments with the force welfare officer.

We also found less recognition of mental health wellbeing than physical health problems. We heard of examples where physical wellbeing issues were recognised, but psychological injuries were not. We are also aware that the force has not yet entirely got rid of the stigma surrounding mental ill health. We heard of officers who had refused referral to formal counselling or a psychologist as they did not want their managers to know. They feared it would affect the way they are treated at work. Such people are pointed towards private mental health services but not all staff can afford this.

## **Individual performance management**

[College of Policing research on organisational justice](#) suggests that the handling of promotion opportunities and failure to deal with poor performance may adversely affect workforce perceptions of fairness, which in turn may lead to negative attitudes and behaviours in the workplace. In addition, effective performance management and development mitigate risks to forces and ensure continuous improvement. We assessed how fairly and effectively the SOJP manages the individual performance of its officers and staff, including the extent to which the process aligns with the [College of Policing guidance](#).

## **The performance assessment process**

The SOJP's performance review assessment (PRA) process is ineffective. Supervisors and managers do not receive support to help them conduct fair assessments, and most officers and staff do not have regular performance conversations with their supervisors. There is no oversight to make sure that managers conduct performance assessments, or that improvements are identified and implemented.

SOJP policy is that PRAs should take place every year, but the reality is that few officers have a current assessment, and some have not received one in years.

The force uses two types of PRA. There is a comprehensive version for those seeking career development; the rest use an abbreviated version. This model does not adequately identify or tackle poor performance, nor does it help with career progression as there is no link to the force's promotion processes.

The consensus among interviewees of all ranks was that the process is not fit for purpose. Some described it as "a tick box exercise" or called it "going through the motions". This negative attitude affects perceptions of fairness among the workforce.

The One Voice survey revealed the scale of the problem. It showed that only 35 percent of respondents received regular feedback on their performance,<sup>12</sup> and only 41 percent thought that their performance was evaluated fairly.<sup>13</sup> Just 26 percent felt that their last performance review was valuable in helping them improve their performance.<sup>14</sup>

Another problem is the lack of an adequate computer system linking the SOJP and the Government of Jersey HR unit. Due to system problems, the Government of Jersey's HR business partner responsible for the SOJP cannot access the SOJP's PRA system. This poses a risk, as they are unable to see the PRAs of any individuals subject to performance review.

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<sup>12</sup> 12 percentage points lower than across the States of Jersey and 31 points lower than across the UK public sector.

<sup>13</sup> 10 percentage points lower than across the States of Jersey and 24 points lower than across the UK public sector.

<sup>14</sup> 11 percentage points lower than across the States of Jersey and 38 points lower than across the UK public sector.

#### **Recommendation 4**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should reform its performance assessment process so that it:

- evaluates performance fairly;
- adequately identifies and tackles poor performance;
- provides supervisors and managers with support to help them conduct fair assessments;
- ensures all officers and staff have regular performance conversations with their supervisors and receive annual performance assessments; and
- provides the Government of Jersey's HR business partner with access to SOJP's staff PRA records.



## Community policing

We assess the force's ability to provide community policing below.

### The context

The SOJP currently lacks an effective community policing capability. This limits its understanding of the risks and threats facing its communities, its effective engagement with the public, and the way it prevents crime and solves problems.

To explain these issues, it is important to understand the context in which this situation has arisen. From 2009 to 2018, the SOJP operated a community policing model, in which community officers conducted community engagement, with individual officers responsible for engaging with several parishes. This model was changed in response to a reduction in officer resources. In early 2018, community policing was disbanded and the force moved all its uniformed officers to response and a referred investigation unit (RIU), responsible for low-level investigations.

The force has recognised that its retreat from community policing created a gap. In late 2018, under Project Horizon, the force once again restructured uniformed policing into three teams: response, community support and community.

The force re-established the community policing team shortly before our inspection took place, seeking to reduce crime by solving community problems and crime prevention. However, at the time of our inspection the model was far from effective. There are several reasons for this.

First, the force lacks the requisite policies, plans and skills to drive activity in this area. Project Horizon was implemented at such a pace that it launched the community team before the force had any community policing plans or policies. It then created a new high-level community policing strategy, but without plans or policies to direct how it should operate.

Secondly, the force did not provide any training or guidance on community policing to the officers or supervisors within the new community team. The result is that community officers lack the skills they need to carry out their roles. The force has recruited a small number of experienced community officers from police forces in England to share their learning. This is a good initiative but does not fill the knowledge and skills gap.

The senior leadership team is aware of these problems and is committed to resolving them. But it is also aware that it will take months to put the required policies, planning and training in place.

The question, therefore, is what should happen in the meantime. When we first visited the force in November 2018, we found community support officers constantly conducting response policing while community officers were often abstracted to fill response, cover sickness and leave, and take courses. Community officers had little time to do community policing. When we revisited the force in January 2019, the situation had changed slightly for the better. The community support team was still invariably deployed on response, but community officers were able to spend some time on community policing.

We found that the community officers' work lacks focus and direction, and that the tasks they received from the force's intelligence unit were uncoordinated and often inappropriate. Community supervisors were unsure about what their officers should be, or were, doing. Coupled with the lack of training, policy and guidance, the unit was ineffective.

In a force with limited resources, this creates serious problems. Response officers' workloads have increased since the launch of Project Horizon and they now must conduct investigatory casework and provide first response. At the same time, a number of officers in the community policing team are not employed effectively because they are not equipped to carry out their assigned roles. This is not only inefficient, it has also caused resentment among response officers who feel the new operating model is placing a disproportionate burden on them.

#### **Recommendation 5**

With immediate effect and for a six-month period, the SOJP should revise its policing model to provide a small but dedicated community unit allowing community support to supplement the response section.

The rest of this chapter examines how the force understands its communities, engages with them and prevents crime. All of this should be viewed in the context of what we outline above. The force is seeking to improve these areas of activity but needs time and support to achieve this.

## Community engagement

Despite the force's problems with community policing, it does engage with the community. It has a good presence on social media and seeks to engage with a wide range of Jersey's population through online activity. The force has established a presence on a range of social media platforms used by different age groups. It has set up an LGBTQ Facebook page, which it updates regularly with stories from the force's main Facebook page, as well as promoting LGBTQ hate crime reporting and sharing stories about other Jersey LGBTQ issues and news. The force promotes this page on its other social media platforms. Few forces have accounts like this and we welcome it. The force's social media activity was recognised with a cross-Channel Islands customer service award and a national police Twitter award in 2017.

The force has also found other ways to communicate with minority communities. We were pleased to find that its website is trilingual and accessible to the Polish and Portuguese communities. The new community policing structure has made some officers responsible for reaching out to specific communities, such as disabled people, the elderly, religious groups and the Polish, Portuguese and LGBTQ communities. Other officers have been assigned to liaise with businesses. This is at an early stage, but the problems described above hamper this work.

The force has also started a community advisory group comprising 20 representatives from a range of backgrounds. This mainly acts as a forum for members to share their experiences, but the force aims to turn it into a more consultative forum to get views on its priorities and policies.

The force should do more to engage with rural parishes. Under the new community policing model, community officers are all based at police headquarters in St Helier. They have thematic rather than geographical responsibilities. Nobody has specific responsibility for engaging with parishes outside St Helier, and most community policing activity invariably takes place in the capital. The force formerly held parish meetings, but it discontinued them because few parishioners attended.

