

# **STATES OF JERSEY POLICE**



## **ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 2007**

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## INTRODUCTION BY THE CHIEF OFFICER

It is a pleasure to report that, in 2007, recorded crime in Jersey fell for the third year in succession and dropped below 5,000 offences in a year for the first time since the mid-Nineteen-Eighties. The risk of becoming a victim of crime in Jersey has been reducing for years and reduced further in 2007. What this means in terms of real day-to-day experience for Islanders is that, for example, 524 fewer people or businesses became victims of crime in Jersey in 2007 compared to just three years ago.

It is particularly pleasing to see that the people of Jersey are also sensing this improvement. Comparison of the results from the Jersey Annual Social Survey (J.A.S.S.) in 2007 against those from 2005 show marked improvements in public's perceptions of the extent of the Island's crime problems. Compared to 2005, more people are reporting that their neighbourhoods are very safe, more people feel safe in town at night and fewer people consider key crime types to be a major problem in Jersey. Very few people in Jersey worry about becoming a victim of crime as they go about their daily lives.

Both the recorded crime figures and public opinion provide strong evidence that crime in Jersey is reducing. This report analyses what is driving this change and considers opportunities for further improvement. At the same time, we cannot afford to be complacent and must recognise and respond to the challenges that might otherwise undo this success. Looking back to my Annual Report in 2004, I suggested then that the Force was nearing the limits of its capacity with the resources and powers at its disposal. At the time I posed the following question –

*'If we are to achieve significant and lasting changes, rather than simple fluctuations around the current norm, then we need to ask whether this is likely to be achieved with more of the same.'*

Three years on and I am proud of the achievements of our police officers and civilian staff who have actually delivered more with less. The current results are indicative of significant improvement not just fluctuations around the norm. The Force still has fewer Police officers than it did 12 years ago and its overall staff complement per head of population is now 13% less than you would normally expect to see in Forces across England and Wales. And yet, compared to three years ago, Jersey has experienced significant reductions in burglary and vehicle crime, increasing penetration of the drugs networks supplying illegal drugs to the Island and a large increase in the number of child abuse cases brought to justice. This improved performance means the public are getting a better service and we are achieving even better value for money.

These successes have not been achieved *'with more of the same'* but rather through significant internal changes to the way in which we use our resources. As part of the continuous drive to improve, we have moved staff resources to strengthen teams such as our Intelligence Bureau and Public Protection Unit (which focuses on domestic abuse and child protection) and created a Proactive Investigation Team. These changes are reaping their rewards in driving down crime and bringing offenders to justice.

The challenge for the future is to ensure that these achievements are consolidated as the *'lasting change'* to which we aspired in 2004, whilst also seeking out the keys to significant improvement in other areas of community safety. We are aware that change has not been delivered across all areas of policing. In that respect, the results of the Jersey Annual Social Survey 2007 regarding anti-social behaviour and alcohol-related disorder suggest public concern that previously-accepted conventions of respect and responsibility to others in public places are under increasing threat. Nearly half of JASS respondents worry about being verbally abused or threatened in the street.

Herein lays the dilemma for the Force. The issues that now dominate public concerns require a policing response that is based around putting large numbers of officers into the community – the public want the reassurance of seeing officers on the beat. Whilst we share that aspiration,

we are also acutely aware that, according to all of the available evidence, 'bobbies on the beat' are the least effective means of tackling crime issues such as burglary, vehicle theft, drug importation and supply, child abuse or international financial crime. If we divert resources away from such areas, the achievements of the last few years may be lost. Making optimum use of the existing front line response units is therefore important but the reality is that these Police officers cannot be everywhere at once and difficult choices have to be made.

Over the past two years, we have changed our working arrangements so that we can now match the supply of patrol resources to peaks in demand better than ever before. Unfortunately, most of that effort has had to be focussed into the policing of the St Helier night time economy at the expense of daytime patrol cover. We are conscious that that these changes have caused some unease at the perceived lack of foot patrols during the day. The counter argument is that the added Police presence on the streets at night has led to a significant increase in public perceptions of safety in town after dark. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, even with a 50% increase in the number of officers deployed, the majority of people still think that town is unsafe after dark and the Police are not doing enough.

I hope that even this brief overview provides an insight into the challenges we face. At the same time, we are potentially vulnerable to the onset of unforeseen demands such as major enquiries or operations, or reductions in the number of officers available for front-line duty due to abstractions or staff turnover. The initiation of a major child abuse enquiry during 2007 provides a case in point. An enquiry on this scale requires a major investigative effort way beyond the normal staffing levels of our Public Protection Unit, who are not resourced for this purpose. That means officers have to be transferred from other areas of the Force, which then suffer a reduction in capacity. Simultaneously, the Force is dealing with the resource demands of a major and complex international drugs trafficking case involving close cooperation with European and British Police Forces. In the meantime, the Jersey public's appetite for the policing of other issues such as road safety and anti-social behaviour, or simply the reassurance of a visible police presence, remains unabated. The Police are invariably the agency of last resort and there is an abiding expectation that we should provide the desired response.

These competing demands on Police time and resources highlight the fundamental importance of a corporate response across government to the social problems that give rise to expectations for the Police to act. The Police deal at the sharp end with late night street violence and disorder in St Helier, but have no remit to tackle the insufficiency of late night transport, inadequate licensing laws or binge drinking culture amongst young adults. It is Police officers who are called by residents who are at their wits end with young teenagers drinking, being foul-mouthed and causing trouble in their neighbourhoods, but the Police have neither the remit nor resources to provide facilities to attract bored youngsters into other pursuits or support families struggling to deal with behavioural issues in the home. Until coherent, joined-up strategies are in place to deal with these and other issues, the States of Jersey Police will work hard to contain the problems they cause but will not have the capacity to deliver the lasting and significant improvement currently being achieved in other areas of policing.

Whilst some readers of our Annual Report are simply seeking the headline figures on crime, disorder and road safety, others prefer a more detailed analysis. For their benefit, I have attached, as appendices, more detailed studies by our Head of Planning that are intended to provide an interesting insight into two of the current issues that rank highly in public interest; street violence and speed enforcement.

Thank you for your interest in the 2007 Annual Report and I trust that we can count on your continuing support in making Jersey safer.



**Graham Power**  
Chief Officer

# KEY PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

What does successful policing look like? The 2007 Policing Plan identified *key performance outcomes* against which our performance could be judged.

INDICATOR	COMMENT
Low levels of crime relative to comparable locations	<b>Achieved.</b> 52 crimes were committed per 1,000 population in Jersey in 2007. This is nearly half the current rate in England and Wales.
High overall detection rate	<b>Achieved.</b> The overall detection rate for 2007 was 40%.
High sanction detection rate	<b>Achieved.</b> The sanction detection rate for 2007 was 28%.
High levels of public confidence in the Police	<b>Achieved.</b> 82% of people who felt able to express an opinion in JASS 2007 thought States of Jersey Police do a good job of policing the Island.
High public perceptions of neighbourhood safety	<b>Achieved.</b> 89% of people in Jersey believe that their local neighbourhood is a safe place to live (JASS 2007).
High levels of satisfaction with the quality of service provided to victims of crime	<b>Achieved.</b> Over 95% of crime victims were at least satisfied with Police call handling and service at crime scenes whilst 87% were at least satisfied with feedback on progress of their investigation.
Significant disruption to illegal drugs supply in Jersey	<b>Achieved.</b> 21 key targets involved in supplying commercial quantities of drugs into Jersey were arrested and charged in 2007.
High public perceptions of safety in St Helier at night	<b>Improving.</b> There has been a statistically significant improvement in public perceptions of personal safety in the town centre after dark.
High % of public are satisfied that Police do a good job in tackling violent crime	<b>Achieved.</b> 77% of people who expressed an opinion in JASS 2007 said the Police were doing a good job of tackling violent crime in Jersey.
High % of public are satisfied that the Police do a good job in tackling drugs	<b>Achieved.</b> 80% of people who expressed an opinion in JASS 2007 said the Police were doing a good job of tackling the supply of illegal drugs in Jersey.
High % of public are satisfied that the Police do a good job in tackling burglary	<b>Achieved.</b> 65% of people who expressed an opinion in JASS 2007 said the Police were doing a good job of tackling burglary. Nearly 40% 'didn't know'. In fact, offender targeting has driven burglary down by 17% compared to the average for 2001-05.
Low levels of RTCs resulting in serious or fatal injury	<b>Achieved.</b> There were 26 serious or fatal injury road traffic collisions (RTCs) in Jersey during 2007, down 33% on the 3-year average.
A reputation for high quality financial crime investigation	<i>IMF inspection deferred to 2008.</i>
Police security arrangements at Jersey ports maintained to recognised standards	<b>Achieved.</b> Security levels maintained to appropriate standards. No security threats materialised.
Resilient and effective response can be delivered in the event of major incidents/emergencies	<b>Achieved.</b> No major incidents. Major incident procedures reviewed and training delivered.
Planned services are delivered within the agreed budget	<b>Achieved.</b> Policing of Jersey was delivered on budget in 2007.
Sickness is effectively managed	<b>Achieved.</b> Police sickness rates are 16% below the average for 2004-06.
Performance and development of staff is effectively managed	<b>Achieved.</b> Improvements to performance review and appraisal systems implemented.

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. This report provides a detailed breakdown of offences recorded by the States of Jersey Police during 2007 and sets out the progress made over the course of the year towards delivering the programme of initiatives prescribed by the 2007 Policing Plan.
2. Policing performance in any one year is best understood in the context of what has gone before, the environment in which the Force is operating and the operational objectives it has set in its Policing Plan for the year in question. Each of the relevant sections in this report therefore includes background information on the issue that draws on the 2007 Policing Plan. Full details of our Policing Plan for 2008 are published on the Police website at [www.jersey.police.uk](http://www.jersey.police.uk)
3. Where possible, key performance indicators are measured against a three-year average from 2004 to 2006. We also include a comparison against 2006 alone but do so with a significant caveat. There is a natural tendency to look to the figure for the previous year and draw assumptions. If the number of crimes committed this year are down compared to the number recorded last year, things are looking up. If this year's figures aren't as good, then crime must be getting worse. Comparisons of this sort are based, however, upon the implicit assumption that the previous year was somehow 'normal'. Having regard to a longer time period, sometimes put an isolated year in context.
4. Looking at the headline figures in the context of a more detailed month-to-month breakdown can give an even greater insight. In key areas of interest, therefore, we have included graphs depicting patterns of crime from January 2004 through to December 2007. These graphs provide a much better understanding of crime trends in Jersey than any single percentage headline.
5. The recording practices used to record crime and detection rates in Jersey are based on those prescribed by the Home Office for Police Forces in England and Wales and have been subject to independent review by Her Majesty's Inspectorate.
6. States of Jersey Police run a Quality of Service programme that involves contacting nearly all individual victims of crime by post to seek their views on the quality of service they have received from the Force. The surveys focus on individuals and not businesses and young victims of crime under the age of 18 or victims of sensitive crimes such as domestic violence or sex offences are not surveyed. Broader public opinion is canvassed through bi-annual participation in the Jersey Annual Social Survey. This survey is administered by the independent Jersey Statistics Unit, which collates, inputs and analyses all the results. Where appropriate, similar questions are asked to the British Crime Survey to allow some benchmarking comparisons to be made.
7. Calculations per head of population are based on the most recent population estimate published by the Jersey Statistics Unit. At the time of writing, the population estimate was 89,300.

# CRIME IN JERSEY 2007


## Context

The overall level of recorded crime is traditionally regarded as the basic measure of policing performance in protecting community safety. In recent years, the Island has seen falling crime rates, with crime reducing by nearly 7% in 2005 and a further 4% in 2006. This performance should be seen in context of two important demographic changes -

- The Island's population has grown by nearly 2,000 in the last five years. All things being equal, this should have placed upward pressure on the total volume of crime committed.
- The population of 14-17 year olds was set to increase by 14% over the last five years. Young offenders commit a significant proportion of the Island's crime. In 2007 37% of all recorded offences was committed by those aged under 18 years. This compares to 35% for 2006. Any increase in the Island's youth population has clear implications for underlying crime trends.

Figure 1 provides a month by month overview of total crime in Jersey between January 2004 and December 2007. The grey dotted line shows monthly crime rates to the end of 2006 and, thereafter, the blue line shows crime by month throughout 2007. The maroon line shows the monthly average for 2004 – 2006. Based on the level of overall crime experienced over the previous three years, we could predict with 80% certainty that there would be 367 to 513 crimes per month in Jersey during 2007. This expected range is depicted by the white band in Figure 1. Where monthly crime rates fall outside of this range into the upper and lower bands, it is indicative of higher or lower levels of criminal activity than might normally be expected.

**Figure 1: Overall Recorded Crime in Jersey, January 2004 – December 2007**



Our aim in 2007 was to keep the crime rate below or consistently close to the lower limit of this expected range. In graphical terms, we hoped to ensure that Figure 1 would show long or deep troughs in 2007 and that any peaks would be short and sharp, reflecting successful intervention bringing outbreaks of criminal activity to a close. A crime rate that remained consistently above or close to the upper limit of the range (ie; the top of the white band) would suggest significant levels of criminal activity that were proving difficult to contain.

## Results in 2007

The key points to note are –

- 4,658 crimes were recorded by States of Jersey Police during 2007. This means that overall recorded crime in Jersey fell by 11.60% during 2007 against the three-year average for 2004-06 and by 7.03% compared to 2006.
- This is the third consecutive year in which overall recorded crime in Jersey has fallen and the first time that overall crime has fallen below 5,000 using the current National Crime Recording Standard that was introduced in April 2002.
- Monthly crime rates in Jersey were at or below the bottom end of the anticipated range for seven months in 2007 and exceeded the monthly average for 2004-06 for just three months.
- Decreasing crime levels are being sustained despite a growing population. In 2007, 52 crimes were committed per 1,000 population compared to 64 per 1,000 population in 2004.
- Decreasing crime levels are being sustained despite the increase in the youth population. In 2004, 34% of offenders were aged under-18. Since that time the proportion of individual offenders who are aged under-18 has stabilised at about 24% (see page 12). In amongst this offender population, there are some individuals who commit numerous offences. In 2007, youths were responsible for 31% of all detected crime in Jersey.
- In England and Wales in 2006/07, over 27% of all crimes recorded by the Police were burglaries, vehicle crimes or robberies.<sup>1</sup> In Jersey, these offences accounted for just over 16% of all recorded crime in 2007.
- Crime levels tend to correspond to factors such as housing density, land use and the social make-up and use of an area. 65% of all recorded crime in Jersey occurred in St Helier in 2007. Outside of the town, seven of the other 11 parishes recorded an average of less than two crimes per week over the course of the year. This pattern remains consistent from one year to the next in Jersey.
- The overall detection rate for 2007 was 40%, compared to an average detection rate for the 43 Police Forces in England and Wales of 27% in 2006/07.<sup>2</sup> This overall detection rate includes all offences cleared up by the Police but not necessarily resulting in a criminal prosecution.<sup>3</sup> The 'sanction detection rate' refers to the number of recorded crimes for which an alleged offender is charged or reported to a Parish Hall Enquiry. In 2007, the sanction detection rate in Jersey was 28% compared to an average sanction detection rate in England and Wales of 26%.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin Crime In England and Wales 2006/07, July 2007

<sup>2</sup> Detection rate for England and Wales sourced from Home Office Statistical Bulletin Crime In England and Wales 2006/07. Home Office Forces work to a financial year from April to March compared to the calendar year applied in Jersey. The detection rate includes crimes committed in 2007 or previous years that were detected in 2007. Significant changes to the calculation of detection rates have been introduced in England and Wales with effect from April 2007 and will be applied in Jersey with effect from January 2008. The new rules will disregard some administrative detections (see note 3 below) and will have the effect of reducing the overall detection rate.

<sup>3</sup> Administrative detections can apply if an offender, victim or essential witness dies or is too ill, a victim refuses or is unable to give evidence, the offender is under the age of criminal responsibility, or a decision is taken that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding.

<sup>4</sup> Home Office Statistical Bulletin Crime In England and Wales 2006/07, July 2007

## Public Perceptions of Crime and Community Safety in Jersey 2005-07

States of Jersey Police believe that it is important to know whether trends identified through crime data are matched by people's experience in their daily lives. For this reason, we regularly participate in the independent Jersey Annual Social Survey (JASS) to seek public opinion on crime and community safety issues. Comparison of results from JASS 2005 and 2007 find that -

- 89% of people in Jersey believe that their local neighbourhood is a safe place to live. Whilst this overall figure is consistent with 2005, there has been a significant increase in the number of people who believe that their neighbourhood is 'very safe'. Decreasing crime levels are matched by an intensifying sense of safety in neighbourhoods. Almost half of all adults in Jersey now perceive their neighbourhood to be 'very safe'.
- There has been a significant improvement in the public's perception of the severity of Jersey's crime problems since 2005. Figures 2 shows how, across every offending category listed in JASS, from drug dealing through to petty theft and shoplifting, fewer people are identifying the issue as a major problem in Jersey.<sup>5</sup>
- This comparison is reinforced by findings within the 2007 survey. Three-quarters of people in Jersey are not worried about becoming victims of burglary, violent crime or vandalism and less than one in five worry about their vehicle being stolen. The majority of people are no more worried about these crimes than they were two years ago.
- Only 4% of people in Jersey are "very worried" about becoming the victim of burglary compared with 13% of people in England and Wales. The actual offence rates are 2.3 domestic burglaries per 1,000 population in Jersey compared to an average of 5.5 across England and Wales. Just 5% of Jersey people are "very worried" about becoming a victim of violent crime in the Island compared to 17% of people living in England and Wales.