We found that the force's senior leaders want it to re-engage with these communities to better understand the issues that matter to them, help solve problems and obtain more information and intelligence. The Government of Jersey is establishing three community hubs: in the east and west and in St Helier. The force plans to assign a community officer to each one and hold engagement sessions. Plans are in the early stages and details are not yet confirmed. The force's leaders are also keen to have dedicated officers for each parish but feel the force cannot achieve this due to a lack of resources.

Jersey's unique policing structure may provide the SOJP with a way to improve links with the parishes. Alongside the SOJP, 12 other police forces operate in Jersey. Each parish has an Honorary Police force. Parishioners elect members and they serve on a voluntary, unpaid basis. Honorary constables outnumber the SOJP's

workforce and provide a range of informal policing services in their parishes. These include monitoring licensed premises, making firearms suitability assessments, checking welfare and property and undertaking community patrols and traffic management. They are integral in the policing of major events, supporting the SOJP's searches for missing persons, and a range of other activities.

Honorary constables are embedded in their communities and therefore are well placed to help the SOJP engage with people in outlying parishes. We are aware that the Honorary Police have a long history of independence and the SOJP cannot give them tasks to do. Their activities also fall outside our remit and the scope of our inspection. But we are also aware that regular meetings take place between senior officers of all forces, and that the Honorary Police and the SOJP are committed to making Jersey a safe place, preventing crime and protecting communities. We therefore believe the potential exists for closer work to improve the SOJP's engagement with parishes. This work would be especially beneficial in relation to improving:

- the SOJP's understanding of issues that concern parishioners and their priorities for policing;
- the SOJP's links to these communities, for example, by inviting the SOJP to community engagement events that the Honorary Police run; and
- intelligence flows to the SOJP. More sharing of information, joint work and better co-ordinated policing activity will make all forces more effective and efficient.

### **Recommendation 6**

By 31 December 2019, the SOJP and the Honorary Police should produce a service level agreement or memorandum of understanding that defines areas of activity where all police forces can work more together to further improve the safety of Jersey.

## **Crime prevention**

The SOJP needs to improve its approach to crime prevention. We found that the force lacks a clear strategy for crime prevention in line with the principles of the [Modern Crime Prevention Strategy](#).

The force does some crime prevention. The SOJP website provides a lot of crime prevention advice and links to other crime prevention resources. The force uses technological solutions to prevent and deter crime, such as town centre CCTV and ANPR. Our review of crime files found that officers provide crime prevention advice to victims in most cases. We are also aware of other initiatives, including a

recent domestic abuse campaign, a comprehensive rape prevention campaign and regular bike marking schemes.

There is little in the way of more sophisticated prevention activity, however. Meaningful crime prevention requires analysis of incidents, police intelligence and information from the community. We saw no evidence of environmental scanning, assessments of vulnerable locations or any intelligence collection plan.

The lack of engagement with communities, mentioned earlier, is one barrier to effective crime prevention. But it also requires an effective analytical capability, and the SOJP lacks this as it has only one trained analyst. Community engagement will only help the force respond to public concerns if it is accompanied by high-quality analysis.

### **Recommendation 7**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should increase its analyst cohort to provide the force with more analytical capacity.

Crime prevention is best achieved in a co-ordinated and joint approach. Forces in England and Wales use [problem-solving policing](#) to help them do this, and the College of Policing provides both toolkits for officers and training. We were told that problem-solving policing would be at the heart of the new community policing model, and the strategy that we read confirmed this. However, staff are unaware of problem-solving policing and have not received appropriate training.

### **Recommendation 8**

By 31 December 2019, the SOJP should develop policies, procedures and training to enable community officers to undertake problem-solving policing.

We found that many community officers deal with issues through tasking by the intelligence unit; this is not problem solving, it is merely responding to community issues. We saw no intelligence products as analytical capability is so limited. There is no sharing of best practice and what works. We came across some initiatives that have been established to help prevent crime. They include a taxi marshals scheme and a diversion initiative for the young, involving sports. This is all welcome, but these schemes remain the exception.

The SOJP has strong partnerships to deal with risks to vulnerable people (see below, 'Identifying and safeguarding vulnerable people'), which is one form of problem solving. But the force should extend that joint work to solve a wider range of problems and so reduce crime and anti-social behaviour.

**Recommendation 9**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should commence problem-solving policing to the standards set in the policies, procedures and training recommended in Recommendation 8.

## Investigating crime and reducing re-offending

When a crime occurs, the public must have confidence that the police will investigate it effectively, take seriously their concerns as victims, and bring offenders to justice. To be effective, investigations should be well planned and supervised, based on approved practice, and carried out by appropriately trained staff. In co-operation with other organisations, forces must also manage the risk posed by those who are identified as being the most prolific or dangerous offenders, to minimise the chances of continued harm to individuals and communities.

Overall, the SOJP investigates crimes effectively. We reviewed 24 police case files across crime types. They concerned larceny, rape, indecent exposure, common assault, breaking and entering of dwellings and grave and criminal assault. We randomly selected files from crimes recorded during 2018 and assessed them against several criteria. Due to the small sample of cases selected, we have not used the results from the file review as the sole basis to assess individual force performance but have used them alongside other evidence.

We assess the force's ability to investigate crime and reduce re-offending below.

### Investigating crime

#### Initial response

The initial investigative response is critical for an effective investigation. It is important that forces record evidence as soon as possible after a crime. The longer it takes for evidence recording to begin, the more likely it is that evidence will be destroyed, damaged or lost. Recording this evidence is usually the responsibility of the first officer who attends the scene. After the officer has completed this initial investigation, the case may be handed over to a different police officer or team in the force. This process must ensure that every crime is investigated by an officer with appropriate skills.

#### Control room response

The SOJP responds to incidents quickly. A graded response policy ensures that officers are sent expediently if they are needed. The force has not fully implemented THRIVE<sup>15</sup> assessments, however, and does not always take the vulnerability of victims into account in its deployment decisions. We explore this issue further in 'Identifying and safeguarding vulnerable people', below.

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<sup>15</sup> THRIVE is a structured assessment based on the levels of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim, rather than simply by the type of incident or crime being reported, in order to help staff determine the appropriate level of response to a call.

The force has a telephone investigation unit to handle incidents that do not require police officers to attend. This unit is working well and investigating the right types of cases.

### **Initial enquiries**

Our review of police case files found that the force generally investigated crimes well. However, the cases we audited dated from before Project Horizon was implemented, and the 'volume crimes' that we examined were investigated by the now-disbanded referred investigation unit (RIU) rather than by response officers.

The force put the new operating model into operation before response officers could receive investigation training. Most have had no recent training on conducting investigations and some have no investigation training at all. Officers from the force's priority crime team provide some informal mentoring, but this is not enough to ensure that response officers have the skills to carry out their role.

#### **Recommendation 10**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that response officers have received PIP 1 investigation training.

After the force conducts the initial investigations, either the response officer retains responsibility for subsequent investigations or the force allocates it to the specialist units, such as the serious crime unit (SCU) or the PPU. This depends on the risk and harm to the victim and the type of offence. Clear policies set out the criteria for allocating crimes to the SCU and PPU, and we were pleased to find that the most appropriate team consistently leads investigations.

The force should, however, improve the way response officers hand over cases to specialist units. The force has introduced a Quality First Investigation (QFI) checklist. Supervisors are meant to sign this off before they hand the case over to specialist investigators, but we found that this process is applied inconsistently and the QFI process is rarely followed in full. Primary investigation is not always completed prior to handover and no process seems to exist for flagging up remedial activity to address any gaps in initial investigations.

#### **Area for improvement 18**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that uniformed officers complete Quality First Investigation checklists and supervisors sign these off prior to handing over cases to specialist units.



## **Subsequent investigation**

The force's SCU has the skills and resources it needs to conduct its role. Investigators in the unit have training appropriate to the cases they handle. Many have several years' experience of work in this area and have the same level of accredited skills as their counterparts in England and Wales.

The SCU has enough investigators to manage regular demand. Its resourcing has recently been reduced by 50 percent, so only four investigators remain. We examined their workload and found it manageable, although there is little spare capacity to handle any rise in serious crime. The SOJP has bilateral arrangements with the Bailiwick of Guernsey Law Enforcement and with forces in England and Wales. These mean it can bring in extra specialists to help investigate the most serious and complex cases.

## **Supervision**

It is important that supervisors and managers provide direction for investigations. We found scant evidence that this is happening in the SOJP. Clear aims and objectives are not routinely set for investigations. Most of the cases we examined lacked investigation plans. Regular supervisory review of investigations is also important. The force's crime reviewing policy reflects this and stipulates that investigatory reviews must be conducted after seven, 14 and 21 days, but our audit and reality testing showed that this often didn't happen.

We found no structure for supervisory reviews, and we also found many cases in which reviews had not taken place or had taken place late. For example, in one rape case, the first recorded review took place two months after the crime was committed. The reviews we saw were very brief; only one met the standards we would expect from a supervisory review. Interviews with investigators, supervisors and managers confirmed that reviews often did not happen. They attributed this to a lack of supervisory training, especially among officers temporarily acting in supervisory ranks.

We acknowledge that the force's crime recording system does not lend itself to supervision of investigations or reviews. It is difficult to navigate and updates must be recorded in free text. It is, therefore, possible that some reviews were conducted but not recorded on the system. But this does not resolve the problem. It is crucial that reviews, investigatory actions and plans are recorded in a retrievable format.

## Recommendation 11

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should take appropriate action to ensure that investigations are directed and supervised effectively. This should include:

- training supervisors on how to plan, supervise, and review investigations;
- ensuring that sufficiently detailed investigation plans are produced for each investigation; and
- ensuring that investigations are reviewed in accordance with the force's policy.

## Supporting victims

The victim care that the SOJP provides is unstructured and needs to be improved. In England and Wales, forces must comply with the [Code of Practice for Victims of Crime](#). This sets out a list of victims' key entitlements.<sup>16</sup> The SOJP is under no obligation to adopt the Code but should clearly articulate the minimum standards of victim care that it expects its officers and staff to provide.

We found that the SOJP currently provides victim care ad hoc. The level and frequency of victim contact is arbitrary and differs from case to case. Among the cases we reviewed, victims only received written acknowledgement that they had reported a crime in three cases. Less than 50 percent of cases included an assessment of the needs of the victim. Only a minority of victims were provided with information about what to expect from the criminal justice system. Where officers did record victim contact, they did so very briefly and lacked sufficient detail.

Officers and staff are confused about their duty to maintain contact with victims. In some cases, the duty sergeant decides the frequency of contact. But some sergeants we interviewed thought this was the role of the officer in charge of the investigation. Some officers told us that they regularly contacted victims but were unaware they had to record details of such contact.

Other officers told us that they did not have time to 'chase victims' and that the force's Victim Care Unit was responsible for contacting victims. This is not the case. The unit is responsible only for ensuring that victims receive care after an offender is charged; it only sends a victim care letter once the victim has made a statement and is supporting a prosecution. The consequence of this misunderstanding is serious:

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<sup>16</sup> See Annex D.

many victims, including victims of domestic abuse, are not receiving the contact they need.

The force provides some elements of victim care regularly. In most of the cases we looked at, it referred victims to victim support and gave them the opportunity to make a Victim Personal Statement. This should take place in all cases.

### **Recommendation 12**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should set standards for victim care. These should be based on those in the Ministry of Justice's Code of Practice for Victims of Crime but amended for the SOJP's operational context.

### **Support to investigations**

The SOJP's criminal investigators receive good forensic support. Accredited crime scene investigators (CSIs) attend incidents promptly, update the crime file with findings and return results to investigating officers in a timely way. We also found that the CSIs discuss forensics strategy with investigators to agree the appropriate action to be taken in more serious crime investigations.

The force has an agreement with the South West Regional Organised Crime Unit, which can provide more CSI resources if required. The force also has a contract with a commercial provider that examines forensic samples. We found that such examinations are usually conducted within set timescales and the force conducts fingerprint checks consistently within the 24-hour deadline.

The SOJP and Bailiwick of Guernsey Law Enforcement operate a joint high-tech crime unit that conducts digital forensics examinations for both forces. The unit receives more than 700 submissions each year from the SOJP, many of which generate multiple evidential exhibits. Given its workload, the unit prioritises its work and has delays sometimes in completing low-risk work. To reduce the demand on this unit, the SOJP has bought cyber-kiosks. These allow officers to access and download material held on mobile digital devices without having to refer to the high-tech crime unit. The force has trained 32 officers to use the kiosks. However, as the download process can take many hours to complete, these officers find the additional demand on their time draws them away from their core roles. The burden would be eased if the force provided all officers with kiosk training.

### **Area for improvement 19**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that sufficient officers are trained to use the cyber-kiosks to access and download material held on mobile digital devices to meet operational demands.

## Reducing re-offending

The SOJP actively seeks to arrest suspects. Details of any wanted offenders are highlighted at the force's daily management meetings, officers are tasked with securing arrests and information on wanted persons is circulated on the force's briefing system.

Our audit showed that the force routinely makes arrests rapidly, conducting voluntary interviews instead of arrest when appropriate. The force also routinely checks with the ACRO Criminal Records Office to see whether any foreign nationals they detain in custody have overseas convictions.

The SOJP does not have an integrated offender management model (IOM) programme, which is an initiative used in England and Wales to reduce re-offending. In other forces, organisations have access to a database that allows agencies to exchange information and a joint agency group meets every month. All IOM cases are discussed at the meeting and a support plan is agreed, based on a range of factors such as re-offending, housing status, financial position and relationship problems. We saw elements of this in some of the force's partnership work, but not enough to constitute a proper programme.

### **Area for improvement 20**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should establish an integrated offender management programme.

# Disrupting, responding to and preventing organised crime

Serious and organised crime (SOC) is defined as serious crime planned, co-ordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain. Organised criminals working together for a criminal activity or activities are called an organised crime group (OCG).

Serious and organised crime poses a threat to the public. Individuals, communities and businesses feel its damaging effects. Police forces that are effective in this area not only prosecute offenders but also disrupt and prevent organised criminality at a local level.

We assess the force's ability to investigate serious and organised crime and reduce re-offending below.

## Understanding the threat

To tackle serious and organised crime effectively, the police must have a good understanding of the threat this type of crime poses to the public. Forces should be using a range of intelligence (including intelligence from other partner organisations) to understand crimes ranging from drug dealing and money laundering to more recently-understood threats such as cyber-crime and child sexual exploitation (CSE).

The SOJP lacks a comprehensive understanding of the threat that serious and organised crime poses to its communities. The force has produced a strategic threat assessment, based on intelligence reports and crime levels. However, it focuses on drug trafficking and lacks analysis of other SOC threats, such as modern slavery and CSE.