**Figure 2:**  
Perceptions of Crime  
in Jersey 2005-07

	<i>How big a problem is this in Jersey?</i>								Not worried about becoming a victim of this crime in 2007	No more worried about becoming a victim of this crime than 2 years ago
	Major problem 2007	Major problem 2005	Minor problem 2007	Minor problem 2005	Not a problem 2007	Not a problem 2005	Don't know 2007	Don't know 2005		
People dealing in drugs	66%	73%	22%	20%	3%	2%	10%	6%	N/A	N/A
Anti-social behaviour	56%	63%	38%	34%	3%	2%	3%	1%	N/A	N/A
Street violence and disorder	39%	41%	48%	50%	6%	4%	7%	5%	N/A	N/A
Speeding motorists	33%	38%	51%	50%	12%	9%	4%	3%	N/A	N/A
Drink driving	24%	32%	59%	57%	7%	6%	9%	4%	N/A	N/A
Vandalism and graffiti	22%	32%	56%	53%	13%	9%	8%	6%	74%	65%
Domestic violence	21%	23%	42%	49%	6%	4%	32%	24%	N/A	N/A
Theft of, or from vehicles	10%	18%	54%	59%	17%	13%	18%	11%	84%	77%
Burglary	12%	17%	64%	66%	12%	9%	12%	7%	75%	64%
Petty theft and shoplifting	11%	17%	57%	60%	11%	8%	21%	15%	N/A	N/A
Money laundering/major financial crime	14%	15%	39%	38%	13%	16%	33%	30%	N/A	N/A

<sup>5</sup> A change of at least six percentage points may be regarded as significant. In this respect, some of the reductions are not statistically significant, although it is interesting to note that they tend to occur in areas where the general public would not necessarily be aware of changing offending rates such as domestic violence and money laundering. It should also be noted that the reduction in the proportion of people perceiving issues to be a major problem is sometimes driven by an increase in people who didn't know if an issue was a problem or not. There is a strong argument to suggest that if people don't know about a problem, it cannot be a significant problem. This argument was tested by checking to see whether the people who 'didn't know' if an issue was a major problem in Jersey still listed it as a policing priority for their neighbourhood. For example, less than 2% of people who didn't know the extent to which burglary was a problem in Jersey, considered it to be a policing priority in their neighbourhood. A similar pattern was found across all offence categories.

# PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

*'The power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour; and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.'* (Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Policing, 1829)

Successful policing is not only about catching criminals and reducing crime. It is just as important that people are confident that they can turn to the Police for assistance in times of need. Again, we use the independent Jersey Annual Social Survey to monitor overall public opinion about the policing of Jersey as a whole and whether they are confident that they would receive a good service from the Police if they needed help.

In JASS 2007, 82% of people who felt able to rate the overall policing of the Island thought it was "good" or "very good". This is consistent with the results from JASS 2005 when 83% considered that States of Jersey Police did a "good" or "very good" job of policing Jersey.<sup>6</sup>

71% of the JASS respondents were confident that they would receive a good service if they needed Police assistance. The difference with the Force's overall performance rating is accounted for by the inclusion in the confidence rating of respondents who said they didn't know what level of service to expect. Of those who expressed an opinion, 79% were confident in the Police.

In other jurisdictions, it is common to hear reports of tensions between the Police and minority groups. It is therefore reassuring to note that 94% of Jersey residents who were born in Portugal or Madeira were confident that they would receive a good service if they needed assistance from the States of Jersey Police.

## Quality of Service

JASS 2007 also highlighted how personal experience, or that of family and friends, of contact with the Police was a major influence on people's opinion of the Force. The survey found that 60% of people who held strong opinions about States of Jersey Police reported that personal experience was a major influence, whereas the media was only a major influence for around a third of these people. Research for the UK Government has indicated that the key drivers of satisfaction with policing are the quality of treatment by staff, the timeliness of an appropriate response and the provision of information.

Figure 3: Quality of Service 2005-06			
Indicator	Year	% of victims at least satisfied	% who were very or totally satisfied
Satisfaction with the handling of call for assistance by Police operators	2006	96%	74%
	2007	97%	73%
Satisfaction with the service from attending officers	2006	95%	78%
	2007	96%	80%
Satisfaction with feedback on the progress of the investigation	2006	84%	61%
	2007	87%	65%

Three principal qualitative indicators are used to monitor our performance. The results, taken from a quality of service survey sent to over 2,400 victims of crime during 2007 are shown in Figure 3.<sup>7</sup> The first relates to the caller's perception of the service provided by the Police Control

<sup>6</sup> In the 2006/07 British Crime Survey, 51% of respondents in England and Wales thought their local Force was doing a "good" or "excellent" job. It should be noted that the BCS finding is based on respondents who answered "excellent", "good", "fair", "poor" or "very poor" whereas in JASS 2007 the comparable options were "very good", "good", "poor" or "very poor"

<sup>7</sup> 2007 Police quality of service postal surveys achieved a response rate of about 21%. The number of responses completed for each question may vary. In 2007, 358 respondents expressed an opinion on their telephone contact with Police HQ, 452 expressed an opinion on the service received from attending officers and 415 expressed an opinion on feedback concerning the investigation of their crime

Room operator who dealt with their call and arranged the response to their incident. Crime victims are also asked for their opinion on the service provided by the officers who attended at the scene and whether they were happy with the feedback they subsequently received on the progress of the investigation. Where a survey respondent expresses concern about the service they have received, a supervisor is assigned to follow up the issue.

90% of crime victims in Jersey believe that the Police do at least a fairly good overall job of policing the Island, with 72% saying that the Police are doing a good or very good job.<sup>8</sup>

### Complaints against the Police

Where a member of the public expresses disappointment with the service provided, a senior officer is appointed to try to put things right. Sometimes a member of the public will wish to make a formal complaint. The Jersey Police Complaints Authority is an independent organisation set up by the States of Jersey under the Police (Complaints and Discipline) (Jersey) Law, 1999. Its members are appointed by the States for a period of 3 years and their services are purely voluntary. The role of the Authority is to oversee, monitor and supervise the investigation by the States of Jersey Police of complaints made by members of the public against States and Honorary police officers. The Authority’s responsibilities are to ensure that the investigations that it supervises are carried out in an impartial, thorough and meticulous manner. No complaint investigation can be concluded until it has been formally signed off and approved by the Authority. Any complaint alleging criminal conduct by a police officer is independently reviewed by Her Majesty’s Attorney General.

Article 29(4) of the Police (Complaints and Discipline) (Jersey) Law 1999 provides that as soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year, the Authority shall prepare a report upon the discharge of its functions during that year and submit it to the Minister for Home Affairs; and the Minister shall present the report to the States. Full details of the handling of Police complaints are published in the Authority’s report.

Complaints against the Police only paint half the picture. In 2007, the Force received 73 letters of appreciation from members of the public along with many other e-mails, phone calls and messages of support.

### Use of Police Powers

Society affords police officers considerable powers to stop, arrest and detain members of the public and, where necessary, use weapons or force in the course of their duties. Maintaining public confidence means ensuring and demonstrating that those powers are used properly and with integrity.

#### i. Police Procedures and Criminal Evidence (Jersey) Law 2003

Under the Police Procedures and Criminal Evidence (Jersey) Law 2003 (PPACE) the Police are required to publish the information in Figure 4 on the number of stop and search checks, intimate searches and vehicle checks carried out by States and Honorary Officers.

#### ii. CS Spray

Since 2002, our officers have carried CS spray and incidents where they use this equipment are closely monitored. In 2007, CS spray was drawn by 19 officers in 15 different incidents and was actually used on 10 occasions. In two of these

Figure 4: Exercise of PPACE Powers		
	States Police	Honorary Police
Article 9 Stop and Search Checks	924	1
Article 51 Intimate Searches	5	Not applicable
Article 13 Vehicle Checks	0	Not applicable

<sup>8</sup> Based on the responses of 476 victims of crime in 2007. Another 24 respondents replied ‘don’t know’ or didn’t answer the question

incidents, the officers were dealing with a person wielding a weapon. Since its introduction, officers have had to resort to using their CS spray about 13 times a year in Jersey.

### iii. Firearms

States of Jersey Police has maintained a formally established firearms team since 1972. The team is made up of ordinary officers who can be called away from their normal duties if they are needed. These officers are trained in line with UK police guidelines and face rigorous continual assessment. In 2007, authorisation was given to issue firearms to trained officers on 20 occasions, six of which were for the protection of public and police officers in response to spontaneous incidents. Another 11 were pre-planned operations such as drugs warrants where there were grounds to believe that the wanted person was in possession of weapons. The remaining three operations were for the protection of special visitors to the Island who were assessed as being at risk.

### iv. Custody


A key policing function is to provide facilities for the reception, processing and adequate care of prisoners in Police custody.

2,996 people were arrested and placed in Police custody in 2007. Many were under the influence of alcohol or drugs and violent or threatening, whilst others were identified as being at risk of harming themselves. There were no deaths in custody in 2007. Another 476 persons over and above the number arrested and detained were also held in Police custody during 2007; a drop of 25% on the number in 2006. These figures include, for example, prisoners attending from court for rest periods, persons brought from the prison for interview and persons detained on behalf of Immigration or Customs. The Police Custody suite is also used as a temporary place of safety for mental health patients. A further 1,245 people also attended the Police Custody suite on a voluntary basis to assist the Police with their enquiries.

Certain demographic information can be monitored from our custody and crime records which enables the Force to build offender profiles for the Island. The following are therefore attached for information and interest

The following graphs are based on individual offenders (eg; any individual is only listed once regardless of how many times they have been arrested, or how many crimes they have committed.)


**Figure 5: Arrests by Place of Birth in Jersey 2004 – 2007**



States of Jersey Police strongly advise against drawing any superficial conclusions from this place of birth data. Place of birth does not necessarily reflect residential status in that country. It should also be noted that these figures cannot be set against the overall demographic profile of the Island in any meaningful way. A large proportion of the Jersey-

born population comprises age groups not typically associated with offending behaviour (see Figure 6). Seasonal and transient worker groups tend to fall within a much narrower age band and so comparisons on the overall population figures are not made on a like-for like basis.

**Figure 6: Offenders by Age 2004-07**



Year	Proportion of offenders by age range													
	10-13	14-17	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-33	34-37	38-41	42-45	46-49	50-53	54-57	58-61	62+
2002	8%	17%	17%	17%	10%	9%	8%	5%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%
2003	7%	20%	17%	14%	10%	8%	7%	6%	4%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%
2004	10%	24%	15%	10%	8%	8%	8%	6%	4%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%
2005	4%	20%	20%	15%	9%	8%	7%	6%	3%	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%
2006	6%	18%	20%	13%	11%	9%	6%	6%	4%	3%	1%	1%	1%	2%
2007	4%	21%	18%	13%	10%	8%	7%	6%	4%	3%	2%	1%	1%	1%

# POLICING PRIORITIES 2007

Each year, States of Jersey Police produce a Policing Plan that sets out our priorities for the year ahead, explains the allocation of our resources and identifies development initiatives intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Force. In developing the Plan, we take into account the views and requirements of a variety of stakeholders. In particular, public consultation provides a valuable insight into the expectations of our local community whilst the States themselves have set a strategic agenda that sets out the aims and objectives for the Council of Ministers through to 2011.

## Strategic Policing Priorities

The States Strategic Plan sets out an unequivocal expectation that the Island's finance industry will receive strong protection against money laundering and other financial crime and that strong protection should be provided against threats to the Island's security. These requirements are directly aligned to two of the Force's key service areas –

- National Security Policing
- Financial Crime Investigation

These service areas are of such fundamental importance to government strategy that our 2007 Policing Plan defined national security policing and financial crime investigation as **strategic priorities**.

## Operational Policing Priorities

The two strategic priorities are largely focused on external threats to the Island's security and economy. Whilst the consequences of service failure in either could be devastating, Islanders tend to be more immediately concerned about the community safety issues that affect their day-to-day lives. Hence the States Strategic Plan also expects Jersey to be 'a *safe community protected against crime and disorder*' and our **operational policing priorities** therefore focus on the issues that pose the greatest threat to community safety in Jersey. These priorities reflect our own assessment of crime trends as well as public consultation findings to ensure that we remain in touch with the concerns of our community.

Our operational policing priorities for 2007 were -

- Illegal Drugs
- Prolific Offenders
- Street Violence and Disorder
- Dangerous Offenders
- Road Safety
- Anti-Social Behaviour and Neighbourhood Policing

# **NATIONAL SECURITY POLICING**

## **Aim**

*Protect Jersey's security and fulfil international and national security obligations*

## **Why is this a Strategic Policing Priority?**

The States of Jersey have decided that strong protection against threats to the security, social and economic integrity and environment of the Island should be a key feature of the Island's five year strategy.

The United Kingdom currently faces a high risk of attacks by international terrorists and countering terrorism is a key national security priority. Whilst Jersey is not currently considered to be a likely target for direct terrorist attack, our policing activity is intended to provide public reassurance and prevent terrorists accessing transport networks through the Island. Nor can we ignore the fact that increasingly strong counter-terrorism security measures in the United Kingdom may cause some displacement of terrorist activity. Again, we aim to deliver effective policing services that dissuade terrorists from regarding Jersey as a 'soft' alternative target.

In addition to the part we play in countering the terrorist threat, effective border controls play an important role in monitoring the movements of criminals in and out of Jersey. People with criminal histories including serious sex and violence offences and the use of weapons are identified entering the Island on an almost daily basis by our Special Branch officers. This intelligence is vital to public protection and crime investigation both locally and in the United Kingdom.

## **Measuring National Security Policing**

National security and anti-terrorism policing is not an area that lends itself easily to numerical measurement. From a Police perspective, our key aim is to maintain an appropriate level of policing activity to dissuade terrorists from targeting or using Jersey to access transport networks and provide reassurance to the travelling public. These objectives are most likely to be achieved if the Force ensures compliance with appropriate counter terrorism standards set by the Association of Chief Police Officers in the UK.

## **National Security Policing in 2007**

In 2007, the Force maintained the appropriate counter terrorism standards.

A total of 3,219 checks were made on passengers passing through Jersey ports in 2007 and 43 people who were wanted locally were arrested.

## **Comment**

One area of particular concern to the Force is the issue of fugitives arriving in Jersey from other jurisdictions. If we identify such a person in Jersey, we cannot detain or arrest them (if there is no suspicion of local offences) without a UK arrest warrant having first been backed locally by a UK officer in person – a process which can at best take hours, but more typically days. Ministers are aware of this issue and we hope to see it addressed during 2008.

# FINANCIAL CRIME INVESTIGATION

## Aim

*Provide financial crime investigation services that help maintain and enhance the Island's reputation as a financial centre of integrity*

## Why is this a Strategic Policing Priority?

The findings of the JASS 2007 survey show how people's policing concerns understandably focus on community safety issues that are close to home. The problems that imprint themselves upon people's minds tend to be those that impact on their daily lives such as anti-social behaviour, speeding motorists or street violence and disorder. By comparison, money laundering is, for most people on the street, an invisible problem that does not carry the same urgency. Hence, less than 10% of the Jersey public think that financial crime and money laundering is a problem that should be prioritised by States of Jersey Police.

At the same time, States of Jersey Police are given a clear mandate by the States to prioritise financial crime investigation in support of the Island's international commitments. At times when our resources are increasingly stretched, there can be tension between the competing aspirations of government and the local community. It is therefore important to understand why our Joint Financial Crime Unit (JFCU) is the largest investigative department in the Force, a commitment matched only by the City of London Police and the Serious Fraud Office in the British Isles.

- Criminals have to find a way of legitimising the money they get from their criminal activities. Money laundering is the means by which they process their "dirty" money through the financial system via a succession of transfers or transactions until it comes out the other end appearing to be legal, or "clean", money. If done without detection or arousing suspicion, it allows the criminals to provide a legitimate cover for the source of their income.
- What should not be forgotten is that money laundering is not just about financial crime. The funds concerned often originate from crimes that threaten and destroy the well being and lives of ordinary people, such as drug abuse, prostitution and people trafficking. Money laundering helps fund the ambitions of criminal organisations, allowing them to plan and execute further illicit activities and accumulate power and wealth. The threat from global terrorism also means that the stakes are higher still.
- Another major source of illicit money is government corruption, with public officials defrauding their countries of crucial funds. Countries affected in this way are generally those who need such funds the most.
- Money laundering is a global phenomenon. Measuring the extent of the problem worldwide is extremely difficult due to the illicit nature of the activity but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates it as between 2 and 5 per cent of global GDP, which could be up to 500 billion US dollars a year. The scale of the problem means that governments worldwide are focusing increasing attention on where and how criminals and terrorists are able to integrate their illicit funds into the legitimate finance sector.
- In this environment, the onus is on international finance centres to demonstrate to both the international community and the criminal fraternity that their finance industries are well-regulated and that suspect activity is likely to be detected and investigated. No international finance centre can afford to be branded as a haven for "dirty" money. For Jersey, with 60%

of its GDP derived from the finance sector and more than one in five of its working population employed in the industry, the stakes are particularly high -

*'The performance of Jersey's economy and the well being of its residents remain highly dependent on the continued success of the Island as an international finance centre that is recognised favourably by the international standard setters, by the international community as a whole, and by those users of financial services whom the Island would wish to attract.'*<sup>9</sup>

It is for this reason that the States have decided that protecting and developing the Jersey finance industry's international reputation for integrity should be a key feature of the Island's current Strategic Plan. The importance of properly resourced policing and regulation to this strategy is self-evident and so Jersey has signed up to internationally agreed standards on financial crime investigation. The JFCU was therefore set up as a joint enterprise of predominantly Police and Customs Officers to work in conjunction with the Law Officers Department and investigate criminal offences relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. The Unit encourages the submission of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARS), researches and investigates these reports and, where appropriate, shares intelligence with other Financial Intelligence Units worldwide, the JFCU

### Measuring Financial Crime Investigation

The key outcome defined by the States Strategic Plan is that Jersey should have 'a flourishing finance industry with an international reputation for integrity'. This outcome is clearly dependent upon the input of a variety of stakeholders, including the Jersey Financial Services Commission, key government departments and the Island's finance institutions themselves. Other stakeholders are clearly better placed to measure whether this desired outcome is being achieved and the Force focuses its own key indicators on the delivery of an effective and efficient financial crime investigation service.

Measure	2007	Comparators	Notes
Number of SARS submitted to JFCU	<b>1,517</b>	2004 1,248 2005 1,162 2006 1,034	This is essentially a workload measure as it monitors the number of SARS dealt with by the JFCU. What it cannot reflect is that a single SAR can lead to a multi-million pound investigation lasting years. In the vast majority of cases, we send out an initial response in writing within 48 hours of receipt of the SAR
Number of Requests for Assistance (RFAs) received by JFCU from other jurisdictions	<b>434</b>	2004 434 2005 362 2006 427	This is also a workload measure that monitors the volume of work generated on behalf of other jurisdictions tracking funds that might be in, or have passed through, Jersey. Most investigations involve criminals who never set foot in Jersey and the proceeds of crime that took place elsewhere. Very few lead to prosecutions in Jersey but are intended to support investigations in other jurisdictions.
Number of 'No Consents' issued by JFCU	<b>40</b>	2004 63 2005 44 2006 35	This monitors the number of occasions where JFCU has reviewed a SAR and decided that it is not able to grant consent for the financial institution to continue operate the account or relationship normally during the investigation.

<sup>9</sup> Colin Powell, Chairman, Jersey Financial Services Commission, JFCS Annual Report 2006

## **Performance in 2007**

The workload of the JFCU grew noticeably during 2007. This was partly as a result of a UK tax amnesty which gave rise to a large increase in the number of Suspicious Activity Reports.

During 2007, the JFCU undertook a major review of its processes for withholding consent. In the UK, there is a maximum period of 38 days for which assets can be informally frozen by means of the police with-holding consent, in the absence of any court order. No such limit exists in Jersey because -

- The majority of SARs disclosed in the UK relate to UK residents and suspected criminality exclusively within the UK. In the majority of cases, the intelligence and evidence gathering potential is contained within the single jurisdictional boundary of the UK and, compared to Jersey, there are relatively few practical and timing difficulties in terms of progressing financial investigations. If a criminal conviction and subsequent confiscation does not appear to be a likely prospect in the early stages of an investigation in the UK, there is a Civil Asset Recovery framework to fall back on to seize assets which are suspected to be the Proceeds of Crime, and hence there is a civil-based option for the consideration of restraint early on. Under these circumstances, it is feasible to operate time limits on the withholding of consent.
- The situation is very different in Jersey. An overwhelming majority of SARs referred to us relate to non-Jersey residents and suspected criminality outside of Jersey. The progression of international financial investigation can be a very lengthy process over which we often have very limited control or influence and the filing of a SAR is often the first step in such a process. We have obstacles to overcome in communication and information-sharing with overseas jurisdictions and cannot significantly influence the speed or direction of overseas investigations. Some countries even have significant restrictions in sharing information internally, let alone with overseas jurisdictions.

Nevertheless, the JFCU is aware of the difficulties faced by institutions in managing client relationship whilst informally freezing the funds during the Police investigation. In 2007, we reviewed our working arrangements to ensure that consent is not withheld indefinitely if we are unable to secure the co-operation of the jurisdiction where the funds originated to pursue an investigation.

The International Monetary Fund will visit the Island during 2008 to inspect Jersey's anti-money laundering defences and 2007 was a busy year for the JFCU in supporting the preparations for this inspection. In particular, the JFCU was represented on the Chief Minister's Department's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Strategy Group which has overseen the introduction of new legislation and other measures that bring the Island's financial crime defences up to date.

## **The Way Forward**

There can be no doubt that the JFCU's workload is set to increase further in coming years –

- The reporting regime that seeks out suspicious transactions in the Jersey finance sector continues to tighten and the Financial Services Commission, supported by JFCU officers, is working hard to raise awareness amongst the industry and encourage vigilance.
- At the same time, there is growing international concern that existing anti-money laundering controls may be displacing criminal proceeds into other sectors of the world economy and so measures are being put in place to extend the reporting regime to cover high value

commodity transactions. In future, the JFCU expect to receive SARs from a wide range of new sources such as estate agents, jewellers and fine art dealers. These changes will give rise to a significant increase in our investigative workload and may well uncover more local crime investigations for the Unit. This development also generates additional work for the Unit in supporting training initiatives by the JFSC to raise awareness and understanding amongst the businesses covered by the new measures.

- Following the UK tax amnesty in 2007, similar initiatives are being planned and so the heightened rate of SARs is likely to continue

The issues at stake in protecting Jersey's finance industry against infiltration by terrorists, money launderers and fraudsters on a global scale vastly outweigh the threat posed by small time criminals living off the proceeds of minor crime in Jersey. Nevertheless, if the opportunities present themselves and the resources are available, there is real scope for the JFCU to target these offenders and reduce the harm they cause to our society.

# ILLEGAL DRUGS

## Our Aim

*To disrupt the supply and distribution of, and demand for, illegal drugs.*

## Why is this an Operational Policing Priority?

Jersey has an active illegal drugs market that is believed to be worth tens of millions of pounds each year. As with any other market, consumers meet their needs in a variety of ways. Some users import their own drugs in person or by post and may sell small quantities to help fund their habit. This approach entails a much greater risk of being caught whilst importing the drugs and the majority of users buy their drugs locally. That creates a significant 'business opportunity' for criminals willing to organise the importation and supply of commercial quantities of illegal drugs in the Island.

The 'businesses' that have stepped in to exploit this market opportunity typically take the form of organised criminal cartels based in the UK and Europe. Experience and current intelligence both point to growing interest in Jersey from such organisations who see our affluent community as a small but lucrative market. If the political vision of Jersey being a safe community protected against crime and disorder is to be upheld, policymakers cannot afford to underestimate the consequences of such organisations gaining a more secure foothold in the Island.

Our principal strategy is to continually attack and dismantle the networks of local contacts upon which these cartels rely to import and distribute drugs in the Island. This strategy has enjoyed considerable success and more than seventy key players involved in the supply of commercial quantities of illegal drugs were brought to justice between 2004 and 2006. These are not 'mules' who have been coerced or duped into trafficking drugs but organised criminals who have knowingly conspired to supply and distribute drugs for considerable personal gain. The strategy has had the effect of discouraging bulk importations of drugs and frequently disrupts supply as the UK drugs cartels are forced to re-establish networks following the loss of key local agents.

The disruption caused by the arrest and prosecution of these key players goes beyond the seizure of the drugs shipment they were associated with at the time. It also means that the supply chain is broken and it takes time for the criminal networks to replace local associates and re-establish themselves in the Island. Furthermore, we damage the criminal businesses by seizing the assets associated with these 'executives'.

The Island's Crime and Community Safety Strategy seeks to address the drugs problem through both enforcement and education. Reducing demand will have the effect of reducing supply. We aim to play our part in this strategy by continuing to support education initiatives such *Prison Me No Way* and by bringing drug users into contact with agencies who will address their drug use.

## Measuring Drugs Policing

Measuring success in tackling an illicit drugs market is always difficult and the traditional indicators that make the easiest headlines, such as the value and volume of seizures, are open to varying interpretation and actually have limited value. Do more seizures mean increasing success in disrupting supply or are they indicative of an increased traffic in drugs? Does the seizure of a million pound consignment of drugs in one year make it more successful than another year where £75,000 seizures were made every month? In focusing on the drugs suppliers rather than the commodity itself, States of Jersey Police are also developing new tactics that bring people to justice for conspiring to import drugs without necessarily having to catch them in possession of a consignment. Indicators that depend on drugs seizures should therefore be treated with caution.

Aside from measures that monitor tactical outputs such as seizures and arrests, we are interested in social outcomes. Again, the inclusion of questions in the Jersey Annual Social Survey helps build a picture of public perceptions about the impact of drug use in the community and the regard in which the policing effort is held.

Indicator	2007	Comparators	Comment
Number of persons identified as being responsible for supplying commercial quantities of drugs who are charged	21	2003 20 2004 24 2005 20 2006 28	These targets are individuals who have identified business opportunities in the local drugs market and are personally involved in, and profiting from, the purchase, importation and supply of commercial quantities of illegal drugs.
Total value of drugs seizures by States of Jersey Police Drugs Squad <sup>10</sup>	£1.2 million	2004 £3.9 million 2005 £1.2 million 2006 £1.6 million	Heroin with a street value of £949,000 and cannabis with a street value of £255,774 was seized during the course of Drugs Squad operations in 2007.
% of people who think people dealing in drugs is a major problem in Jersey	77%	2005 73%	The change since 2005 is not statistically significant. Drug dealing is regarded by the general public as Jersey's most significant policing problem. Apart from anti-social behaviour by young people, it is regarded as a major problem for the Island by twice as many people as any other community safety issue.
% of the population who think the Police do a good job of catching people who sell illegal drugs	83%	2005 80%	The improvement on 2005 is not statistically significant. Given the widespread public concern about drugs in the Island, it is very positive and important to note the high regard with which the policing effort is held.
% of people who think drug dealing is one of the top three problems requiring Police action in their local neighbourhood	22%	2005 24%	Despite the overriding concern about drugs amongst the general population, drug dealing is not translating into a pressing problem for many neighbourhoods in Jersey. Only 7% of households listed drug dealing as Problem 1 for their neighbourhood
Number of people reported for drugs possession offences	166 <sup>11</sup>	2004 219 2005 190 2006 141	Catching people in possession of drugs brings these individuals into contact with services who can address their drug use. Successful interventions can help reduce demand for drugs in the Island.

## Comment

2007 was another very successful year that saw several existing and new sources of supply into the Island cut off or significantly disrupted through intelligence-led targeted policing operations.

<sup>10</sup> These figures are based on the maximum potential street value of drugs in Jersey. They collate the values for different drug types such as cocaine, heroin, cannabis, etc. The figures only relate to major seizures by the Drugs Squad and do not include smaller amounts seized from street dealers and users.

<sup>11</sup> Correct at time of publication. This figure may rise further as the results are returned confirming

21 targets who were alleged to be dealing in commercial amounts of illegal drugs were arrested and charged by the Drugs Squad over the course of the year. This is on a par with previous years. Another 15 people who were identified as regularly dealing larger amounts of drugs and potentially making financial gain were also targeted, arrested and charged as part of Drugs Squad operations during 2007.

Differences in the number of these targets from one year to the next has more to do with the size of each criminal group targeted by the Drugs Squad than fluctuating performance. The Force has been making the point for several years that it is operating at the full capacity of its current resources in drugs policing, bearing in mind that the policing effort does not stop at the point of arrest and charge. An enormous amount of time and resource goes into the prosecution process and this represents an opportunity cost (albeit necessary) that diverts resources away from operational drugs policing. Fluctuations in output are more likely to do with the complexity of different cases before the courts than operational performance issues.

The Drugs Squad is the key component of our drugs policing strategy with its focus on criminals organising the importation and distribution of commercial quantities of drugs. Their work is supplemented by pro-active policing by other Police units such as the uniformed shifts and the Proactive Investigation Team, whose main role is to target street dealers and identify other persons in possession of illegal drugs. During 2007, another 165 people were reported or charged for dealing, possession or other drugs-related offences.

The JASS 2007 results show that drug-dealing is still regarded as Jersey's biggest policing problem. Whilst frequent exposure to UK and local media coverage concerning the harm caused by drugs undoubtedly sensitises the public to the issue and may influence the survey results, there is a real threat. A disjointed drugs market whose supply networks are constantly disrupted or dismantled is a very different proposition to one where criminal businesses have secured control of supply and are able to manage and develop demand. If the political vision of Jersey being a safe community protected against crime and disorder is to be upheld, policymakers cannot afford to underestimate the consequences of such organisations gaining a more secure foothold in the Island. Drug cartels do not just deal in drugs. Their business operations require the additional use of "debt collectors", "enforcers" and other supporting activity. The substantial assets arising from drug-dealing afford opportunities for bribery and corruption as these criminal gangs seek to penetrate the Island's institutions and way of life. If illegal drug use became more prevalent in the Island, the harm would impact on all sectors of our society and could be measured in terms of –

- Increases in drug-related burglary, robbery and theft. In the UK, it is estimated that as much as 55% of property crime is related to fund-raising to buy illegal drugs;
- Increases in drug-related violence as rival suppliers seek to establish primacy in the local drugs market and through drug debt enforcement;
- Intimidation and corruption of legitimate businesses and institutions
- A rising fear of crime as a consequence of increases in violent and acquisitive crime and growing awareness of drug supply and use at a neighbourhood level;
- An increase in demand, and associated cost, for Health and Social Services as a result of drug-related deaths and overdoses, new hepatitis and HIV cases due to intravenous drug use, neonatal problems and drug-related mental health and behavioural problems. In addition, there is clearly an association between illegal drug use and the impact of illicit drug use on social care services and the children of drug users;
- Unemployment, productivity and absenteeism as well as educational attainment, financial stability and homelessness. Academic research suggests a strong association between problematic drug use and these issues.

States of Jersey Police will continue to work hard at preventing this scenario from developing. In that respect, the results from JASS 2007 are particularly pleasing. Very few neighbourhoods in Jersey report being blighted by drug problems and the overwhelming majority of people believe the Police are doing a good job of tackling people who sell illegal drugs. That in itself is a valuable defence against the criminal business eyeing Jersey's drugs market as a potential target. When the risks attached to the opportunity are too great, they may choose to go elsewhere. Others who have chosen to ignore States of Jersey Police's reputation for effective drugs enforcement often find themselves coming to regret their decision.

# PROLIFIC OFFENDERS

## Our Aim

*To reduce levels of key acquisitive crimes by bringing prolific offenders to justice*

## Why is this an Operational Policing Priority?

Acquisitive crime usually accounts for over 40% of all recorded crime in the Island. Our decision to define prolific offenders as a policing priority is based on Home Office research which shows that 10% of the active offender population commit about 50% of crime. Even within this group, a real hard core (0.5% of the active offenders) are estimated to be responsible for one in ten crimes.

Burglars don't just burgle. In Jersey, these criminals are generally after money, goods they can consume for themselves like cigarettes or alcohol, or property they can easily sell for cash. It makes no difference to them if they acquire these goods through burglary, shoplifting or theft. So, by targeting Jersey's most prolific offenders, we can impact not only on offences such as burglary and vehicle theft but also have a knock-on effect on other forms of acquisitive crime.

## Performance in 2007


43 prolific offenders were arrested 102 times between them for burglary and vehicle crime in 2007. The impact of these interventions on burglary and vehicle crime is illustrated below.

## Burglary

Figure 7 provides a month by month overview of burglary in Jersey between January 2004 and December 2007. The grey dotted line shows monthly burglary rates to the end of 2006 and, thereafter, the blue line shows burglary by month throughout 2007. The maroon line shows the monthly average for 2004 – 2006.

Based on burglary rates for the previous three years, we could predict with 80% confidence that there would be 26 to 51 burglaries a month in Jersey during 2007. Our aim was to keep the burglary rate below or consistently close to the lower limit of this expected range. In graphical terms, we hoped to ensure that Figure 7 would show long or deep troughs in 2007 and that any peaks would be short and sharp, reflecting successful intervention bringing burglars to justice.

**Figure 7: Burglary in Jersey, January 2004 – December 2007**




The key points to note are –

- Jersey experienced a total of 377 burglaries and 39 attempted burglaries in 2007. Overall burglary levels were down by 10% against the three-year average for 2004-06. Looking further back, burglary is now 13% below the three-year average for 2001-03.
- This is the second year in succession that the number of actual burglaries in the Island has fallen below 400. Prior to 2006, the number of actual break-ins had ranged from 424 to 510 a year over the past five years.
- The arrest of key offenders thwarted an emerging series of breaks in the early spring of 2007, following which burglary rates in Jersey fell below the normal range in May. Intelligence-led targeting also brought two potentially serious burglary sprees to an end in the summer, leading to a period of four months when burglary levels were consistently at the bottom end of the normal range. This was the most prolonged period with a low burglary rate that the Island has experienced in the last four years.
- The spring and summer peaks and the rise in offences in December serve as a reminder, however, that the pool of active offenders in Jersey is regularly replenished by young offenders maturing into more active criminals, released prisoners who revert to crime and criminals arriving in the Island. The intelligence-led policing effort must always keep pace with the changing profile of the offender community.
- Burglary of commercial properties is falling year on year and was down by over 36% in 2007 against the three-year average for 2004-06. Unfortunately, many home owners often fail to take basic security precautions and so make themselves vulnerable to the seasoned burglar or the opportunistic thief. About 160 domestic burglaries may not have occurred in 2007 had the owners ensured that their property was properly secure.

## Vehicle Theft

Figure 8 provides a month by month overview of vehicle theft in Jersey since January 2004. The grey dotted line shows monthly vehicle theft rates to the end of 2006 and, thereafter, the blue line shows offences through 2007. The maroon line is the monthly average for 2004-07. Based on the level of vehicle theft experienced over the previous three years, we could predict with 80% confidence that between eight and 25 vehicles would be stolen or taken without the owner's permission each month during 2007. Our aim was to keep the vehicle theft rate below or consistently close to the lower limit of this expected range. In graphical terms, we hoped to ensure that Figure 8 would show long or deep troughs and that any peaks would be short and sharp, reflecting successful intervention bringing a vehicle crime spree to an end.

**Figure 8: Vehicle Theft in Jersey January 2004 – December 2007**



The key points to note are –

- Pro-active policing drove vehicle crime down by another 15% in 2007 against the three-year average for 2004-06. To put this success into further context, vehicle crime is now 39% below the three-year average for 2001-03.
- There were two serious spates of offending over the course of the year that were both brought to an abrupt end by the intelligence-led targeting and arrest of key offenders.

### **Theft from Vehicles**

138 thefts from vehicles were recorded during 2007. This is nearly 34% down compared to the three-year average for 2004-06 and nearly 39% down compared to 2001-03.

### **Bicycle Theft**

Historically, persistent bicycle theft has seemed to be a proving ground for some young offenders who have developed into prolific criminals as young adults. It should also be noted that these crimes involve property of some considerable value, with some bikes being worth well over £1,000. 264 bicycles were recorded as being stolen or taken without the owner's permission during 2007. This is nearly 27% down compared to the three-year average for both 2004-06 and 2001-03.<sup>12</sup>

### **Shoplifting**

Shoplifting is an offence which is likely to be significantly under-reported and so movements in the figure must be treated with caution. If shoplifters are successful, the crime may go unnoticed until stores conduct stock takes. The losses revealed through this process are not usually reported to the Police and will not be reflected in the crime figures.

Most shoplifting offences are recorded as a result of the offender being caught and so an increase in shoplifting may reflect positive outcomes such as improved shop security and staff training rather than a real increase in crime. In 2007, 293 shoplifting offences were recorded compared to 239 offences in 2006 and a three-year average of 253 offences.