The force also lacks robust intelligence collection processes. This hinders its understanding of the SOC threat. The strategic assessment has informed the force's operational control strategy. It sets out six high-risk and high-harm policing themes requiring particular attention.<sup>17</sup> The control strategy highlighted that "organisational knowledge gaps ... [have] ...had a significant contributory bearing on the overall assessment, and intelligence gathering opportunities and priorities should be influenced by such gaps".<sup>18</sup> However, the force has not developed comprehensive intelligence requirements to identify intelligence gaps about SOC activity and OCGs.

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<sup>17</sup> Child protection, domestic abuse, internet enabled crime, misuse of drugs, organised crime groups and vulnerable adults.

<sup>18</sup> *Operational Control Strategy 2017–2018*, States of Jersey Police, 2017. Unpublished.

Nor does it have an intelligence collection plan to address these gaps. Intelligence collection plans exist for some issues, including modern slavery and the trafficking of sex workers, but not for all SOC threats.

The absence of a defined comprehensive SOC intelligence requirement and an intelligence collection plan limit the force's ability to gather SOC-related intelligence from officers across the force. Police forces that involve uniformed officers in the fight against organised crime, by telling them about the organised criminals in their area and giving them tasks designed to fill intelligence gaps, have more intelligence collection, more disruption opportunities and a greater long-term ability to spot the signs of potential organised crime at an early stage.<sup>19</sup> The SOJP's uniformed officers told us that they are keen to be involved in this type of work but had received no information about local OCGs. Nor did the force tell them specifically what information to collect to fill intelligence gaps. We found that this problem is not confined to SOC activity. We came across little evidence that the process to task officers is genuinely intelligence led.

The SOJP could also do more to gather SOC-related intelligence from other public-sector agencies and tackle this type of criminality in collaboration with them. Again, developing and circulating an articulated SOC intelligence requirement to agencies would be key to this. While the force shares intelligence and information with the States of Jersey Customs and Immigration Service, France's *Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects*, French police and the States of Jersey Fisheries and Marine Resources, the force needs to increase its understanding of how other public-sector agencies' information can provide a valuable insight into organised crime activity. Alongside other Government of Jersey departments, the force should also consider developing a local serious and organised crime profile and a multi-agency serious and organised crime partnership board. SOC profiles are mandatory in England and Wales. They are designed to identify the threat, vulnerability and risk from SOC within a local area, and help police and local partners form a multi-agency action plan to reduce its impact.

The force is committed to increasing its understanding of the threats that newer types of organised crime pose, but it still has more to do. It has created working groups to scope the threat of modern slavery and child sexual exploitation in Jersey and has an intelligence collection plan for modern slavery and trafficking sex workers. However, it has not yet produced any intelligence-based analytical products, such as problem profiles, network analyses or market analyses for these issues, or for other emerging threats, such as human trafficking or forced labour. The force's intelligence unit does not have enough staff or relevant intelligence reports to conduct such analyses for all threat areas.

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<sup>19</sup> [PEEL: Police effectiveness 2016: A national overview](#), HMICFRS, 2016, page 97.

Forces in England and Wales are required to map organised crime groups in accordance with national guidance. By mapping OCGs and by scoring them against a range of indices, they develop a more detailed picture of serious and organised criminality. We were pleased to find that although the SOJP is not obliged to do this, it has mapped 11 OCGs in conjunction with the Southern Wales Region Organised Crime Unit. As the force lacks a comprehensive understanding of the SOC threat, all its mapped OCGs are involved in drug supply. We also found that the force does not re-score its OCGs and does not archive those that are no longer active. These actions, obligatory in England and Wales, represent good practice.

### **Recommendation 13**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should adopt the elements of the National Intelligence Model and Serious Organised Crime Strategy, which promote intelligence collection plans, intelligence-led tasking, organised crime group mapping, comprehensive strategic threat and risk assessments, and sharing information with partner agencies and uniformed police officers.

## **Responding to serious and organised crime**

We encourage forces in England and Wales to tackle SOC through a '4P' approach: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. Many forces develop SOC control strategies using the 4P framework. These set out the activity they will undertake in each area to address their SOC threats; they develop specific 4P plans for each mapped OCG. The SOJP has not done this. It does not follow a 4P approach, and instead seeks mainly to address SOC by pursuing, arresting and charging criminals. The force would benefit from adopting a 4P approach to tackling serious organised crime.

### **Area for improvement 21**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should develop a 4P approach to tackling serious and organised crime.

The force's proactive team is responsible for conducting SOC investigations, and it has recorded some successes. During 2017, the force seized a record amount of drugs. At the time of the inspection, 11 of the 22 identified OCG members had been convicted or were awaiting trial. However, we also came across several issues that could limit the team's effectiveness.

Until recently, the proactive team was part of SCU. However, since the launch of Project Horizon, it has been under the management of a chief inspector from the community team. This has created problems in terms of reviewing ongoing SOC investigations as reviews are no longer conducted above detective sergeant level. The team's tasking process should be improved. The team receives a variety of tasks at the force's daily management meeting instead of appropriate work based on thorough intelligence.

The force's surveillance capability is limited. In 2018, the surveillance team was deployed for 17 weeks, which placed a significant demand on other resources.

The SOJP has a basic appreciation of the extent to which it is disrupting OCGs and reducing harm. It monitors performance metrics, including the number of drug and cash seizures, but it lacks processes to measure the level of disruption it has caused OCGs.

Regarding financial crime investigations, the SOJP operates to City of London Police standards, and investigators are trained and dedicated to their roles. Intelligence packages focus on complex, third-party money laundering crimes; this was identified as an area for improvement in the Moneyval report of 2016. The financial crime unit assesses over 3,500 suspicious activity reports (SARs) each year that financial institutions provide; these are the basis of its investigations.

## **Preventing serious and organised crime**

In order to effectively tackle serious and organised crime, police forces need to be able to stop people from being drawn into it. Many of them may be vulnerable people, already involved in gang and youth violence. It should also be using a range of approaches and powers to prevent known criminals from continuing to cause harm. We expect the force's approach to prevention to be a significant element of its overall strategy to tackle the harm that SOC causes communities.

The SOJP could focus more closely on preventing or deterring SOC. The force is aware of OCG members and troubled families, but we found it was conducting little activity apart from liaising with schools to prevent younger siblings and partners of criminals from being drawn into organised crime. The force has not done enough work to identify other people at risk. As the force does not brief patrol officers on OCGs, it has missed a chance to engage with high-risk individuals and families and divert them from crime.



The force also lacks the tools that forces in England and Wales use to monitor convicted OCG members and prevent them from re-offending. In England and Wales, the Serious Crime Act 2007 introduced orders. Through these, courts can impose extra restrictions on serious offenders to help manage the risk of them offending again. These include Serious Crime Prevention Orders and civil orders to prevent or deter serious crime. These can impose far-reaching restrictions on the convicted person's ability to:

- use communications devices, such as mobile phones;
- conduct specific types of business bank accounts;
- engage with criminal associates; and
- visit certain locations.

No such legislation exists in Jersey. The SOJP, along with the Government of Jersey's Home Affairs Department, should consider introducing similar orders.

#### **Area for improvement 22**

The SOJP's senior leadership team and the Government of Jersey Home Affairs Department should conduct an evaluation to establish whether Serious Crime Prevention Orders and civil orders to prevent or deter serious crime would help prevent serious and organised crime.

## Identifying and safeguarding vulnerable people

Protecting the public, particularly those who are most vulnerable, is one of the most important duties placed on police forces. People can be vulnerable for many reasons and the extent of their vulnerability can change during the time they are in contact with the police.