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<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that 27 burglaries also involved the theft of bicycles from garages, sheds and communal areas. These are counted as part of the overall count of burglary figures and not within the bicycle theft figures. The same method of calculation is used for previous years.


# STREET VIOLENCE AND DISORDER

During 2007, the number of physical and sexual assaults recorded by States of Jersey Police in the pubs, clubs and streets of St Helier between 8pm and 4am increased by 1.6% compared to 2006.<sup>13</sup> This simple measure cannot be used in isolation to determine changing levels of violence in the night time economy. It must be considered in the context of the following indicators.<sup>14</sup>

- Calls from members of the public for Police assistance to deal with street violence and disorder **fell** by 13% during 2007
- The number of physical assaults recorded as taking place on the streets of St Helier **fell** by over 12%
- The overall number of physical assaults *reported* to the Police by alleged victims during the course of 2007 **fell** by nearly 8%.
- The number of people seeking medical treatment for assault injuries in the Hospital Accident and Emergency Department **fell** by nearly 4%.
- The number of injury assaults attended by the Ambulance Service remained unchanged.
- In nearly 80% of the assaults recorded during 2007, the Police were able to identify and interview the suspect offender

The cumulative evidence of these indicators is that the night time economy of St Helier was a safer place during 2007. This statistical evidence is supported by the findings of the 2007 Jersey Annual Social Survey. This showed a statistically significant improvement in the Jersey public's perception of the safety of the town centre after dark. Overall, in 2007 just over half (55%) of people felt town was either "A bit unsafe" or "Very unsafe" after dark, compared with nearly three-quarters (70%) of people in 2005.<sup>15</sup>

**Figure 9: Public perceptions of the safety of the town centre after dark**



**The policing of street violence and disorder in St Helier during 2007 is the subject of a separate in-depth study in Appendix C.**

<sup>13</sup> The preferred comparison used by the Force is against a three-year average. At face value, this comparison would give rise to an increase of 11% compared to average for 2004-2006. In this case, however, such a comparison is not valid given the impact of a change in the level of Police resources in St Helier at peak periods with effect from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2006. This led to a significant increase in the number of assaults recorded by the Police and creates a distortion in the three-year average.

<sup>14</sup> All Police data refers to St Helier during the time period between 8pm and 4am. Hospital and Ambulance data refers to all assault injuries. It will therefore include assaults that are not associated with the St Helier night time economy

<sup>15</sup> See JASS 2007, page 21

# DANGEROUS OFFENDERS

## Aim

*To protect vulnerable individuals and the wider public from sexual, violent and other potentially dangerous offenders.*

## Why is this an Operational Priority?

The protection of the public has always been core police business. This is reinforced by the Human Rights (Jersey) Law which requires government to protect the rights and security of citizens. However, no single agency, including the police has the capacity to deliver public protection alone and success in this area depends on participation in efficient partnership working. There are three key strands to this priority – child protection, domestic abuse and the management of sex offenders in the community. The consequences of crime committed in each can be devastating for individuals, families, communities and the public as a whole. Although the threat posed can never be completely eliminated, the public is entitled to expect the States of Jersey Police to do all they reasonably can to prevent serious harm and reduce re-victimisation and risk for future potential victims.

## Child Protection

Child abuse encompasses all circumstances of ill treatment of children by strangers, family members and other people known to the child. It includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse and neglect. Children in Jersey are by no means immune and the States of Jersey Police seek to take effective action against offenders so that they can be held accountable through the criminal justice system, while safeguarding the welfare of the child. This area of policing underwent significant reform in 2006 following the introduction of the new Children’s (Jersey) Law in the previous summer. The Force set a priority objective to promote a proactive multi-agency approach to preventing and reducing child abuse and neglect and appointed an Inspector with specific responsibility for this area. New procedures and protocols were developed to help share information between agencies, notably the Police and the Children’s Service, and agree the appropriate handling of cases. In addition, the Force adopted new ACPO guidelines on investigating child abuse and introduced new notification forms to help raise awareness of potential abuse cases.

The reform of policy and procedures in this area, coupled with new training for shift officers and joint working and training with a variety of partner agencies and other interested parties, means that there has already been a considerable increase in workload over the past two years. In 2007, the Child Protection Team dealt with 159 referrals from other agencies and were notified of 376 incidents attended by officers who expressed concern for the welfare of a child.

On top of this, during 2007, the Force opened a child abuse investigation which has developed into the biggest enquiry of its kind in the Island’s history. At the time of writing, the investigation had recorded details of about 140 victims and

	2006	2007
Cruelty/neglect of children	41	26
Rape/buggery of a child aged under-16	1	4
Rape/buggery of a child aged under-16 (historic)	7	4
Indecent assault of a child aged under-16	15	11
Indecent assault of a child aged under-16 (historic)	7	6
Gross indecency with a child	0	3
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16 years	4	5
Possess/distribute indecent images of a child	1	4

witnesses. This sort of major enquiry has a significant impact on resources.

## **Domestic Abuse**

Domestic abuse is officially defined as:

*'any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults, aged 18 or over, who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender and sexuality. Family members are defined as mother, father, son, daughter, brother, sister, grandparents, whether directly or indirectly related, in-laws or step family'.<sup>16</sup>*

Domestic abuse is a major problem for society and for the Police. In JASS 2007, 60% of women considered the town centre to be unsafe after dark and yet:

- About one in four of all the physical assaults recorded in Jersey are domestic violence related.
- Women are seven times more likely to report being the victim of a domestic violence assault than one by a stranger in the streets of St Helier after dark
- About 60% of the recorded assaults on women in the Island are committed by partners, former partners or other adult family members. In reality, that figure may well be even higher as research shows that many domestic violence assaults go unreported.

Nearly 80% of these incidents occur behind closed doors in the home so few people are truly aware of the extent of the problem. The reality is that, whatever form it takes, domestic abuse is rarely a one-off incident. More usually, it is a pattern of controlling behaviour that deprives victims of the freedom to live their lives how they want, and without fear. There are also significant links between child abuse and domestic violence. Where one type of abuse exists, the other is also likely to be present. Failure to identify and investigate domestic violence could result in failure to protect the safety and well being of the adult victim and their children.

The role of the Police in domestic abuse cases is the protection of the victim and any children present at the incident and the enforcement of the law through positive action against offenders. The latter can ultimately prove difficult in many cases because, whilst victims want the abuse to stop, they are sometimes reluctant to go to court. The evidence shows that many victims either refuse to make a complaint or subsequently withdraw their statement. Unfortunately, experience shows that this often leaves the offender free to continue the abuse. Where sufficient additional corroborating evidence is available, the Police will still present a case to the prosecuting authorities without the verbal evidence from the victim.

## **Policing of Domestic Violence in 2007**

In England and Wales, the government has produced a National Delivery Plan for Domestic Violence to improve the protection of victims and bring more offenders to justice. Considerable research has gone into identifying best practise in the effective investigation of domestic abuse. States of Jersey Police have followed suit and adopted the new ACPO *Guidance on Investigating Domestic Violence* in 2006. Our Domestic Violence Unit was also restructured and placed under the direction of a new Public Protection Detective Inspector in mid-2006. Significant research went into the introduction of innovative practices aimed at tackling domestic abuse and implementation of some of these initiatives began to roll out in 2007. In particular, the

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<sup>16</sup> Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) *Guidance on Investigating Domestic Violence*, 2004

Force increased its commitment to the victims of domestic abuse by introducing risk assessments whenever officers go to incidents where domestic abuse may have occurred.

Officers now ask people who may have suffered domestic abuse a series of key questions. Their report is then passed to specialist officers in the Force’s Public Protection Unit (PPU) who can then prioritise victims deemed to be at most risk and determine the service they can provide to these individuals. Where appropriate, the PPU officers can call meetings with other agencies to determine how to offer someone the help they need. Such risk assessments were initially piloted by South Wales Police and are now used by all UK forces. They are essential to provide the Police with a fuller picture of what may be happening to a victim. Since the introduction of the risk assessments in the summer of 2007, 421 cases of domestic abuse have been assessed. 105 of these victims were considered to be at a very high risk of further victimisation and another 48 were considered to be a high risk.

**Domestic Violence – Results in 2007**

**Figure 11: Domestic Abuse 2005-07**

Overall, States of Jersey Police were called to deal with 788 domestic incidents in 2007. These incidents gave rise to 234 recorded domestic-related assaults. This sustained the large increase recorded in 2006, when the recorded level of domestic assaults rose by a third. It is worth reiterating that we do not believe this increase is being driven by increasing levels of violence. Rather, the evidence suggests that the investment made in training, improving procedures and working with victims means that we are making greater inroads into an existing problem. This is reflected in the fact that we were again able to secure sufficient evidence to record a crime in 30% more incidents than was the case two years ago.

Indicator	2005	2006	2007
% of all physical assaults that were domestic-related	21%	26%	24%
% of domestic assaults that occurred in dwellings	79%	85%	79%
% of reported assaults that were ‘no crimed’ following investigation	33%	24.5%	22%
% of <u>reported</u> assaults resulting in prosecution	20%	20%	23%

The proportion of reported domestic assault cases resulting in the prosecution of the offender increased slightly to 23% in 2007. Reported offences include recorded offences and those which are excluded as ‘no crime’ because there is insufficient evidence to conclude that a crime actually occurred. If, for example, a domestic assault victim is adamant that no assault took place and there is no physical evidence to the contrary, there are no grounds to record a crime regardless of whether the attending officer suspects that violence has occurred. In the particular circumstances of domestic violence, and in the knowledge that some victims will cover up the abuse, we keep a weather eye on reported as well as recorded offences. Of those cases where a crime was recorded, 30% resulted in the offender being prosecuted. This is a sanction detection rate that we aim to further improve.

**Management of Sex Offenders in the Community**

In seeking to protect the public from convicted sex offenders who may pose a risk to society, the Police in Jersey are operating without a specific legal framework as exists in the UK. It is understood that the States of Jersey are considering bringing forward proposals for a new law to provide for the registration, risk assessment and management of convicted sex offenders. At the time of writing, States of Jersey Police are aware of 306 individuals who had been convicted of offences of a sexual nature who had a Jersey address at the time of their conviction. Of these, it is currently envisaged that 121 individuals known to be still living in Jersey would require management in the community.

## **Sexual Offences in 2007**

Sex attacks by strangers are a rare occurrence in Jersey, with only a handful of cases being recorded over the past few years. Most complaints investigated by the Police relate to incidents that occurred between the victim and an acquaintance with whom they have been socialising.

There were seven recorded cases of alleged rape taking place in Jersey during 2007. Three of the victims were girls aged under-15. Only one of these cases was an attack by an unidentified stranger and a suspect has been interviewed in all the other cases. Charges have so far been brought in three cases and the remainder currently remain under investigation. There were another 14 cases of indecent assault against females aged 16 or over during 2007, compared to 18 in 2006. At the time of writing, investigations had led to detections in five of these cases.

# **ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR & NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING**

## **Our Aim**

*To provide positive policing intervention in neighbourhoods where crime and anti-social behaviour impact on quality of life*

## **Why is this an Operational Policing Priority?**

Unlike crime, an intermittent threat that in theory the Police can be expected to deal with, anti-social behaviour can form a persistent background to everyday life in certain neighbourhoods. Witnessing or experiencing offensive and threatening behaviour has more of an impact on peoples' perceptions of risk than crime statistics. The danger is that people's quality of life can suffer if their concerns lead to changes in their beliefs and behaviours.

In Jersey, anti-social behaviour by a minority of young people is an issue of growing concern amongst the general public. Aside from drugs, it was the only issue in both the 2005 and 2007 Jersey Annual Social Survey where a majority of the public believed that the Island has a major problem. The JASS results also suggested that this was not simply an unfounded belief driven by hearsay or speculation, because the issue dominated people's experience at neighbourhood level. Overall, 60% of respondents living in urban or semi-urban parishes listed anti-social behaviour by young people as one of the top three policing priorities for their neighbourhood, making it the only neighbourhood problem identified by a majority of respondents.

It is all too easy to present these concerns as an inter-generational issue so it is worth noting that JASS 2007 revealed that young people aged 16 to 24 are just as worried about anti-social behaviour by youths as any other age group and are actually more worried about being verbally abused and threatened on the street than middle-aged or older people. We have always maintained that the overwhelming majority of our young people are honest and law-abiding citizens in whom Jersey should take pride. Within this age group, however, there will always be a troublesome element and Jersey is no exception. It is also important to remember that the most likely victims of these offenders are young people themselves. For example, States of Jersey Police deal with three times as many teenagers as victims of crime as we do pensioners.

## **Policing Anti-Social Behaviour in 2007**

Neighbourhood policing is recognised as an area that is currently suffering due to a lack of resources in States of Jersey Police. With the Force as a whole under strength, only five of the nine Community Officer posts are currently filled and the five uniformed shifts which provide the principal incident response service are also having to operate below authorised staffing levels. This inevitably impacts on our capacity to provide the level of pro-active neighbourhood policing to which we would normally aspire. What this means in practise is that it is proving difficult to assign identified officers to specific communities. Without this consistency of ownership, it is difficult to gather intelligence, engage effectively with local residents and provide long term solutions to their problems.

The net effect of these resource issues is that the Force is primarily providing a reactive service to anti-social behaviour issues whilst concentrating a limited pro-active effort on communities identified through our regular tasking process as those in need of most support. The overall level of crimes and incidents reported in different areas is constantly monitored so that the tasking meetings can prioritise the deployment of officers to the most problematic locations at the right times of day.

In the UK, the Government is investing heavily in the concept of neighbourhood policing, putting dedicated teams of police officers and Police Community Support Officers into specified communities. States of Jersey Police do not have the resources to implement this approach at a

neighbourhood level in the Island but, during 2007, the Force developed an Integrated Community Patrol Strategy. The latter is designed to address some of the issues highlighted above and will be implemented when the Force is at full strength. That said, we should recognize the fact that, at parochial level, the Honorary Police provide a valuable service in maintaining a visible presence and addressing some of the anti-social behaviour issues which affect neighbourhoods. We will continue to co-ordinate our own effort with those of the Honorary Police in 2008.

# ROAD SAFETY

## Aim

*To reduce road traffic injury casualties by targeting the offences that pose the greatest threat to the safety of road users*

## Why is this an Operational Policing Priority?

Ensuring that Jersey enjoys high standards of road safety requires the input of various government departments to ensure that road surfaces, junctions and facilities are safe and properly maintained, vehicles meet approved standards and drivers are properly qualified. The Police play a supporting role in creating this safe driving environment by -

- providing the road traffic engineers with details of the road traffic collisions we record to help identify potential problems with road and junction layouts and facilities;
- supporting roadside checks on the roadworthiness of vehicles;
- checking license and insurance details of drivers who came into contact with the Police;
- working in partnership with agencies such as the Road Safety Panel and Prison Me No Way to deliver road safety education programmes.

Ultimately, however, road safety is determined by the degree to which people drive responsibly and the States of Jersey Police work in partnership with the Honorary Police of the 12 Parishes to monitor and enforce compliance with the Island's road traffic legislation. Figure 12 shows some of the key motoring offences reported during 2007 in comparison with previous years.

## Speed Enforcement

The future of speed enforcement in Jersey is the subject of a separate in-depth review. Interested readers can read this study in Appendix D.

1,623 people were reported for speeding offences in 2007. This is nearly 29% up against the three year average for 2004-06 but down by just over 5% against 2007.

To put this figure in context, the number of motorists reported for speeding in Jersey had averaged around 860 a year for at least 20 years prior to 2006. The significant increase thereafter is due to the partial introduction of new speed enforcement technology.<sup>18</sup>

Figure 12. Road Safety Enforcement 2004-07	2007	2006	2004-06 average
Reported for speeding	1,623	1,713	1,261
Dangerous driving	14	27	24
Mobile phone offences	256	370	293
Pro-active DIC arrests <sup>17</sup>	165	171	195
Traffic light/signal offences	279	243	255
Insurance offences	209	233	212
No driving licence	157	158	124

## Drink-Driving Enforcement

Drink-driving is a consistent focus of our enforcement effort and the results speak for themselves. In the Nineteen-Eighties, there were up to 185 drink-drive RTCs and 550 arrests per year for drink driving. In 2007, there were just 54 drink-drive RTCs and another 165 people

<sup>17</sup> Arrests for drink-driving that were not as a result of an RTC but through pro-active policing.

<sup>18</sup> Please see the Focus on Speed Enforcement at the end of the Report

were arrested as a result of pro-active police checks. The annual Christmas drink-drive campaign deliberately targets the festive season when the temptation and opportunities to drink drive are perhaps at their height. Its deterrent value is illustrated by the fact that, over the past nine years, the number of drink-drive RTCs occurring in December has been significantly lower than that for any other month.

## Road Safety Education

States of Jersey Police work closely with the Road Safety Panel, Prison Me No Way and other agencies to deliver a range of road safety programmes and initiatives. During 2007 –

- the Road Safety Officer cycle trained just under 500 hundred children;
- nearly all primary schools received input on being seen, crossing the road safely, wearing bike helmets and seat belt wearing;
- All secondary schools received input on drink and drug driving and most received inputs on the importance of wearing seat belts through the Prison Me No Way programme;
- The Road Safety Officer worked with the Youth Service to help deliver the *On Two Wheels* programme to young people intending to get onto mopeds;
- The Road Safety Officer delivered several programs to Highlands college students for pre driver education;
- the Road Safety Panel ran the *Young Driver Of The Year* competition to raise road safety awareness amongst young drivers;
- the Road Safety Panel launched the '*A Crash Is Not An Accident*' campaign to raise awareness of bad driving practises (see [www.crash.je](http://www.crash.je));
- The Road Safety Officer held regular talks for parents regarding child seats.

## Measuring Road Safety Outcomes

The cumulative effect of our enforcement and education efforts is intended to keep the roads of Jersey safe and so a key performance outcome for the Force is the number of road traffic collisions (RTCs) resulting in serious or fatal injury. Serious injury is defined as one requiring hospital treatment. Records are also kept of all recorded injury RTCs. Outside of these key indicators, however, it is more difficult to keep an accurate profile of all the minor road traffic collisions that occur across the Island. RTCs are only formally recorded in the following circumstances –

- where persons have suffered injury;
- where there is evidence of a road traffic offence considered worthy of prosecution;
- 'hit and run' RTCs;
- where it appears that vehicle defects may have been a contributory factor;
- where a States Police Officer on duty is one of the drivers involved;
- where a defect in the road is believed to be a contributory factor;
- where an animal specified in road traffic legislation is killed or injured.

In all other cases there is no requirement for police reports to be submitted. The incident becomes a civil matter between the parties involved and the Police cannot either advise parties to accept responsibility nor apportion blame. Many incidents are also resolved over the phone to

the satisfaction of all concerned. This not only saves the time of persons involved but reduces traffic congestion and demand on police resources.

The only full record of reported RTCs in Jersey is, therefore, the computerised Police Control Room incident log which records the number of RTCs notified to the Police, some of which will not result in a full RTC report. This system was introduced early in 2004 meaning that full annual data is only available from 2005. It should be emphasised, however, that there are limitations to this data. The logs are based on the information supplied by the caller and RTCs will sometimes be misreported as to whether they involve injury or not.

### Road Safety Results in 2007

In 2007, there were 26 RTCs resulting in serious or fatal injury in Jersey, representing a reduction of 31% against the three-year average. Sadly, two people died in a road traffic collision in Grouville, as a result of which the driver was imprisoned for drink-driving. It should be noted that the number of injury RTCs recorded

Figure 13: Road Traffic Collisions 2004-07	2007	2006	2004-06 average
Serious/fatal injury RTCs	26	34	39
All recorded injury RTCs	313 <sup>19</sup>	336	334
All <i>reported</i> RTCs	1,835	1,753	n/a
All <i>reported</i> injury RTCs	365	343	n/a
DIC RTCs	54	47	52

by officers, the overall number of RTCs reported to the Police and the number of those *reporting* injury show very little variance from previous years. Whilst the reduction in serious and fatal incidents is welcome, there are so many factors at work in determining the outcome of a road traffic collision that we remain wary of suggesting any significant improvement in road safety in Jersey.

<sup>19</sup> Correct at time of publication but RTC data collection in 2007 was still paper-based and some more records may still filter through the system so it would be inappropriate to draw any conclusions from this figure

# RESOURCES AND EFFICIENCY

## Context

The States Strategic Plan sets out a commitment to the people of Jersey to ensure that States services are necessary, efficient and of good quality. It sets out to deliver balanced budgets and public services that are recognised as efficiently and effectively meeting people's needs.

States of Jersey Police are fully committed to this concept. The policing of the Island costs about £240 per head of population over the course of a year and the people of Jersey have the right to be assured that this money is being well spent and that we are efficient as well as effective in what we do.

## Police Expenditure 2007

Over recent years, there have been significant reductions in crime in the Island and evidence of strong Police performance. This has been achieved against a background of tight resource constraints. Actual net revenue expenditure by States of Jersey Police has only increased by 10% between 2002 and 2007. Over the same five-year period-

- the cost of living in Jersey has increased by about 20%;<sup>20</sup>
- overall net revenue expenditure by the States of Jersey has risen by about 32%;<sup>21</sup>
- on a like-for-like basis, government grant and central spending on services for the police in England and Wales will have increased by over 62% between 2000-01 and 2007-08.<sup>22</sup>

Not even these figures represent the full picture in terms of value for money. In 2002, the people of Jersey paid 60 pence per person per day for the policing of their Island. Five years on, the size of the population has increased and so have the demands on policing. But each person is now still paying less than 65 pence a day in 2007 - less than 8% more – whilst average earnings have increased by 23%. In other words, at a time of rising demand, the real cost of policing has progressively reduced whilst performance has increased.

The policing of Jersey was delivered on budget in 2007. It should be noted that this performance was effectively only achievable due to vacancies carried by the Force over the course of the year. States of Jersey Police are almost unique in the public sector in not being able to fill vacancies as they arise. If a Police officer retires or otherwise leaves the Force, there is a delay of at least six months and up to a year before a replacement officer can be walking the beat. There is no opportunity to fill these vacancies with temporary or supply staff as in other organisations and so the Force's operational strength gradually declines until the next annual intake of Police recruits have been trained. The only compensation is that funds originally allocated to staffing can be used to shore up under-resourced budgets such as the maintenance and repair of the town CCTV system.

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<sup>20</sup> In 2002, Police net revenue expenditure was £19,155,694 and the population of the Island was 87,600. Five years on, Police net revenue expenditure for 2007 (as at 30<sup>th</sup> September 2007) is forecast to be £21,069,700 and the population is now 89,300.

<sup>21</sup> These figures compare actual revenue expenditure in 2002 to budgeted revenue expenditure in 2007. States of Jersey net revenue expenditure in 2002 was £360 million. Budgeted expenditure for 2007 was £474 million.

<sup>22</sup> Written Ministerial Statement by the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety (Lords Hansard text for 28 Nov 2006). The comparative figures for England and Wales cover a longer period than those cited for Jersey as they are government-published figures which will take into account variations in calculating methodology

## Police Staff Resources

About 85% of Police revenue expenditure is committed to staff costs. Policing is by its very nature a human resource intensive service and, unlike, most public sector services, we operate a full service around the clock for 365 days a year. Keeping just one officer permanently on the beat would actually require six Police posts to cover a rotating shift, leave and other abstractions.

The authorised establishment of States of Jersey Police in 2007 was 245 Police and 90 civilian staff. Again, to put this in perspective –

- the authorised strength of 245 full-time equivalent Police posts is two less than at the time of the first Clothier report on policing in 1996;<sup>23</sup>
- since 1997, total Police officer strength has increased by 10.5% in England and Wales and, over the past five years, been reinforced by the creation of over 13,400 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). There is now nearly one PCSO for every 10 police officers in England and Wales. The number of civilian staff working in the Police Service in England and Wales has also increased by 39% over this period. Across the 43 police forces of England and Wales, there are 4.33 Police staff per 1,000 population<sup>24</sup>. In Jersey, there are 3.75 Police staff per 1,000 population;<sup>25</sup>
- the authorised number of Police officers per head of population is lower in Jersey than that in Guernsey, the Isle of Man or Gibraltar. Jersey has 2.74 police officers per 1,000 population. Guernsey has 2.95 and the Isle of Man has 2.99.<sup>26</sup> In order to match these Police resource levels, States of Jersey Police would need to increase its authorised establishment by about twenty Police posts. The smallest Force in the UK, Dumfries and Galloway in Scotland, has around 3.4 officers per 1,000 population;
- States of Jersey Police also service a visitor population of around 750,000 a year. This represents at least 300,000 more visitors per year than either Guernsey or the Isle of Man.

## Comment

These figures starkly illustrate the resource constraints under which States of Jersey Police operate. Funding is declining in real terms and, in relative terms, staff resources are below those of comparable jurisdictions and, compared to the United Kingdom, falling further behind. Under these circumstances, it has been essential that the Force work within its means and accommodate new or changing demands on its services by making efficiency savings, investing in technology and driving continuous improvement. There are three key strands to drive efficiency -

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<sup>23</sup> Report of the Independent Review Body on Policing Services in Jersey, July 1996, paragraph 5.1.1, page 20

<sup>24</sup> As at 31 March 2007, there were 232,948 full-time equivalent (FTE) Police and civilian staff working in the 43 police forces of England and Wales. Another 1,100 Police staff work for the Serious Organised Crime Agency. The most recently published population estimate for England and Wales was 53,728,800 in mid-2006.

<sup>25</sup> The cited figures refer to professional Police officers and civilian staff in the paid employment of the public sector. On the English side, it does not include national assets such as the British Transport Police, Police National Improvement Agency, Defence Police, Atomic Energy Police or private contractors who transport and manage prisoners, court security officers, CCTV operators and the like. Clearly if these were included they would tip the balance further against Jersey. The figures do not include volunteer staff. They do not therefore include the Honorary Police in Jersey or Special Constables and other community volunteers in other jurisdictions.

<sup>26</sup> Based on 2006 data. Gibraltar has 215 Police officers servicing a population of about 28,000. Their ratio of Police officers per 1,000 population is just under 7.7. To put this figure in perspective, if Jersey was to be policed at the same level as Gibraltar, an additional 442 police officers would be required on top of our existing establishment.

- External inspection by independent Inspectors from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to review the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Force against agreed standards and known best practice. The Force was last inspected in 2006 and the report referred to the Force as *'modern, fast-moving with high expectations of operational and cultural change amongst a motivated workforce.'*<sup>27</sup> The report outlined a number of opportunities for improvement and Her Majesty's Inspector was *'impressed by the openness and receptiveness of the Chief Officer team to the suggestions made, demonstrating a desire and drive to adopt good practice.'*<sup>28</sup> The 2007 Policing Plan included a series of objectives arising from the report and there will be an independent review of progress against these recommendations early in 2008.
  
- The Force also regularly invites peer reviews of its policies, procedures and processes by specialists from HMIC, other Forces or its own internal improvement teams. During 2007, for example, HMIC inspected States of Jersey Police's compliance with protocols and procedures for the use of the UK Police National Computer. The Force has also established its own Internal Inspectorate to maintain a regular audit cycle that monitors and evaluates the implementation of Force policies and procedures and identifies opportunities to drive service improvement.
  
- In addition, the Force is continually reviewing demand and prioritising activities to ensure optimum use of the available resources.

States of Jersey Police ended 2007 with 12 vacant Police posts against our authorised strength and another 16 officers eligible to retire. This level of vacancies, coupled with no less than nine of our 41 female officers being pregnant or on maternity leave, effectively means that front-line operational units have been nearly 10% below strength. These shortages, coupled with the resource demands of a major child abuse enquiry, are stretching the operational resilience of the States of Jersey Police to the limit. 17 new probationers started training in January 2008 and will be available for partial deployment by July 2008.

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<sup>27</sup> HMIC Baseline Assessment of States of Jersey Police 2006, page 6

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, pages 6-7

# PARTNERSHIP WORKING

The contribution of the voluntary sector to community safety in Jersey is particularly strong and the Force is grateful to the support and assistance it receives from volunteers in a wide range of voluntary organisations. This report provides an opportunity to publicly thank those people who give up their time to serve their community by contributing to the Crimestoppers Board, the Domestic Violence Forum, People Against Crime, Prison Me No Way, the Road Safety Panel, Roseneath Committee of Management, Safer St Helier, Victim Support and others.

## The Honorary Police

The longest standing voluntary organization working to improve community safety in Jersey, however, is the Honorary Police. The policing of Jersey is based around the States Police Force and the 12 independent Parish-based Honorary Forces. The origins of the Honorary Police system in Jersey date back over 700 years and each Parish provides and equips its own Force of volunteer officers who are funded by Parish ratepayers. Each Parish Force has its own command structure and the 12 Forces are independent of one another and the States of Jersey Police. Honorary Police Officers perform a range of tasks but a number undertake operational police duties.

In May 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed between the States of Jersey Police and the Island's 12 Honorary Forces concerning the operational deployment of resources. Under its terms, the Police Control Room now routinely assess whether it would be appropriate to inform Honorary Units of reported incidents. Those agreed as appropriate include incidents such as non-injury road traffic collisions, noisy parties, neighbour disputes, minor disorder, loose animals and minor theft. Figure 14 provides a breakdown of incidents during 2007 where the Honorary Police were informed of or involved in the Police response.

**Figure 14: Honorary Police Involvement in Response to Incidents 2007**

Incident Parish	Response Code <sup>29</sup>				Total
	1	2	3	4	
St Brelade	9	102	172	26	309
St Peter	19	74	126	24	243
St Saviour	8	46	131	26	211
St Clement	13	29	62	16	120
St Ouen	8	17	57	10	92
St John	4	17	51	10	82
Grouville	4	20	39	12	75
St Martin	3	15	47	9	74
St Lawrence	3	14	42	7	66
Trinity	3	14	28	12	57
St Mary	1	8	16	7	32
<i>St Helier</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>88</i>	<i>128</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>245</i>
<b>Total incidents with Honorary Police (HP) involvement</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>446</b>	<b>902</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>1606</b>
<b>Total incidents outside St Helier</b>	<b>406</b>	<b>2249</b>	<b>4482</b>	<b>952</b>	<b>8089</b>
<b>Total incidents in St Helier</b>	<b>531</b>	<b>4622</b>	<b>8355</b>	<b>1455</b>	<b>14963</b>
<b>% of incidents outside St Helier involving HP</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>17%</b>
<b>% of incidents in St Helier with HP involvement</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>2%</b>

About two-thirds of all incidents occur in St Helier and it would be impractical for the town's Honorary Police to provide a full level of response. The partnership arrangements in the town therefore tend to focus on the policing of public events and other planned initiatives. Outside of St Helier, the Honorary Police were involved in or informed of the response to about 17% of all incidents reported to the States of Jersey Police, which is on a par with previous years.

In addition to day to day response policing, the partnership also extends to a weekly tasking and co-ordinating meeting where Honorary Police representatives are briefed on current crime issues and hotspots that will be the target of joint patrolling initiatives in the coming week.

### **Honorary Police Activity 2007**

An important part of policing is to provide a visible presence in the community that reassures the public and deters offending behaviour. There is also an invaluable role to play in dealing with minor incidents where advice and guidance is often the most appropriate form of intervention. There are many other activities, such as the policing of major events, where the Honorary Police provide an invaluable service to the community. None of these activities lend themselves readily to measurement.<sup>30</sup> They should be given due weight alongside the substantial indicators of crime investigation as it would be unreasonable to expect a volunteer force to play a major role in the investigation of crime and detection of suspects. The following statistics are therefore indicative of the support provided by the Honorary Police over and above their important contribution to general community safety.

**Figure 15: Honorary Police Investigative Activity 2007**

	<b>Crime Records submitted</b>	<b>Persons arrested and detained in custody</b>	<b>Prosecution files submitted</b>
<b>Honorary Police</b>	152	37	355
<b>% of Island total</b>	3.4%	1.3%	5.6%

Where the outcomes of policing activity can be evidenced in a tangible way, it is clear that the contribution of the Honorary Police is most evident in the enforcement of road safety. About 97% of the prosecution files submitted by Honorary Officers in 2007 related to motoring offences

### **Honorary Police Training**

During 2007, a Training Memorandum of Understanding was signed between States of Jersey Police and the Honorary Police. The Training Department of States of Jersey Police, together with members of the Honorary Police Training Committee, devised a new modular foundation course for honorary officers of all ranks. There are four modules which range from power of arrest, stop and search, the drink drive law and dealing with a road traffic collision. Each month since January 2007 States of Jersey Police Training Department have provided one training module each month. This has seen 54 honorary officers from the various 12 Parishes attend and, over the 12 modules, States of Jersey Police have effectively trained 193 officers.

Apart from the Foundation Training, States of Jersey Police have also delivered two other courses have been provided to the Honorary Police, these include 'Intelligence Gathering' (41 honorary officers), the 'Regulations of Investigatory Powers (Jersey) Law 2005 (17 officers) and officer safety (53 honorary officers).

## **GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS**

The following abbreviations are in common use in Police parlance and regularly feature in States of Jersey Police publications.

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	Automatic Number Plate Recognition
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television Camera
CI	Chief Inspector
CJU	Criminal Justice Unit
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CRB	Criminal Records Bureau
CSB	Community Safety Branch
DIC	Drunk-in-charge (drink-driving)
DVS	Driver and Vehicle Standards
FTE	Full-time Equivalent
HOCR	Home Office Counting Rules
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IS	Information Systems
JASS	Jersey Annual Social Survey
JFCU	Joint Financial Crime Unit
JIB	Joint Intelligence Bureau
NIM	National Intelligence Model
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PII	Police Internal Inspectorate
PIT	Proactive Investigation Team
PNC	Police National Computer
PPU	Public Protection Unit
PRU	Planning and Research Unit
RFA	Request for Assistance
RIT	Reactive Investigation Team
RTC	Road Traffic Collision
SB	Special Branch
SAR	Suspicious Activity Report
"24/7"	Policing 24 hours a day, 7 days a week

## APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL DIGEST 2007

**Table 1: Recorded Crime by Offence Type in 2007**

Offence	Detected		Total
	Yes	No	
Annoying/obscene phone calls	67	37	104
Arson	2	1	3
Assault on police	43	2	45
Burglary (dwelling)	42	157	199
Burglary (other than a dwelling)	42	175	217
Buggery	1	1	2
Common assault	447	303	750
Computer misuse		1	1
Cruelty / negligence	17	9	26
Demanding money of the person		1	1
Drug offences (other than those listed)	6	2	8
Drug possession	168	10	178
Drug importation	4	3	7
Drug production	3	1	4
Drug supply	16	1	17
Drug possession with the intent to supply	7	1	8
Embezzlement	4	1	5
Escape from custody	4		4
False accounting		1	1
False pretence	14	4	18
Firearms Law offences	13		13
Fire Service Law offences	3	26	29
Fraud (cheque and cash)	18	15	33
Fraud (other offences)	7	8	15
Fraud by company director		3	3
Going equipped to commit a crime	1		1
Grave and criminal assault	163	63	226
Gross indecency with a child	1	2	3
Impersonate a police officer	3	1	4
Indecent assault of a female	12	14	26
Indecent assault of a male	4	1	5
Indecent exposure	10	3	13
Kidnapping	1		1
Larceny as a bailee	1	3	4
Larceny from a meter or machine	3	6	9
Larceny (other offences not listed)	71	379	450
Larceny of bicycle (with intent to deprive)	3	110	113
Larceny from shop	217	76	293
Larceny by a servant	15	5	20
Larceny from dwelling	8	50	58

Offence	Detected		Total
	Yes	No	
Larceny from a vehicle	8	130	138
Larceny of a motor vehicle (with intent to deprive)		1	1
Larceny from the person	2	6	8
Larceny from a vehicle (fixtures and fittings)		25	25
Malicious damage to a building	38	157	195
Malicious damage to a dwelling	36	98	134
Malicious damage (to property other than that listed)	49	144	193
Malicious damage to motor vehicle	44	549	593
Money laundering (proceeds of crime)	1		1
Money laundering (proceeds of drugs)	1		1
Forgery (other offences)	1		1
Any other notifiable offence		1	1
Perverting the course of justice	2	1	3
Possession / distribution of images of children	1	3	4
Possession of an offensive weapon	44		44
Post Office Law offences		1	1
Rape of a female	5	5	10
Receiving / handling stolen goods	30		30
Robbery (of a business)		1	1
Robbery (of an individual)	3	1	4
Taking and driving away a motor vehicle	54	115	169
Taking and driving away a bicycle	9	143	152
Tampering with a motor vehicle	5	21	26
Unlawful sexual intercourse with a female aged under 16 yrs.	2	3	5
Wasting police time	1		1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,777</b>	<b>2,881</b>	<b>4,658</b>

### Table 1 notes

The published detection rate is calculated on the basis of -

$$\frac{(\text{Number of offences committed \& detected in 2007}) + (\text{Number of offences committed prior to but detected in 2007})}{\text{Number of offences committed in 2007}}$$

The 2007 detection rate does not therefore include detections of 2007 offences that were secured in 2008. These will be reflected in the 2008 detection rate. The detections listed in the table above reflect the current status of investigations from 2007 at the time of publication. It does not include detections of offences committed in previous years and does include detections of 2007 offences in 2008. Many 2007 offences remain under active investigation. Please note, therefore, that a straightforward calculation of the detection rate by dividing 1,777 by 4,658 will not result in the official detection rate.