We assess the force's ability to identify and safeguard vulnerable people below.

### Identifying vulnerable people

Forces need to work with a range of communities, including those whose voices may not often be heard. It is important that forces understand fully what it means to be vulnerable, what might make someone vulnerable, and that officers and staff who come into contact with the public can recognise this vulnerability. This means that forces can identify vulnerable people early on and provide them with an appropriate service.

### Understanding the risk

The States of Jersey Police could do more to understand the nature and scale of vulnerability. It lacks access to the information it needs to fully understand the prevalence of different types of vulnerability in its communities. It receives a range of data on domestic abuse from women's refuges and other partner agencies, but this is not the case for other types of vulnerability.

The force has produced problem profiles for child sexual exploitation and domestic abuse. These should be analytical assessments, using intelligence and information to understand a crime type or emerging crimes better. Bringing together data and intelligence in a problem profile can help forces identify possible victims, intelligence gaps and prevention or reassurance opportunities. The SOJP's problem profiles are largely statistical packages. They lack intelligence collection plans, which might improve the force's understanding of the scale of these offences.

### Identifying those who are vulnerable

Forces define vulnerability in different ways. The SOJP has adopted the [College of Policing's definition of vulnerability](#). This states that:

"A person is vulnerable if, as a result of their situation or circumstances, they are unable to take care of or protect themselves or others from harm or exploitation."

At the time of the inspection, officers had not received training on this definition. As a result, it was not widely known. The force plans to resolve this. Later in 2019, all uniformed officers will receive the College of Policing's vulnerability training package, which includes the definition of vulnerability.

### **Assessing levels of risk and need**

The force has introduced the THRIVE assessment model to help call handlers risk-assess incidents. This enables them to make a structured assessment of incoming calls and determine the level of response. We found that call handlers conduct THRIVE assessments for calls they receive on the non-emergency line. These are recorded on the force's command and control system and help the call handlers decide whether the caller requires an emergency, prompt or scheduled response, or does not need attendance.

However, the force does not conduct such THRIVE assessments for 999 emergency calls. Interviewees told us that dynamic risk assessments are made for these calls, but we found no records of such assessments on the command and control system. Our audit of call logs also identified some emergency calls that had been graded as needing a prompt response but which should have received an emergency response because of the vulnerability of those involved. Officers arrived at these calls well within the force's one-hour target time for prompt response incidents, so the incorrect grading did not result in harm.

The force is trying to manage demand by attending prompt response calls more slowly than the current average of 18 minutes. To mitigate the risk this could pose, the force should thoroughly assess all calls for vulnerability. It must also ensure that such assessments are recorded on the command and control system and used in the grading of all calls.

#### **Recommendation 14**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure:

- all calls for service are subject to a thorough assessment of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim; and
- such assessments inform incident grading and are recorded on the command and control system.

The force's IT systems support effective and consistent processes to identify repeat callers and victims. They readily identify all previous incidents associated with an address. They also search, and easily identify, repeat incidents by the name of either the victim or the caller.

## Initial response to vulnerable victims

Officers' initial response to a vulnerable person is vital. This could be the first time that a victim has contacted the police, or they may have had repeated contact with the police. Either way, the initial response to a vulnerable victim must inspire confidence that their concerns are being taken seriously and provide practical support to keep the victim safe.

The officer should also assess the risk to the victim at that moment, and to others in the same household, and collect enough information to support the longer-term response of the force and other partner organisations.

### Risk assessments

Officers and staff largely understand their responsibility to protect people from harm. When they attend incidents, they are required to complete an initial risk assessment for all vulnerable victims. The SOJP has developed a domestic abuse risk assessment and an aide memoire form. It is based on the DASH form that UK police forces use to help frontline officers identify high-risk cases of domestic abuse, stalking, harassment and so-called honour-based violence. We found this document comprehensive. It includes a witness list, blank statement forms, officer observations, injury identifier and a list of useful relevant contacts as well as the SafeLives risk identification checklist (RIC). The force also uses the child protection notice (CPN) and adult protection notice (APN) risk assessment templates. We found these fit for purpose.

A 2017 internal review highlighted that RICs were not completed in about 50 percent of all standard-risk domestic incidents.<sup>20</sup> The force has worked to improve this. It has reminded supervisors of their duty to ensure that response officers complete RICs and it monitors compliance through the force's performance board.

### Recommendation 15

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that response officers conduct thorough risk assessments for all incidents involving vulnerable victims.

Officers told us that they receive good support in completing their assessments. They can contact supervisors for advice if they have queries. In early 2018, they also received training from partner agencies on why they must record certain information.

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<sup>20</sup> *Submission from the States of Jersey Police 'Force Management Statement Appendix 4: Protecting Vulnerable People Q1 – 15', 2017, section 1.*

Despite these efforts, at the time of the inspection the force was not completing RICs in 20 percent of standard domestic abuse incidents. The quality of the initial CPNs, APNs and RICs that response officers carry out was also inconsistent. We also found that officers do not always conduct risk assessments for other vulnerable people within the primary victim's household. The force needs to ensure that uniform sergeants rigorously supervise incidents involving vulnerable victims to ensure thorough risk assessments have been completed.

The force's review processes are designed to mitigate some of the risk posed by poor initial assessments and initial supervision. The PPU reviews all new domestic abuse cases daily. In medium and high-risk domestic abuse cases, PPU supervisors review the RICs. The Independent Domestic Violence Advocate (IDVA) service reviews high-risk assessments. PPU supervisors, Children's Services and Adult Services review all CPNs and APNs, when applicable.

### **Immediate safeguarding**

The force's immediate safeguarding actions are effective. Officers understand their safeguarding responsibilities to victims of domestic abuse and other vulnerable people. Officers take positive action<sup>21</sup> when attending domestic abuse incidents to help and protect victims and any others present, including children. Our crime file review showed that officers routinely safeguard domestic abuse victims by arresting and removing offenders when they have the opportunity. We also came across good examples of officers using other safeguarding options to help domestic abuse victims.

Oversight of initial safeguarding actions is good. Sergeants attend all medium and high-risk domestic abuse cases and direct safeguarding activity. The PPU reviews all immediate safeguarding actions and agrees any further actions that are required. All domestic abuse cases are reviewed at a daily morning meeting to ensure that initial safeguarding is in place and suitable follow-up actions have been identified and assigned.

The SOJP uses body-worn video cameras to record injuries to victims and the behaviour of perpetrators, when appropriate. The force's policy on body-worn video guides officers on when the cameras should be used. However, we found that some officers were unaware of this guidance.

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<sup>21</sup> The first priority of the police is to make people safe. At domestic abuse incidents it is particularly important that officers take positive action to make the victim and any children safe. This may mean arresting a person suspected of an offence, where the power to arrest exists, or taking other positive steps to ensure safety, such as organising refuge accommodation or organising the fitting of a panic alarm.

## **Domestic violence prevention orders and notices**

Since 2010, police officers in England and Wales have had additional powers to protect victims of domestic abuse.

A domestic violence prevention order (DVPO) enables the police and courts to act immediately following a domestic abuse incident. Where there is insufficient evidence to charge a perpetrator and provide protection to a victim via bail conditions, a DVPO may be used instead. This can prevent the perpetrator from returning to a residence and from having contact with the victim for up to 28 days, allowing the victim time to consider the options and get the support needed.