**Table 2: Police Procedures and Criminal Evidence (Jersey) Law 2003 Article 9 Stop and Search Checks**

Reason	Jan		Feb		Mar		Apr		May		Jun		Jul		Aug		Sep		Oct		Nov		Dec		Total	
	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests	Searches	Arrests
Drugs	16	1	22	2	32	1	28	8	62	1	57	7	47	4	58	7	81	11	32	10	73	18	45	6	553	76
Property	7	0	7	0	17	3	14	3	19	1	19	2	16	2	16	3	6	0	7	1	5	2	18	3	151	20
Other	5	1	5	1	18	0	22	0	22	1	9	0	9	0	11	1	13	0	6	0	20	0	12	0	152	4
Weapon	2	0	4	2	7	0	0	0	9	1	4	1	7	2	14	2	0	0	15	1	2	0	4	2	68	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>924</b>	<b>111</b>

**Table 2 notes**

One PPACE stop and search check was conducted by the St Ouen Honorary Police. The remainder are stop and search checks carried out by States of Jersey Police officers.

The arrests shown are those resulting at the time of the stop check. It is important to note that information and intelligence gathered at the time of a stop and search check may also yield evidence that leads to a subsequent arrest

## APPENDIX B:

### PROGRESS AGAINST 2007 POLICING PLAN OBJECTIVES AND HMIC INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

This Appendix sets out the progress achieved in 2007 against the corporate development objectives set out in the 2007 Policing Plan, including the recommendations arising from the HMI Inspection Report published in 2006. The reference numbers are part of an internal review system developed to monitor implementation and the source column identifies whether the objective originates from the Policing Plan, the HMIC Inspection or a combination of the two. Where an item is marked as complete, a Quarterly Review Board chaired by the Chief Officer has signed off the objective as complete or not requiring any further action as an ongoing project. Items listed as 'progressing' will continue to be monitored as development objectives by the Board.

Ref	Source	Recommendation	Status
HMIC1 HMIC 3	HMIC	New Information Security Officer should address current shortfalls in the protection of security assets such as information and data security, physical security and information systems security. Systems should be adequately resourced, managed and monitored to ensure integrity, quality assurance and speed of investigation.	Completed
HMIC2	HMIC	A personnel vetting policy based on ACPO guidelines should be introduced and implemented as a matter of urgency.	Progressing
HMIC4	HMIC	Consider strengthening the permanent proactive capacity within the Professional Standards Department	Completed
HMIC5	HMIC	Review the need for specific analytical capability within PSD to ensure potential problems of security, prioritisation issues and operational compromise issues are addressed.	Completed
HMIC6	HMIC	Put in place a quality of service review process for public and internal customers of PSD to assess confidence and improvement opportunities.	Completed
HMIC7	HMIC	Publicise the complaints process through the provision of posters and leaflets in the public areas of police buildings to encourage and develop wider feedback from the public on services provided.	Completed
HMIC8	HMIC	Carry out a strategic assessment of key internal threats facing the organisation	Progressing

HMIC9	HMIC	Test staff confidence in internal complaints process through internal staff consultation and surveys	Completed
HMIC10	HMIC	Train all inspectors and sergeants to carry out the informal resolution procedure at local level.	Progressing
HMIC11	HMIC	Develop an appropriate policy for substance and alcohol abuse testing to meet the requirements of Article 4 of pending new Police (Jersey) Law	Progressing
HMIC12	HMIC	The PSD should develop and introduce a strategic plan.	Progressing
HMIC13	HMIC	Consider the introduction of a Crime Strategy to provide staff with an agreed corporate framework for all crime matters.	Completed
HMIC14	Dual	Properly evaluate the crime screening policy.	Completed
CD30			
HMIC15	HMIC	Publicise, with the public and partners, the crime screening policy in order to maintain levels of openness and public confidence as to the service provided and accessibility to the crime reporting/recording process	Completed
HMIC16	Dual	Review benchmarking opportunities with relevant offshore Islands	Completed
CD35			
HMIC17	Dual	Introduce an agreed process with partners to conduct appropriate evaluation of volume crime reduction schemes and initiatives and feedback good practise and learning opportunities	Progressing
CD39			
HMIC18	HMIC	Consider engaging relevant partners in tasking and co-ordinating meetings and introduce joint tasking when appropriate to enhance crime reduction activity and strengthen multi-agency approaches.	Completed
CD37	Dual	Roll out performance management framework to unit level	Progressing
HMIC19		Consider the introduction of key policing targets within a SMART based priority framework to drive crime reduction and prevention activity and enhance the focus on priority areas	

HMIC20		Promote a clear vision for the development and use of performance management principles in the force through effective training for managers and supervisors together with effective use of published material and clear messages from the chief officer team to heighten the status of performance management.	
HMIC21		Better integrate policing priorities, performance monitoring, the NIM and the intended force control strategy in order to ensure clarity and minimise duplication.	
HMIC22	HMIC	Develop intelligence system to capture real time community intelligence to feed into daily and weekly tasking meetings and influence policing activity.	Completed
HMIC23	HMIC	Review whether examination and understanding of partnership related problems specific to locations over time should be responsibility of JIB or PRU.	Completed
HMIC24	HMIC	Develop, implement and evaluate programme of appropriate refresher training on problem solving policing for staff and partner agencies	Completed
HMIC25	HMIC	Consider the implications and benefits of open information sharing with partner agencies within the principles of the Data Protection Law.	Completed
HMIC26	HMIC	Staff should be given suitable advice and training to equip them to implement any agreed policy on open information sharing	Completed
HMIC27	HMIC	Work with the honorary police and relevant states politicians to agree a suitable course of action with regard to approval for firearms ownership	Completed
HMIC28	HMIC	Introduce community impact assessments where appropriate	Completed
HMIC29 CD9	Dual	Develop systematic and formal systems to routinely debrief critical or major incidents in order to capture and use good practice and lessons learnt.	Completed
HMIC30 CD9		The force should consider the re-introduction and reiteration of aides-memoire for front line staff to ensure that major and critical incidents are promptly identified and that the correct action is initially taken at the scene.	
HMIC31 Cd9		Contingency plans for major and critical incidents should be reviewed and updated as a matter of priority	
HMIC32	HMIC	Train SIOs in investigative interviewing	Completed

HMIC33	HMIC	The force should review arrangements for gold/silver and bronze command training in critical high risk areas such as firearms, critical incident, CBRN and public order.	Completed
HMIC34	HMIC	Ensure establishment of authorised firearms officers is maintained at the required strength	Completed
HMIC35	HMIC	Utilise the training opportunity afforded through the new shift system to provide relevant training to all operational officers and supervisors on critical incident management	Completed
HMIC36	HMIC	Consider linking HOLMES 2 to local systems to facilitate automated data exchange	Completed
HMIC37	HMIC	Ensure that sufficient resources are available in the joint financial crimes unit to minimise vulnerability.	Completed
HMIC38	HMIC	Consider the introduction of a forensic steering group that involves all key parts of the organisation to address such issues as performance, training, awareness, intelligence gathering and dissemination.	Completed
HMIC39	HMIC	Introduce a comprehensive forensic management strategy with fully documented policies, processes and procedures.	Completed
HMIC40	Dual	Develop and introduce an appropriate performance management framework for the forensic science function which should include clear performance targets.	Completed
HMIC41			
HMIC42	HMIC	Ensure that operational actions in respect of suspect identifications from fingerprints and DNA are effectively prioritised and robustly monitored.	Completed
HMIC43	HMIC	Improve the information flow from the criminal justice unit to the forensic management function to allow the proper disposal of buccal swabs and improve the recording process.	Completed
HMIC44	HMIC	Ensure that a SOCO representative attends TTCG meetings to identify, advise and recommend potential tactical options for operational decision makers.	Completed
HMIC45	HMIC	Continue as a matter of priority to seek an alternative fingerprint analysis service provider and secure a meaningful service level agreement to include timeliness of turnaround and appropriate sanctions.	Completed

HMIC46	HMIC	Focused effort should be made to recruit for the post of senior SOCO as a priority to increase resilience in this important investigative position.	Completed
HMIC47	Dual	The force should introduce an agreed and co-ordinated programme of forensic awareness training for all SOJP officers, relevant civil servants and explore training options with the honorary police.	Completed
CD16			
HMIC48	Dual	The force should develop a more robust approach to the monitoring of the quality of Performance Review and Appraisals.	Completed
CD45		Further develop the Performance Review and Appraisal (PRA) process. The force should develop a more robust approach to the monitoring of the quality of PRAs.	
HMIC49		Continue the development of the performance review and appraisal process to ensure links are made more evident with the NIM and with equality and diversity assessments, effectively linked to grievance, discipline, and that training and improvement needs are clearly identified.	
HMIC50	HMIC	The force should ensure that monitoring of the effectiveness of the new shift system is a continual process and that evaluation is meaningful and based on agreed criteria.	Completed
HMIC51	Dual	Develop a costed HR plan in support of organisational plans.	Completed
CD46			
HMIC52	HMIC	Consider whether targets for the recruitment of minority groups or females would be appropriate	Completed
HMIC53	HMIC	Undertake an internal review of current approaches to learning and development utilising key national learning and development reports from HMIC that have been published over recent years	Completed
HMIC54	HMIC	A formal 'learning and development strategy' and 'learning and development plan' should be developed as a priority and should reflect national guidance so far as is practically achievable and relevant to the island.	
HMIC55	HMIC	Quality assurance or evaluation strategies and processes need to be developed as a priority utilising the guidance contained in the Centrex 'Models for Learning and Development in the Police Service'.	
HMIC56	HMIC	Develop a more robust approach to costing learning and development programmes.	

HMIC57	HMIC	Develop a formal community engagement strategy, together with underpinning processes for all aspects of learning and development.	Completed
HMIC58	HMIC	Consolidate agreed improvement actions into a formal improvement plan with time bound milestones which is regularly monitored through to completion at chief officer level.	Completed
HMIC59	HMIC	Drive the replacement of the CLUE 2 intelligence database	Progressing
HMIC60	HMIC	Review and enhance the development of intelligence prior to dissemination	Completed
CD10	Dual	Redeploy existing staff to create new post of Field Intelligence Officer in Joint Intelligence Bureau	Completed
HMIC61		Enhance the capacity to undertake intelligence field work and research to develop intelligence in order to overcome the potential for un-actioned intelligence, incomplete audit trails and the loss of offenders brought to justice.	
CD11	Dual	<p>Improve the tasking process to include :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) appropriate development of problem and target profiles,</li> <li>b) embed effective targeted patrols in day-to-day policing activity</li> <li>c) raise awareness amongst front line staff as to relevant links between NIM, strategic priorities and their own performance.</li> <li>d) a focus on effective tasking to facilitate clear lines of accountability and timeframes for action,</li> <li>e) the provision of accurate minutes to provide a robust audit trail</li> <li>f) effectively planning and tasking the following week's activity</li> <li>g) recording task allocation and decisions, thus increasing accountability.</li> </ul>	Completed
HMIC62			
HMIC63	HMIC	Seek agreement with the Honorary Police on appropriate exchange of information to build on current arrangements of providing parishes with a daily e-mail summary of recorded incidents	Completed
HMIC64	HMIC	Develop and promote a staff suggestion scheme to empower the wider organisation to take ownership for service improvement.	Completed
HMIC65	Dual	Develop and undertake a staff survey for all staff in order to assess the morale of staff across the organisation.	Completed
CD43		Develop and implement action plan in response to the "Have Our Say" Employee Survey.	Completed

HMIC66	Dual	Raise awareness of Force's policing vision, Force priorities and current performance amongst front line staff	Completed
CD34			
HMIC67	HMIC	Develop a corporate communications strategy covering both internal and external communication mechanisms.	Completed
CD38	Dual	The Force should consider the value of identifying and introducing appropriate performance measures for support departments/functions	Completed
HMIC68			
HMIC69	HMIC	The new internal inspectorate's inspection programme should include a cycle of inspection linked to policing plan priorities and areas of under performance.	Completed
HMIC70	HMIC	Ensure debriefs of relevant incidents and operations are properly undertaken with feedback loops in place to encourage organisational improvement and through a 'near miss reporting procedure' whereby staff can identify and report issues in a safe environment. Work is ongoing to embed this work at shift and team level and should be completed by year end.	Completed
HMIC71	HMIC	Consider enhancing staffing/resilience in the Planning and Research Unit in order to drive performance management activity.	Completed
CD1	Policing Plan	Launch new States of Jersey Police website	Completed
CD2	Policing Plan	Participate in the 2007 Jersey Annual Social Survey to seek public opinion on policing issues and performance	Completed
CD3	Policing Plan	Review question design in JASS and our own victim surveys	Completed
CD4	Policing Plan	Review processes to ensure customer feedback properly informs training opportunities	Completed
CD5	Policing Plan	Develop on-line crime recording facility	Completed

CD6	Policing Plan	Conduct 'call tracking' audit of offences reported by members of the public Amended in April 2007 to Identify and implement improvements in response to "Are We Listening Internal Inspectorate report of October 2006	Progressing
CD7	Policing Plan	Upgrade crime recording system	Completed
CD8	Policing Plan	Brief media on impact of improved crime reporting arrangements	Completed
CD12	Policing Plan	Review and improve offender targeting processes	Completed
CD13	Policing Plan	Ensure proper implementation of Regulation of Investigatory Powers Law	Completed
CD14	Policing Plan	Explore avenues to fund the policing of major events	Completed
CD15	Policing Plan	Review incident response policy	Progressing
CD18	Policing Plan	Make the case for new financial crime legislation	Completed
CD19	Policing Plan	Review the development of information sharing gateways between the JFCU and other government agencies	Completed
CD20	Policing Plan	Hold a financial crime investigation conference for local finance industry in spring 2007	Completed
CD21	Policing Plan	Explore possibility of seeking to recoup costs of medical treatment in custody for offenders through the prosecution process	Completed
CD22	Policing Plan	Further review partnership opportunities with General Hospital for medical needs of prisoners in custody	Completed
CD23	Policing Plan	Implement changes resulting from review of corporate interpreter services being conducted by Chief Minister's Department	Completed

CD24	Policing Plan	Introduce Live Scan fingerprint technology	Completed
CD25	Policing Plan	Upgrade and implement custody system	Completed
CD26	Policing Plan	Introduce fast track prosecution process for key offender groups	Completed
CD27	Policing Plan	Implement upgraded case preparation system	Completed
CD32			
CD28	Policing Plan	Introduce enhanced performance management regime for prosecution process	Progressing
CD29	Policing Plan	Engage with CJS partners to review effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in addressing offending behaviour	Completed
SV6	Policing Plan	Review the effectiveness of current criminal justice system processes in addressing offender behaviour	Completed
CD31	Policing Plan	Work with the parish authorities to review the possible introduction of fixed penalty notices for specified offences	Completed
CD33	Policing Plan	Carry out IS enabling works required in preparation for development of new Police Headquarters in 2008	Deferred pending decision on new Police HQ
CD40	Policing Plan	Review opportunities to support the analysis of Police crime, disorder and road safety statistics with relevant data from other agencies	Completed
CD41	Policing Plan	Further develop the HR function in line with the corporate "HR Transformation" programme	Completed
CD42	Policing Plan	Complete Phase 1 of the new HR and Payroll Information Systems	Completed
CD44	Policing Plan	Ensure managers are conversant and compliant with legal and regulatory requirements of new discrimination law	Postponed pending States decision on legislation

CD47	Policing Plan	Replace Force Control Room dealer board telephone system	Completed
CD48	Policing Plan	Replace Force Control Room call/voice recorder	Completed
CD49	Policing Plan	Roll out new TETRA radios.	Completed
CD50	Policing Plan	Roll out TEA2 encryption across Force operational radio system	Progressing
CD51	Policing Plan	Upgrade Voice messaging service with call handling capability	Progressing
CD52	Policing Plan	Upgrade/replace /enhance CCTV digital recording system.	Completed
CD53	Policing Plan	Carry out enabling works for Communications systems in preparation for new Police headquarters.	Deferred pending decision on new Police HQ
RS1	Policing Plan	Increase establishment of Roads Policing Unit to two officers	Completed
RS2	Policing Plan	Implement processes to ensure optimum use of LASTEC technology	Progressing
RS3	Policing Plan	Review deployment arrangements for RTCs to make optimum use of States and Honorary Police resources	Completed
RS4	Policing Plan	Review the way we gather and analyse road traffic collision data	Completed
RS5	Policing Plan	Develop agreed programme with Transport and Technical Services to monitor speed at identified locations	Completed
RS6	Policing Plan	Review and improve partnership arrangements with Driver and Vehicle Standards	Completed
PO1	Policing Plan	Develop the process for interviewing offenders to help clear up other crimes	Completed

PO2	Policing Plan	Review the appropriate definition of a 'prolific offender' in the Jersey context	Completed
DO1	Policing Plan	Support the introduction of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) to assess and manage violent and sexual offenders	Completed
DO2	Policing Plan	Develop the process for deploying Sexual Offences Liaison Officers	Completed
DO3	Policing Plan	Roll out advanced suspect interview training for RIT detectives	Completed
DO4	Policing Plan	Develop use of NIM processes to inform tasking priorities for the management of violent and sexual offenders	Completed
DO5	Policing Plan	Ensure compliance with requirements of new sex offender legislation	Completed
DO6	Policing Plan	Introduce ACPO Domestic Violence Risk Assessment Model	Completed
DO7	Policing Plan	Promote the use of Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARAC) to focus on high risk victims of domestic violence	Completed
DO8	Policing Plan	Introduce and train Domestic Violence specialist officers on each shift to enhance investigation process at domestic violence scenes	Progressing
DO9	Policing Plan	Provide a dedicated patrol car equipped with domestic violence evidence recovery kits during busiest periods for domestic violence	Progressing
DO10	Policing Plan	Ensure all child abuse investigators are trained to new 'Achieving Best Evidence' investigation standard	Completed
DO11	Policing Plan	Develop integrated Police IT system for the management of child abuse notifications, referrals and investigations	Completed
DO12	Policing Plan	Implement proposed Sexual Offences Law which includes offences such as "grooming" minors for sexual purposes	Completed
SV1	Policing Plan	Redeploy existing staff to create permanent establishment of four Police posts in Licensing Unit.	Completed

SV2	Policing Plan	Train 2 officers per shift to conduct licensing checks with Licensing Unit on Friday and Saturday nights	Completed
SV3	Policing Plan	Develop the licensed premises check initiative and more consistent approach to licensing checks.	Completed
SV4	Policing Plan	Support the development of enhanced training programmes for staff working in licensed trade	Completed
SV5	Policing Plan	Provide training in respect of new public order legislation	Postponed pending decision on legislation
SV7	Policing Plan	Support 'Safer St Helier' initiative	Completed
ASB1	Policing Plan	Develop and implement neighbourhood policing strategy	Progressing
ASB2 ASB3	Policing Plan	Develop community profiles in support of neighbourhood policing strategy	Progressing
DR1	Policing Plan	Enhance the role of uniformed officers in targeting street dealers	Completed

## **APPENDIX C**

# **THE POLICING OF STREET VIOLENCE AND DISORDER IN THE ST. HELIER NIGHT TIME ECONOMY**

**Dr Ian Skinner  
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States of Jersey Police  
February 2008**

## **INTRODUCTION**

Street violence and disorder and the policing of these issues are the subject of considerable media, public and political scrutiny and comment in Jersey.