A domestic violence protection notice (DVPN) is a notice issued by the police to provide emergency protection to an individual believed to be the victim of domestic violence. This notice contains prohibitions that effectively bar the suspected perpetrator from returning to the victim's home or otherwise contacting the victim.

DVPOs and DVPNs provide similar powers to emergency banning orders, which are used in many European jurisdictions and recommended by the Council of Europe. However, there is no equivalent in Jersey law. Because of this, the SOJP and the courts are unable to provide victims of domestic violence in Jersey with the level of protection provided to victims of domestic violence elsewhere.

### **Recommendation 16**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should conduct an evaluation of reported domestic violence incidents in Jersey. Based on this data, the most appropriate agency should conduct an evaluation to establish whether DVPOs and DVPNs, if they had been available, would have provided valuable additional protection to victims. If the evaluation shows that they would, the Government of Jersey should consider pursuing changes to legislation to enable their introduction as soon as possible thereafter.

## **Investigating offences involving vulnerable victims and working with partners to keep victims safe**

Vulnerable people often have complex and multiple needs that a police response alone cannot always meet. They may need support with housing, access to mental health services or support from social services. However, the police still have a duty to keep victims safe and investigate crimes. These can be serious and complex, such as rape or violent offences. Their victims may appear reluctant to support the work of the police. Often this is because perpetrators are controlling victims, such as victims of domestic abuse or of child sexual exploitation.

The SOJP takes effective action and works well with its partner organisations to keep vulnerable victims safe. It investigates and responds well to crimes committed against vulnerable people.

### **Investigation of crimes involving vulnerable people**

The force's crime allocation processes are appropriate. It allocates offences to the correct units, depending on the risk and complexity involved. The PPU is allocated cases concerning vulnerable victims and high-risk crimes involving sexual offences. PPU officers have received the training they need to handle these investigations. All PPU officers are trained in achieving best evidence (ABE)<sup>22</sup> and have taken the Specialist Child Abuse Investigator Development Programme. They are Tier 2<sup>23</sup> trained and received training on the new Sexual Offences Act before it became law. We were also pleased to find that PPU detectives receive regular continuous professional development (CPD) sessions.

The PPU also conducts effective investigations. When we reviewed a small number of PPU case files, we found that in each of them all lines of enquiry were followed. The standard of investigations was high and focused on the victims' needs. However, as with investigations conducted by uniformed officers and SCU, the supervision of PPU cases was inconsistent. Investigation plans were present in most investigations' electronic case files we reviewed, but some files lacked evidence of such plans or of objectives. Similarly, while some case files contain evidence of regular, albeit unscheduled, supervisory reviews, others lack any reviews of the direction of the investigation. One officer told us: "I have to chase supervisors to support me in my investigations."

Although we did not identify any shortcomings among the PPU investigations we reviewed, we are aware that the unit is not fully staffed; it has 11 officer posts but not all of them are filled. One PPU detective constable is on secondment to a project. Two are abstracted from daily PPU work to run investigations into historic abuse. Although PPU workloads were manageable at the time of the inspection, our interviewees expressed concern that upcoming court preparations for long-term investigations, and the introduction of the new Sexual Offences Act, could add to demand.

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<sup>22</sup> The visually recorded statement of young victims and witnesses with the police is usually described as the ABE DVD. It is usually played as their evidence-in-chief at trial.

<sup>23</sup> Specialist Child Abuse Investigator Development Programme is a developmental route led by the College of Policing that supports achievement of competence. Tier 2 is a level of interview expertise that means that an officer is competent to conduct interviews in serious and complex cases (PIP level 2).

## Working with partners

The SOJP works well with a number of partner organisations to protect vulnerable people. These include children's services, education, housing, social security, home care and health. Third-sector partner agencies, including the NSPCC, Jersey Action Against Rape, women's refuges and MIND also have close links with the police.

These partner agencies told us that the force does its best to safeguard vulnerable people through partnership work. They talk with officers at all levels and find the force understanding, knowledgeable and insightful. They feel comfortable raising issues with SOJP and told us that the force responds well and takes corrective action. For example, following discussions with its partner agencies, the force adopted a focus on child welfare, rather than on law enforcement alone.

Safeguarding vulnerable people by providing safe and effective care is important in preventing harm and abuse to adults and children. We found that the Jersey Safeguarding Partnership Board works well. We found evidence that the multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACS) and a multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) were well established.

The SOJP contributes well to the Jersey Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (JMARAC).<sup>24</sup> Two inspectors regularly attend to discuss cases. Nineteen of the highest-risk domestic abuse cases in Jersey in 2018 were brought to the JMARAC for review. All the force's partner agencies were informed about the cases for discussion in advance, and they considered ongoing safeguarding in each case. This applied even when the victim could be considered safe: for example, when the perpetrator had left the island.

The force works closely with its partner agencies in the Jersey MASH.<sup>25</sup> The PPU has a close working relationship with the MASH. A PPU sergeant is based in the MASH and a review of referrals by the MASH generates much of the PPU's work. All the partner agencies in the MASH see child protection as a priority and work together and share information to ensure safeguarding is effective. Unlike some safeguarding hubs in England and Wales, the Jersey MASH only handles referrals about children. If a case involves children and adults, two referrals are made, and they follow different paths.

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<sup>24</sup> MARACs (multi-agency risk assessment conferences) are local meetings at which information about high-risk domestic abuse victims (those at risk of murder or serious harm) is shared between local agencies.

<sup>25</sup> A MASH (multi-agency safeguarding hub) co-locates principal safeguarding agencies to better identify risks to children and improve decision making, interventions, and outcomes. A MASH enables the multi-agency team to share all appropriate information in a secure environment and ensures that the most appropriate response is provided to effectively safeguard and protect the individual.



The SOJP has good working relationships with its partner agencies in the Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC). This provides victims of sexual offences with a range of services, including conducting forensic examinations and retaining this evidence for two years. This means forensic evidence can be handed to the police if the victim chooses to report the offence later. As well as forensic examinations, the SARC also carries out risk assessments, provides support to victims and makes direct referrals to other support services.

The SOJP has been instrumental in establishing an IDVA service in Jersey. IDVAs handle the safety of domestic abuse victims at risk of harm from partners and family. They regularly review the risk assessments that officers attending medium and high-risk domestic abuse incidents have made. They refer appropriate cases to the MARAC. For each high-risk case, the IDVAs develop a joint risk management and safety plan with the police and partner agencies. They also attend the SOJP's daily domestic abuse meetings. Here, they jointly review incidents and discuss a joint safety plan for all medium-risk cases.

Jersey's IDVA service lacks the capacity to handle the number of domestic abuse incidents. At the time of the inspection, it comprised 2.5 advocates, one funded by the SOJP, one by Health and Social Services and 0.5 from Build a Safer Society (BaSS) funding. They handled 462 referrals in 2018. This compares with national good practice guidelines of a maximum of 100 referrals per worker per year.

Between 2016 and 2018, the number of reported medium and high-risk domestic abuse incidents increased by 134 percent. If this upward trend continues, and if the capacity of the IDVA service does not increase, the IDVAs will not be able to review medium-risk cases. This would limit the PPU's ability to investigate domestic abuse cases.

### **Recommendation 17**

By 1 May 2020, the Government of Jersey should increase the number of IDVAs to ensure advocates' workloads are comparable to UK good practice guidelines.