Unlike many crimes, street violence is a highly visible issue. Very few people will see domestic violence, burglary or drug dealing taking place but anyone can visit St Helier on a weekend evening and witness drunken behaviour that, for many, makes familiar public spaces seem unpredictable and intimidating. Sometimes this behaviour will spill over into violence and disorder. People who have been drinking excessively tend to be more aggressive, reckless or over-confident than usual and also tend to have false or exaggerated perceptions of aggression or disrespect from other people. In a social environment where binge drinking is a growing phenomenon, some trouble is to be expected. These violent incidents can create a lasting impression for both victims and witnesses.

The perception of a potential problem is reinforced by the fact that the worst excesses of the night time economy are regularly brought into everyone's home environment by way of the media. The combined effect sensitises the public to the topic and helps mould the community's belief about the safety of town after dark and Police performance in tackling the issue.

The purpose of this report, therefore, is to provide interested readers with the States of Jersey Police's perspective on street violence and disorder in the St Helier night time economy. It explains why we define street violence and disorder as one of our policing priorities, provides an insight into some of the issues we face in tackling the problem and explains how we measure results. In particular, the report reviews the results achieved in 2007 and considers where the answer might lie to achieve further improvements in the safety of St Helier's night time economy.

# STREET VIOLENCE AND THE 2007 POLICING PLAN

The 2007 Policing Plan set six operational policing priorities for 2007. These were policing issues where we intended to focus resources and effort to deliver tangible improvements in community safety. One of those priorities was street violence and disorder.

## Our Aim


*To reduce street violence and disorder associated with the Island's night time economy*

## Rationale

St Helier is the focus of Jersey's night time economy with about 90 pubs and night clubs. On a busy evening weekend, up to 4,000 people will be out and about in the town centre. Over the course of a year, that equates to hundreds of thousands of people enjoying St Helier's night life.

Inevitably, there is potential for some violence and disorder in this environment, particularly as the trend towards binge drinking of alcohol becomes more engrained in our society. In fact, over half of all the physical and sexual assaults that are recorded as taking place in public places in Jersey over the course of a year occur in the streets, pubs and clubs of St Helier between the hours of 8pm and 4am in the morning.<sup>31</sup>

Figure 1 provides another illustration of how, even if policing activity was limited to incident response, the night time economy would serve as natural draw on Police resources. Public demand for Police assistance is dominated by events in St Helier on Friday and Saturday evenings. (On average, the Police are called to twice as many incidents in St Helier between 11pm and midnight on a Saturday than in all the other parishes put together at any other time of the week.<sup>32</sup>)



Wherever possible, however, our approach is to keep the peace

and prevent crime and disorder before it occurs. That means we seek to provide more than just reactive policing by putting high visibility patrols in amongst the crowds in known hotspots, visiting licensed premises and generally maintaining a reassuring presence to help maintain order.

This style of policing is resource intensive and so street violence and disorder is defined as an operational policing priority for the States of Jersey Police. By so doing, we hope to help –

- reduce the risk of becoming a victim of violent crime in the night time economy,
- reduce demand for, and the cost of, health and social care services
- reduce potential demand for criminal injury compensation,
- reduce costs to businesses resulting from staff absenteeism and criminal damage
- support efforts to create a night time town environment in which people can feel safe, thereby also contributing to Jersey's reputation as a safe tourist destination.

# MEASURING STREET VIOLENCE

Ultimately, our aim is to play our part in reducing the level of street violence and disorder in the St Helier night time economy. Just as a private sector business must measure its performance in terms of productivity or sales, so we must gather and interpret information to understand how the scale of the problem changes over time and what effect Police action is having, or can have, on the situation.

## Using Recorded Crime Data

The simplest and most commonly cited indicator of the level of violence in Jersey's night time economy is the number of assaults that take place in the streets, pubs and clubs of St Helier during the peak period when most trouble occurs. This provides a consistent time period and geographical area in which to monitor the number of assaults being recorded. States of Jersey Police have used this indicator for a number of years as the starting point for analysis to understand the nature of the problem.

As part of that analysis, we are aware of many factors that can influence this indicator. Whilst it may be simple and easy to compare the number of assaults from one year to the next, such comparisons are very limited and can be hugely misleading. Real insight into the nature and extent of street violence can only be derived from proper analysis. The following points illustrate the importance of understanding what lies beneath the headline figures –

### ■ ***Changing levels of recorded assaults may reflect changes in the information provided to the Police by victims***

The British and Jersey Crime Surveys both show that many victims choose not to tell the Police that they have been assaulted. In 2003, only a third of assault victims in the Jersey Crime Survey claimed to have reported the incident. Reasons given included the victim deciding that the Police would not be able to do anything, it was too inconvenient to report the incident, fear of reprisals and the matter being dealt with privately.<sup>33</sup> In about a third of the assaults recorded in the pubs, clubs and streets of St Helier, the victim already knows their assailant and this can sometimes affect their willingness to involve the Police.

Our records show that over 55% of assaults in the St Helier night time economy are reported by witnesses, identified by CCTV cameras or seen by Police officers on patrol. The Police would have remained unaware of some of these incidents if it had been left to the victim. For example, one in five of the victims located by the Police after a third party reported the incident still refused to make a formal complaint in 2007. It is therefore highly unlikely that they would have come forward to report the crime independently and no crime would have been recorded.

In summary, some assaults will go unreported. Police recorded crime figures can only reflect the number of assaults of which the Police are aware and therefore they do not represent the true level of violence in the night time economy. Any commentator looking at significant increases in the level of street violence, for example, must consider the possibility that the Police are making greater inroads into this pool of previously unreported violence.

Another factor to consider is the detail of the information that the victim is prepared to tell the Police officer. If an officer cannot glean sufficient information from a victim who is reluctant to support a Police investigation, the initial report may not pass the subsequent evidential test that decides whether a crime has been committed. In these cases, the initial crime report may be reclassified under official crime counting rules as a 'no crime'. From this perspective it is valuable to compare not only the number of *recorded* assaults but also the number of *reported* assaults. The latter provides an insight into the overall number of assault

incidents being dealt with by the Police, even if some do not end up being finalised as a recorded crime.

■ **Changes in the number of recorded assaults may reflect different levels of cooperation between the licensed trade and the Police.**

Nearly a quarter of the assaults recorded by the Police in 2007 were initially reported by licensed premises. This raises two issues -

- Reporting rates can be influenced by the attitude of licensed premises towards the Police. A poorly run premises may be reluctant to inform the Police about trouble if they believe their license may be jeopardised. Improving standards in the licensed trade, with better trained bar and door staff, better management and increased use of private CCTV in and outside of premises can lead to more assaults being reported.
- Stricter enforcement of entry criteria by licensed premises can actually lead to more violence as people react aggressively to being refused entry or asked to leave.

■ **Changes in the number of recorded assaults may be a reflection of changes in the level of Police resources deployed to tackle the problem.**

The fact that a Police officer arrives at the scene is sometimes the telling factor in whether a formal complaint is forthcoming. Unless there is other definitive evidence, it can be difficult to ascertain whether a crime has been committed. Therefore -

- The more officers there are on patrol, the more assaults are likely to be recorded. The smaller the number on patrol, the more likely they are to become tied up in dealing with incidents. This may mean that it takes longer to deploy officers to the scene of a new incident and the purported victim may have moved on before they can be spoken to (bearing in mind the evidence that a significant number have no interest in reporting the incident to the Police).
- Having more officers on the street means incident response times may improve. More victims are located and more crimes are recorded. In addition, offenders may also be apprehended and they sometimes make a counter allegation of assault. The increase in recorded crime doesn't mean people's safety is at greater risk. In fact, a faster Police response to reported assaults can limit their duration and therefore reduce the incidence and seriousness of injury.

The counter argument to this contention is the traditional perception that having more officers on the beat will reduce street violence and disorder. Certainly, the data bears out the notion that offenders will rarely commit an assault in full view of the Police. Less than 5% of the assaults recorded in St Helier's night time economy during 2007 were directly witnessed by an officer in the street. Much Police time is spent preventing assaults by intervening in arguments and defusing situations before violence breaks out but this 'business as usual' does not lend itself to statistical measurement. So a Police presence may impact on the behaviour of some potential offenders but we cannot quantify these benefits.

Other offenders are not so easily deterred and will be intent on pursuing a grudge against another individual or just looking to provoke a fight. These individuals will always manage to find a time and place away from patrolling officers. The Police don't have the resources to put an officer on every street corner. Nor do we have the resources to replace every officer who is deployed to an incident with another patrol whose purpose is solely to watch the crowds and deter trouble. In this respect a better measure of street violence policing is not

whether these assaults take place, but whether the Police are able to track down these violent individuals and bring them to justice.

■ **Changes in the number of recorded assaults may reflect changes in Police crime recording practices.**

In April 2002, the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced across police forces in England & Wales. Its purpose was to promote greater consistency in how the Police record crime and take a more victim-led approach by recording alleged offences, as well as evidence-based ones. Previously, the police may quite legitimately not have recorded an alleged offence if there was no evidence to support that it had occurred. In many cases, the NCRS led to an *increase* in police recorded crime figures, making it look like more crimes were committed, when that might not have been the case. For example, it is estimated that the total figures for violence against the person in England and Wales were inflated by an estimated 23% in 2002/03.

The introduction of the new NCRS had a similar effect in Jersey. An internal audit of our compliance with the new rules identified that some officers were not recording assaults in accordance with the new guidelines. Our processes were tightened and, as a consequence, recorded street violence in the St Helier night time economy went up by nearly 25% in 2004. This step change was not a reflection of declining public safety in the town at night, but rather the changes in recording processes by States of Jersey Police.

This example illustrates the importance of understanding how Police crime recording practices can impact upon the figures.

## **Conclusion**

The level of street violence in our night time economy and the effectiveness of the Police response cannot simply be measured by a crude comparison of the number of assaults from one year to the next. Any attempt to do so must be qualified by understanding of possible changes in–

- levels of cooperation from victims
- incidents associated with licensed premises
- policing resources and activity
- Police crime recording practices

The resulting insight can be further strengthened by seeking out other sources of information concerning street violence.

### **Using Police Incident Data**

The Police Control Room incident log can yield information about the number of incidents of street violence and disorder being reported by phone to the Police by members of the public. If significant changes in the level of street violence and disorder were occurring, this would be reflected in the incident log.

### **Using Health Data**

Some assault victims will seek medical treatment. In some cases, they will be attended by an Ambulance Service and in others they will seek treatment at the Hospital Accident and Emergency Department. Anonymised data from these Health services can provide a cross-check of potential trends indicated by Police data. An increasingly violent society is likely to impose increased demands on these services.

# MEASURING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF STREET VIOLENCE

Hard data from Police information systems, supplemented by information from partner agencies can provide an evidence-based insight into the changing levels of street violence and disorder in the night time economy of St Helier.

Equally important, however, is how the public perceive the problem. All the indicators and analysis may point to increasing community safety, but the figures are of little value if the public believe that the situation is getting worse. Those beliefs impact on people's behaviour, influencing decisions as to whether to visit St Helier after dark or even buy property in the town. They can also influence people's perceptions of Police performance and can potentially distort people's priorities. For this reason, the Force has been working to develop effective performance indicators that measure public perceptions of town safety and Police performance in tackling street violence and disorder.

## Public Perceptions and the Media

From the outset, it is important to recognise that the local media exert enormous influence on people's perceptions. According to the findings of the 2007 Jersey Annual Social Survey, the most popular means of hearing government news and general day-to-day information are newspapers (indicated by 82% of people), television (77%) and radio (58%).

JASS 2007 also repeated a question originally asked in JASS 2005 about what influenced people's perceptions of how safe town is after dark. Respondents were asked to rate whether personal experience, that of friends or family, or reporting by the local media were major or minor influences on the way they felt. The JASS 2007 report found little change from 2005 when it concluded –

*‘Interestingly, those who feel “Very safe” in town after dark are more likely to report that their own personal experiences were a major influence (81%), with fewer (16%) saying the local media was a major influence. In contrast, those who feel “Very unsafe” in town more frequently indicated that the local media had been a major influence than their own personal experience. This was true for two thirds (68%) of those who felt unsafe in town, compared to under half (48%) of the same group for whom personal experience had shaped their opinion.’<sup>34</sup>*

The JASS results demonstrate that the media are the principal source of information informing the Jersey public about these issues. That role carries significant responsibility. Lazy journalism or cherry picking the figures to seek out impactful ‘bad news’ headlines will have an insidious effect on public opinion and fear of crime.

Key performance indicators based upon public perceptions about their own safety in town after dark have to take into account the fact that many people's beliefs are heavily influenced by the media as opposed to personal experience. It is therefore important to look past the headline figure to understand what more detailed analysis can tell us about people's perceptions. For that reason, we also take particular note of the views expressed by –

- people who visit the town centre after dark on a frequent basis;
- younger age groups. They are the main users of the night time economy and were most likely to cite personal experience as opposed to media as their main influence.

# STREET VIOLENCE AND DISORDER IN 2007

## Recorded Assaults

During 2007, the number of physical and sexual assaults recorded by States of Jersey Police in the pubs, clubs and streets of St Helier between 8pm and 4am increased by 1.6% compared to 2006.<sup>35</sup> This simple measure cannot be used in isolation to determine changing levels of violence in the night time economy. It must be considered in the context of the following indicators.<sup>36</sup>

- Calls from members of the public for Police assistance to deal with street violence and disorder **fell** by 13% during 2007;
- The number of physical assaults recorded as taking place on the streets of St Helier **fell** by over 12%;
- The overall number of physical assaults *reported* to the Police by alleged victims during the course of 2007 **fell** by nearly 8%;
- The number of people seeking medical treatment for assault injuries in the Hospital Accident and Emergency Department **fell** by nearly 4%;
- The number of injury assaults attended by the Ambulance Service remained unchanged;
- No changes to Police resource levels or tactics deployed to deal with street violence were introduced;<sup>37</sup>

The cumulative evidence of these indicators is that the night time economy of St Helier was a safer place during 2007. Closer inspection of the recorded assault figures also reveals why they have shown a slight increase despite the overall improvement –

- The number of assaults that took place inside or immediately outside licensed premises increased by 34%. Over half of these incidents were reported by the licensed premises themselves. It is interesting to note that the overall number of premises reporting assault incidents remained constant and the increase was driven by incidents at a handful of premises.
- The number of these *reported* cases that had to be classified as ‘no crime’ due to a lack of evidence fell by nearly 46%. This may in part be due to more assaults taking place in the vicinity of licensed premises with CCTV and more witnesses. It may also be due to better cooperation from victims. So, whilst the overall number of reported assaults has fallen, we have been able to secure the evidence needed to record a crime in accordance with NCRS rules and this has contributed to an apparent increase in *recorded* assaults in 2007.<sup>38</sup>

## Police Performance

This analysis has shown how it is difficult to measure the policing effort that successfully deters trouble and prevent incidents flaring up into violence and disorder. What we can measure, however, is the effectiveness of the Police response when trouble does break out, bearing in mind that most of these incidents do not occur in the immediate vicinity of an officer. In 2007 -


- In 78.5% of the physical assault cases recorded as having taken place in the St Helier night time economy during 2007, the Police investigation identified a named suspect
- In 38% of the physical assault cases where the Police failed to identify a suspect, the alleged victim had refused to make a formal complaint and support a Police investigation
- Currently, an offender has been charged or referred to a Parish Hall Enquiry in 47% of the physical assault cases recorded as having taken place in the St Helier night time economy during 2007. Overall, 59% of assaults have been detected.
- Where victims refused to support a Police investigation, the Police have currently only been able to secure a prosecution in just under 10% of cases

## Public Perceptions

The results of the 2007 Jersey Annual Social Survey provide the following insight into public perceptions of street violence and the safety of St Helier after dark.