### **Missing people**

Once the SOJP's control room receives a call reporting a missing person, it undertakes robust, consistent risk assessments. These are reviewed and updated in many cases, but we came across some cases in which the updated risk assessments had not been recorded on the command and control system. Similarly, there are cases where the force acted (such as looking for the person in a particular location, or contacting transport companies), but did not record it. The force should ensure that missing person entries on the police incident logging system contain an accurate record of decisions, tasking and activity, which clearly indicates when all these occurred.

### **Area for improvement 23**

The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that missing person entries on the police incident logging system contain an accurate record of decisions, tasking and activity, which clearly indicates when all these occurred.

The force's investigations of missing children are thorough and well supervised, with a strong focus on assessing and managing risks. Continuing cases are scrutinised at the divisional daily management meetings. The force conducts effective, continuous reviews of missing persons investigations. Where such reviews identify an increased risk to the individual, the force intensifies its efforts to locate and protect the person.

Interviewees from the PPU and response showed a good understanding of what to do in response to missing children reports. Officers routinely conduct safe and well checks when missing children are found, and if they have concerns about the safety of the child, they complete a CPN. The force shares this with other agencies via the MASH. The force also receives details of independent 'return to home' interviews conducted by Youth Services and are involved in multi-agency meetings and planning in respect of children who go missing more than three times.

The force has processes to identify cases of child sexual exploitation. It takes part in MASE (multi-agency sexual exploitation) meetings with its partner agencies and recognises tackling CSE as a priority. We also found that officers have a good understanding of the links between missing children and child sexual exploitation.

### **Mental health**

The SOJP has a good understanding of its role in supporting people with mental health problems and of the demand that such cases create. The senior leadership team is aware of the shortcomings of the current multi-agency response to people with mental health problems. It is actively working with partner agencies to improve the provision for these people.

The force flags mental health incidents on its command and control system. Staff can therefore identify repeat victims who have mental health conditions. However, unlike many forces in England and Wales, the force does not have mental health professionals in its control room to help identify other people with mental health problems. In a 2018 report on policing and mental health in England and Wales, we highlighted the benefits that forces derive from having mental health professionals in control rooms. The report stated:

"Their expertise can be invaluable in identifying mental health problems and finding solutions for people in crisis. Immediate access to health records

and data to find out patient history means forces can identify the right help more quickly.”<sup>26</sup>

We were pleased to find that the SOJP is working with its partner agencies to secure a similar arrangement in Jersey.

All the frontline officers we spoke to understood that their role includes helping to safeguard people with mental health problems. But many have not received recent mental health awareness training. The force should do more to improve workforce skills in this area. Several forces in England and Wales have developed handbooks, checklists or cards to help officers understand the range of mental health conditions they might encounter. The SOJP should consider giving its officers similar guidance, as well as updated training.

### **Recommendation 18**

By 1 May 2020, the SOJP’s senior management team should ensure that all frontline officers receive updated training and clear guidance to help them safeguard people with mental health problems.

The arrangements to safeguard those in a mental health crisis in Jersey are not fit for purpose. The [Mental Health \(Jersey\) Law 2016](#) describes how police officers should deal with persons with mental ill health found in public places:

“(1) Paragraph (2) applies where a police officer finds, in any place other than a private dwelling, a person who appears to the police officer –

(a) to be suffering from mental disorder; and

(b) to be in immediate need of care or control.

(2) Where this paragraph applies, and the police officer thinks it necessary to do so in the interests of that person or for the protection of other persons, the police officer may remove the person to a place of safety.”<sup>27</sup>

In England and Wales, [section 136A of the Mental Health Act 1983](#) (as revised) gives officers similar powers to remove people to a place of safety. However, the [Mental Health Act 1983: Code of Practice](#) states that in England a police station should only be used as a place of safety “in exceptional circumstances” (paragraph 16.38). While no similar codes of practice operate in Jersey, we believe detention in police custody is not an appropriate solution for people suspected of experiencing a mental health crisis. These people are ill, not criminals. Placing them in police

<sup>26</sup> [Policing and Mental Health: Picking up the Pieces](#), HMICFRS, 2018, page 27.

<sup>27</sup> Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, section 36 (1 and 2).

custody also adds to the demand on police forces, drawing them away from other activity.

Unlike England and Wales, Jersey has no designated places of safety aside from the SOJP police station. Therefore, officers' only option is to detain those suspected of experiencing a mental health crisis in police custody, so they can get them the support they need. In 2018 alone, the SOJP detained 46 people in police custody who were experiencing a mental health crisis.

We are aware that leaders of the SOJP have long called for the creation of appropriate places of safety. Interviewees told us that a multi-agency working group has recently been convened to resolve this situation. We welcome this important development.

In England and Wales, most police forces have mental health triage schemes to help provide people in crisis with the right support and reduce the number of such people taken into police custody. These schemes involve police officers contacting mental health nurses, who then assess the needs of the person suspected of experiencing a mental health crisis. In some schemes, nurses conduct face-to-face assessments at the scene of the incident. In others, it is done by phone. In 2018, Jersey Health and Social Services and the SOJP piloted a mental health triage for six months. A lack of funding meant that the pilot was discontinued before it could be formally evaluated. During the inspection, we were told of plans to revive the scheme. Given the success of similar schemes in England and Wales, we would welcome this development.

To evaluate the quality of services that forces provide to people with mental health problems, forces should seek feedback from those who have received them. Once the SOJP and its partner agencies have put into practice the changes outlined above, they should consider using such feedback to evaluate the triage scheme and other aspects of their services.

#### **Area for improvement 24**

Once the Government of Jersey has created an appropriate place of safety for people in mental health crisis and has established a mental health triage service, the SOJP's senior leadership team should seek feedback from service users to evaluate the triage scheme and other aspects of their services.

## **Annex A: Terms of reference**

We were commissioned by the Jersey Police Authority (JPA) to conduct an inspection of the States of Jersey Police (SOJP) in the autumn of 2018.

The agreed terms of reference were very broad in scope and were a series of broad headings of areas to be covered by the inspection, with a few subheadings. They were as follows:

### **1. Leadership**

Structure, effectiveness

### **2. Strategic direction/objectives**

Policing plan, strategic objectives, governance (internally and externally), accountability

### **3. Performance**

Governance, effectiveness, performance framework, accountability, managing demand

### **4. Resourcing**

Establishment, workforce strategy, workforce mix, retention, recruitment

### **5. Policing model**

Fit for 2018 and beyond, delivering for the community, integrated, cost effective

### **6. Collaboration**

Assessment of current collaborative work/units, future opportunities

### **7. Vulnerability**

Management of risk/public protection (child and adult), missing from home, mental health

### **8. Partnerships**

Effectiveness, management of risk, outcomes

## Annex B: Areas for improvement

1. The SOJP's senior leadership team should extend the scope of its review of demand to include the serious crime and public protection units, to ensure it is making most effective use of all its policing resources.
2. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that its analysis of current and future demand uses all available sources of information including data from partner organisations.
3. The SOJP's senior leadership and the Government of Jersey should ensure the force's business support functions are fit for purpose, with clear specifications for required support, with robust monitoring and evaluation in place to maintain an effective level of HR, finance and ICT services to meet the police's needs.
4. The SOJP's senior leadership team should develop its workforce plans to fully identify its future workforce capabilities and improve analysis of future demand. This will ensure that the force can develop medium-term plans that are aligned effectively and efficiently to future demand.
5. The SOJP's senior leadership team should communicate the force's policing priorities across its workforce.
6. The SOJP's senior leadership team should establish a performance management structure that assesses performance against the policing priorities and activities set out in its policing plan.
7. The SOJP's senior leadership team should amend the force's annual performance review and promotion processes so that they record evidence of ethical decision making.
8. The SOJP's senior leadership team should consider establishing a network of ethics champions, representing each department, who would meet to share learning.
9. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that it communicates more effectively with the workforce to inform them about action taken to address their concerns.
10. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that the force collects and regularly monitors a suite of management information to understand the workforce's wellbeing needs. This should include data about sickness levels and their causes, long-term sickness rates and the number of rest days in lieu.

11. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure the force routinely monitors which officers accrue the most overtime, or those who work their rest days in lieu.
12. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that supervisors are trained to provide wellbeing support for their staff.
13. The Government of Jersey should ensure that the SOJP's workforce has access to timely support from occupational health support services.
14. The SOJP's senior leadership team should develop a robust return-to-work policy and ensure supervisors agree a formal return-to-work programme with staff.
15. The Government of Jersey should ensure that the SOJP's workforce has access to timely mental health first aid.
16. The SOJP's senior leadership team should produce clear guidance for supervisors and managers that outlines when they should conduct stress management debriefs with officers.
17. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure all staff in high-risk posts, including those in the Public Protection Unit, undergo psychological screening and have mandatory annual appointments with the force welfare officer.
18. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that uniformed officers complete Quality First Investigation checklists and supervisors sign these off prior to handing over cases to specialist units.
19. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that sufficient officers are trained to use the cyber-kiosks to access and download material held on mobile digital devices in order to meet operational demands.
20. The SOJP's senior leadership team should establish an integrated offender management programme.
21. The SOJP's senior leadership team should develop a 4P approach to tackling serious and organised crime.
22. The SOJP's senior leadership team and the Government of Jersey Home Affairs Department should carry out an evaluation to establish whether Serious Crime Prevention Orders and civil orders to prevent or deter serious crime would help prevent serious and organised crime.
23. The SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that missing person entries on the police incident logging system contain an accurate record of decisions, tasking and activity, which clearly indicates when all these occurred.

24. Once the Government of Jersey has created an appropriate place of safety for people in mental health crisis and has established a mental health triage service, the SOJP's senior leadership team should seek feedback from service users to evaluate the triage scheme and other aspects of their services.



## Annex C: Recommendations

1. In order to enable proper accountability, oversight and governance, by 1 May 2020, the Government of Jersey should ensure that the annual revenue allocation to policing should be clearly and separately identified in the medium-term financial plan, and financial planning and decision making should include appropriate input from both the chief officer of the States of Jersey Police as the accountable officer and the police authority.
2. By 1 May 2020, the Minister for Justice and Home Affairs, in consultation with the Director General Justice and Home Affairs, the Jersey Police Authority and the Chief Officer of Police should design, publish, and subsequently operate in accordance with, a document that clarifies each party's responsibilities for (as a minimum):
  - objective and priority setting;
  - strategic governance and oversight;
  - operational direction and control;
  - independence; and
  - provision of performance information for governance purposes.
3. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that the workforce is provided with wellbeing training and guidance.
4. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should reform its performance assessment process so that it:
  - evaluates performance fairly;
  - adequately identifies and tackles poor performance;
  - provides supervisors and managers with support to help them conduct fair assessments;
  - ensures all officers and staff have regular performance conversations with their supervisors and receive annual performance assessments; and
  - provides the Government of Jersey's HR business partner with access to SOJP's staff PRA records.
5. With immediate effect and for a six-month period, the SOJP should revise its policing model to provide a small but dedicated community unit allowing community support to supplement the response section.

6. By 31 December 2019, the SOJP and the Honorary Police should produce a service level agreement or memorandum of understanding that defines areas of activity where all police forces can work together more, to further improve the safety of Jersey.
7. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should increase its analyst cohort to provide the force with more analytical capacity.
8. By 1 December 2019, the SOJP should develop policies, procedures and training to enable community officers to undertake problem solving policing.
9. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should commence problem solving policing to the standards set in the policies, procedures and training recommended in Recommendation 8.
10. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that response officers have received PIP 1 investigation training.
11. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should take appropriate action to ensure that investigations are directed and supervised effectively. This should include:
  - training supervisors on how to plan, supervise, and review investigations;
  - ensuring that sufficiently detailed investigation plans are produced for each investigation; and
  - ensuring that investigations are reviewed in accordance with the force's policy.
12. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should set standards for victim care. These should be based on those in the Ministry of Justice's Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, but amended for the SOJP's operational context.
13. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should adopt the elements of the National Intelligence Model and Serious Organised Crime Strategy, which promote intelligence collection plans, intelligence-led tasking, organised crime group mapping, comprehensive strategic threat and risk assessments, and sharing information with partner agencies and uniformed police officers.
14. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure:
  - all calls for service are subject to a thorough assessment of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim; and
  - such assessments inform incident grading and are recorded on the command and control system.

15. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior leadership team should ensure that response officers conduct thorough risk assessments for all incidents involving vulnerable victims.
16. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP should carry out an evaluation of reported domestic violence incidents in Jersey. Based on this data, the most appropriate agency should conduct an evaluation to establish whether DVPOs and DVPNs, if they had been available, would have provided valuable additional protection to victims. If the evaluation shows that they would, the Government of Jersey should consider pursuing changes to legislation to enable their introduction as soon as possible thereafter.
17. By 1 May 2020, the Government of Jersey should increase the number of IDVAs to ensure advocates' workloads are comparable to UK good practice guidelines.
18. By 1 May 2020, the SOJP's senior management team should ensure that all frontline officers receive updated training and clear guidance to help them safeguard people with mental health problems.

## **Annex D: Victims' key entitlements under *The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime***

- A written acknowledgement that you have reported a crime, including the basic details of the offence;
- An enhanced service if you are a victim of serious crime, a persistently targeted victim or a vulnerable or intimidated victim;
- A needs assessment to help work out what support you need;
- Information on what to expect from the criminal justice system;
- Be referred to organisations supporting victims of crime;
- Be informed about the police investigation, such as if a suspect is arrested and charged and any bail conditions imposed;
- Make a Victim Personal Statement (VPS) to explain how the crime affected you;
- Read your VPS aloud or have it read aloud on your behalf, subject to the views of the court, if a defendant is found guilty;
- Be informed if the suspect is to be prosecuted or not, or given an out-of-court disposal;
- Seek a review of the police or CPS's decision not to prosecute in accordance with the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and CPS Victims' Right to Review schemes;
- Be informed of the time, date and location and outcome of any court hearings;
- Be informed if you need to give evidence in court, what to expect and discuss what help and support you might need with the Witness Care Unit;
- Arrange a court familiarisation visit and enter the court through a different entrance from the suspect and sit in a separate waiting area where possible;
- Meet the CPS advocate and ask him or her questions about the court process, where circumstances permit;
- Be informed of any appeal against the offender's conviction or sentence;
- Opt into the Victim Contact Scheme (VCS) if the offender is sentenced to 12 months or more for a specified violent or sexual offence;

- If you opt in to the VCS to:
  - make a VPS for consideration by the Parole Board if the offender is considered for release or transfer and apply to the Parole Board to read it out at the hearing;
  - make representations about the conditions attached to the offender's licence on release and be informed about any licence conditions relating to you;
- Apply for compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme;
- Receive information about Restorative Justice and how you can take part;
- Make a complaint if you do not receive the information and services you are entitled to, and to receive a full response from the relevant service provider.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> [Code of Practice for Victims of Crime](#), Ministry of Justice, 2015, page i.