- There has been a significant improvement in public perceptions of the safety of town after dark. Overall, in 2007 just over half (55%) of people felt town was either “A bit unsafe” or “Very unsafe” after dark, compared with nearly three-quarters (70%) of people in 2005.<sup>39</sup>

**JASS Report Figure 3.4: How safe or unsafe do you consider the town centre to be after dark?**



- The media continue to exert a significant influence on people’s perceptions of the safety of town after dark. It is therefore important to note that –
  - 70% of the people who visit the town centre after dark on a daily or almost daily basis believe it is safe;
  - 60% of people aged 16-24 and 50% of people aged 25-34 regarded the town centre as being safe after dark.
- The people of Jersey do not perceive that street violence and disorder is any worse now than it was in 2005. A majority of people (50%) continue to regard street violence and disorder as a minor problem for the Island, although a significant minority (33%) consider it to be a major problem. About 47% of people believe that street violence and disorder should be a key priority for Police action. These figures have shown no change since 2005.
- The proportion of the public who think the Police do a good job of policing street violence and disorder has increased from 45% in 2005 to 49% in 2007. This falls just short of being a statistically significant improvement.

## Summary of 2007 Performance

In summary the results for 2007 show that –

- Between 2005 and 2007, public perceptions of the safety of the town centre after dark have improved significantly;
- This step change coincides with the introduction of 50% more police officers into the policing of the night time economy since January 2006.
- It is impossible to measure the value of this additional Police presence in preventing violence and disorder. Certainly, the overall level of violence is being contained and there are some indications of improvement that will be monitored carefully.
- Nevertheless, the majority of people still regard St Helier as being unsafe after dark. Nor has the additional policing effort led to any significant change in public impressions of Police performance in tackling street violence and disorder.

## THE WAY FORWARD

It should be emphasised that the 50% increase in the number of officers deployed to police the night economy was not achieved by increasing the establishment of the Force. Rather it was done by changing our shift structure and patterns so that more officers could be deployed at night. Some 40% of our front-line response strength is now rostered to be on the streets between the peak times of 11pm and 3am on weekends.. The system has now been in operation for two years and evaluation has identified two key issues –

- The increased Police presence in the night time economy has had to be achieved at the expense of daytime policing. The impact is felt not only in terms of the physical time spent on patrol but also because the enquiries and prosecution paperwork generated by a busy night shift then continue to divert officers away from the beat when they return to daytime duties. At the same time, however, the public's appetite for the policing of other issues such as road safety and anti-social behaviour, or simply the reassurance of a visible police presence, remains unabated and the reduction in daytime presence appears to be causing some unease.
- As and when the Force falls below its authorised strength, or police resources have to be diverted into other enquiries, the resilience of the new shift system comes under increasing pressure. The new shift units are smaller than before so staff vacancies and absences have a greater impact. Officers from specialist departments are regularly called upon to reinforce the public order policing effort at weekends. In addition, the work generated by a busy night of public order carries on long after the revellers have gone home. Officers are interviewing and processing prisoners, dealing with forensic medical examiners and lawyers, taking statements from victims and witnesses and writing their reports. Again, detectives from specialist departments are routinely diverted from their normal work to alleviate the pressure on their shift counterparts.

The reality is that the existing commitment to the policing of the night time economy is a powerful drain on Police resources that impacts across the whole organisation and detracts from the policing service that we aspire to deliver at other times of the day. With the existing authorised strength, the current level of commitment is only just sustainable. Under these circumstances, there is no prospect of States of Jersey Police being able to further reinforce the resources committed to the policing of the night time economy from within its existing establishment.

Herein lies the problem. As long as a substantial proportion of young adults in Jersey binge drink, the Island will have a problem with raucous and drink-fuelled public behaviour which sometimes spills over into violence and disorder. It is a social problem which afflicts every urban centre across the United Kingdom that has developed a popular night time economy based around alcohol. States of Jersey Police believe that our commitment of substantial resources to the policing of the St Helier night time economy has underpinned growing public confidence in the safety of the town centre after dark since 2005. The improvement evidenced by JASS represented a significant move in the right direction but it is clearly not enough. The majority of the public still don't like what they see in St Helier by night and they still believe that the Police should be doing a lot more.

Under these circumstances, what can drive the next significant improvement in public opinion? It is hoped that this report will highlight the problems inherent in simply exhorting the Police to do more. The current position represents the Police effort functioning at its full capacity with existing resources and powers. There are no additional Police resources to throw at the problem and, indeed, there is mounting pressure to draw Police officers away from the night time economy and back into daytime policing. Politicians and policy makers must either decide that

they are satisfied with the status quo or consider what other alternatives will make a real difference.

States of Jersey Police believe that the following options should form part of the debate –

### **Decisive action to change the dynamics of the street environment at closing time**

States of Jersey Police have now been arguing the case for several years for two key changes that will significantly alter the dynamics of the street environment during the peak periods for violence and disorder in the night time economy.

- Introduce changes to the Island's out-of-date licensing laws as a matter of priority. It is no coincidence that the busiest times for the Police follow the 11pm and 2am closing times when different types of drinker who frequent different venues are brought together at the point when they are at their most drunk. By forcing these drinkers outside at the same time, the legislation is actually creating the environment for more violence and disorder and making the policing problem more difficult.
- Police concerns regarding the issue of late night transport have so far not been entirely resolved. The current arrangements, whereby there are no buses and a limited supply of taxis can lead to tensions when large crowds exit from licensed premises. The recent initiative by the Safer St Helier project in partnership with the Jersey Taxi Drivers Association to introduce 'Taxi Marshalls' in St Helier is welcome and the effect will be evaluated in 2008.

States of Jersey Police believe that the effective combination of these two initiatives would promote the swift dispersal of crowds from the street environment in the latter stages of the evening when most violence occurs. This would facilitate better management of the street environment and the reduction in violence would in turn help maintain a higher Police presence.

### **Increased Police powers to deal with disorderly conduct**

Unfortunately, the task of individual police officers in dealing with some offenders continues to be made more difficult by the shortcomings of the legal powers available to them. Currently, for example, only a person who can be proved in a court of law to have been totally "drunk" can be prosecuted for disorderly behaviour. New legislation was considered by the States in January 2007 but then deferred pending amendments. Our officers must continue with their current powers until such time as the new legislation is brought into force.

### **Managing Alcohol Consumption in Jersey**

Jersey has a strong drinking culture and alcohol consumption per person is significantly above that of the UK. Every year around £111,000,000 is spent on alcohol in the Island.<sup>40</sup> The Medical Officer of Health has expressed particular concern that '*we were gradually winning the fight against alcohol misuse but binge drinking is a new challenge*'. Over a third of young adults in Jersey now binge drink.<sup>41</sup> As long as excessive alcohol consumption dominates St Helier's night time economy, we will continue to police an environment where too many people resort to aggressive confrontation and violence. That problem will not be cured by putting a dozen extra officers on the beat. Rather, it requires a fundamental review of government policy to promote the responsible sale and consumption of alcohol in Jersey.

## **APPENDIX D**

# **DELIVERING AN EFFECTIVE SPEED ENFORCEMENT REGIME IN JERSEY**

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February 2008**

## **DELIVERING AN EFFECTIVE SPEED ENFORCEMENT REGIME IN JERSEY**

In March 2005, the Environment and Public Services Committee presented a new Island policy on speed limits to the States. In its report, the Committee included the comments of the working group that had researched the policy, who commented that –

*'Evidence showed that speed limits in themselves are ineffective in significantly reducing traffic speeds without strict enforcement, which will always be constrained by limitations in manpower.'*

There is considerable truth in this analysis -

- Using conventional methods of speed detection, States of Jersey Police have never been 'fit for purpose' in their capacity to deliver speed enforcement to a level likely to achieve a sustained impact on driver behaviour. To do so would require the long term deployment of large numbers of police officers to roadside speed enforcement. This would not be sustainable, would divert resources from other policing activity and would not represent value for money to the taxpayer.
- As a consequence, traditional methods of policing speed in Jersey have not had the desired overall effect on driver behaviour either through deterrence or the prosecution of habitual offenders. Prosecuting less than 1,000 drivers a year for speeding when about 2,000 such offences are committed every day on some roads does not constitute a significant deterrent.

In approving the new speed limits policy in 2005, the States also agreed that speed enforcement should be improved. This political mandate is supported by steadfast public opinion concerning the threat posed by speeding motorists to community safety. In 2005, the Jersey Annual Social Survey found that 52% of people in Jersey thought that speeding motorists should be a policing priority in their neighbourhood.<sup>42</sup> Two years on, JASS 2007 returned the same result. Residents want the speed limits outside their homes to be properly respected. Chronic abuse of those limits creates a perception of danger and affects people's quality of life. This is likely to manifest itself in behaviour changes, especially for the most vulnerable road users – children, other pedestrians and cyclists. It will also be forcibly expressed through demands for Police action, as evidenced by surveys and public pressure to keep reducing speed limits on local roads.

If government is serious about achieving significant change in this area, then doing what we have always done demonstrably does not work. The Island will not witness a significant reduction in the chronic abuse of speed limits and an associated improvement in people's concerns about speeding motorists if we continue to rely on the conventional approach to speed enforcement. Drivers must have a reasonable expectation of being caught if they are to change current behaviours and conform to speed limits. Interventions with offenders must also give them cause for serious thought about changing their behaviours.

States of Jersey Police responded to the mandate from the States in 2005 and acquired new roadside enforcement technology, known as LASTEC, in the following year. LASTEC is a manually operated speed detection device linked to a camera that photographs the vehicle and records its speed. This dispenses with the need to stop the driver at the roadside, allowing the operator to concentrate solely on speed detection. Whilst a police officer using a hand held speed gun might be able to detect three offences in an hour, LASTEC has been known to record sixty speeding offences in that time.

States of Jersey Police are now in a position to deliver highly effective and cost efficient speed detection at the roadside. LASTEC, if fully deployed as part of a coherent roads policing strategy and supported by an efficient process for dealing with offenders, has the potential to transform speed enforcement in Jersey. The deterrent value of this transformation may finally mean that speed limits become effective in reducing vehicle speeds in the Island.

It is worth reiterating that this is the sole purpose of speed enforcement policing as some opponents will suggest that the Police prioritise speed enforcement in order to raise revenue or bolster detection rates. Such views are regularly put forward by critics via the media and risk gaining some credence through repetition. It is therefore worth emphasising that –

- States of Jersey Police accrue no financial benefit whatsoever from speed enforcement activity. Speeding fines levied by the courts are paid into the Treasury but over 80% of speeding cases were dealt with at Parish Hall Enquiries in 2007. Speeding fines levied through the parish system are retained by the parish authorities as agreed by the States in January 2006.
- The number of motorists reported for speeding offences has no bearing whatsoever on the crime detection rate. Speeding is not and never has been prescribed as a crime in the same sense as offences such as burglary, assault or malicious damage.

Unfortunately, resource and process issues have significantly hindered the deployment of LASTEC in 2007. The physical detection of speeding offenders is only one part of the criminal justice process. The new technology has facilitated a vast increase in productive capacity 'on the street' but this needs to be matched at each stage of the prosecution process or else systems designed and resourced to cope with a smaller volume of work will become log-jammed and fail. This is one of the fundamental reasons why States of Jersey Police have not yet been able to exploit the full potential of LASTEC as part of a coherent roads policing strategy. There are two key barriers to the wider deployment of the equipment –

- Traditionally, speeding offenders who have been reported for prosecution must attend a Parish Hall Enquiry. They can either be dealt with at this stage or charged to attend court in the case of more serious infractions. In law, responsibility for the administration of the prosecution process rests with the Parish authorities but, in practice, it has been centralised through the Police Criminal Justice Unit and is a service provided free of charge to the Parishes. The administration procedures involved in reporting a person to a Parish Hall Enquiry, booking and arranging their attendance and providing the Centenier with the information required are time consuming and resource intensive. The advent of LASTEC has further complicated the procedure as the Police must first engage in correspondence with the registered keeper of the vehicle to identify the driver at the time of the offence. The bureaucracy of servicing Parish Hall Enquiries is proving untenable with the much increased volume of speeding offences being processed.
- In addition, the Parish Hall Enquiry system is not designed to cope with the additional workload. LASTEC is designed to detect large volumes of speed offences - the current prosecution process is not. Parish Hall Enquiries must deal with all manner of crime, public order and motoring offences as well as speeding. The system simply does not have the physical capacity to deal with the thousands of speeding offences that LASTEC can potentially yield.

## **The Way Forward**

States of Jersey Police has responded to the mandate from the States of Jersey and equipped themselves to deliver a more effective speed enforcement regime. Whilst limited use of LASTEC has already yielded a twofold increase in the number of speeding offences reported, the full potential of the equipment has not yet been realised. But the Police represent only one agency in the partnership entrusted with delivering government policy. Unless all agencies are in agreement and align their working practices, it will prove impossible to deliver the expected results. Set out below are a number of options put forward by States of Jersey Police for comment and discussion. It is not intended that this should be an exhaustive list but rather a stimulus for debate as to how all the agencies involved in delivering an effective speed enforcement regime in Jersey can contribute towards this objective.

## Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo

Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
<p>This will only work if States of Jersey Police effectively withdraw LASTEC from operation. The equipment is designed to deal with large volumes of speeding offences. Large volumes of speeding offences are currently being committed in Jersey. Deployment of the equipment will result in large numbers of offenders being reported.</p> <p>Speed enforcement must then revert to the traditional strategy which has already proven unsuccessful</p>	<p>The only advantage of this approach is that relieves the pressure on a prosecution process designed to cope with less demand.</p>	<p>Conventional methods of policing speed in Jersey have been shown to have minimal impact on driver behaviour either through deterrence or the prosecution of habitual offenders.</p> <p>The opportunity to deliver a States mandate to develop better enforcement of speed limits in Jersey will be forfeited for the sake of preserving existing ways of working in the criminal justice system</p> <p>Chronic abuse of speed limits in Jersey will persist and public concern about the danger posed by speeding motorists at neighbourhood level will continue unabated.</p> <p>Revenue from speeding fines now accrues entirely to the parish where the offence occurred. Maintaining the status quo will mean that parishes will forfeit significant income. That money could have been used to fund traffic calming schemes at appropriate locations to eliminate speeding problems once and for all. In the absence of potential income for LASTEC operations, there will be significant delay before such schemes can be implemented</p>

## Option 2: Review States Speed Limits Policy

Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
<p>Some critics argue that, despite chronic abuse of speed limits, most infractions are relatively minor and Jersey's road safety record remains good. This argument implies that a number of speed limits are inappropriate and should be reviewed. Raising the limits would then bring many drivers within the law without, in theory, impacting on road safety.</p> <p>If, for example, it was considered appropriate that La Route de la Liberation was designated as a 40mph zone instead of a 30mph zone, only four drivers would have been reported in 2007 instead of 178 (allowing drivers a 10% margin of error on their actual speed)</p> <p>Similarly, if it was considered appropriate to re-designate St Peter's Village as a 30mph zone, no drivers would have been reported in 2007 instead of 56 (again allowing a 10% margin of error).</p>	<p>If this contention is valid, LASTEC would then be deployed to enforce more appropriate speed limits and less offences would be reported.</p>	<p>The work of the speed limits working party highlighted the strength of public opposition to increases in speed limits. Wholesale increases in limits are likely to lead to a public outcry and strong opposition at a local level.</p> <p>Increases in the speed limits will exacerbate people's perceptions of the threat posed by motorists to their quality of life</p> <p>An increase in speed limits is likely to lead to an increase in road traffic collisions. The stopping distance for a car travelling at 30mph is considerably shorter than one travelling at 40mph.</p> <p>There is a danger that more people will be inclined to speed at between 40 and 50mph in newly designated 40mph zones</p> <p>Again, there would need to be a serious challenge as to whether the motivation behind adopting this option would be to enhance road safety or protect existing ways of working in the criminal justice system</p>

### Option 3: Transfer Responsibility for Arranging NIP of Speeding Offences to Parishes

Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
<p>States of Jersey Police should cease all administrative work associated with LASTEC prosecutions other than to provide the relevant Parish with the prosecution evidence, the name and address of the registered keeper of the vehicle and the number of speeding offences listed for that individual. It would then be the responsibility of the Parish to take forward any prosecution as it saw fit</p>	<p>This would substantially reduce the staff time and costs absorbed in serving the PHE system for speeding prosecutions at a time when the Police are coming under significant budgetary pressure. At the moment, it is estimated that the Police incur more cost in processing a speeding offence on behalf of the Parish than the value of any fine likely to be imposed at an Enquiry</p> <p>Should the Parishes maintain the view that PHEs are appropriate means of dealing with all speeding offences, this would enable them to do so</p> <p>This approach would allow the Parishes to exercise their own judgement on whether it would be appropriate to issue an offender with a notice of intended prosecution.</p> <p>Whilst this option would increase the administrative burden on the Parishes, they are now in receipt of all revenue from speeding fines.</p>	<p>This option would not solve the fundamental problem that the criminal justice system cannot cope with the volume of offences created by stricter enforcement of speed limits in Jersey. Whilst it would address the resource pressures with the Criminal Justice Unit of States of Jersey Police, it could give rise to a host of anomalies and inconsistencies in the administration of justice across the parishes unless –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▫ the parishes are able to significantly increase the capacity of the Parish Hall Enquiry system to deal with an increased volume of offences</li> <li>▫ new systems were put in place at parochial level</li> </ul>

#### Option 4: Combine Fixed Penalty Notices with Targeted Use of Parish Hall Enquiries

Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
<p>Legislate for the introduction of a fixed penalty notice system for speeding offences. Only use the Parish Hall Enquiry system to deal with speeding offences where –</p> <p>the alleged offender requests a Parish Hall Enquiry to plead mitigating circumstances or indicate their intention to contest the evidence</p> <p>the alleged offender has committed a specified number of speeding offences within the previous three years and is considered to be an appropriate referral for community-based restorative justice (eg; referral to a self-funded road safety awareness course)</p> <p>the offender is under the age of 21 and is considered to be an appropriate referral for community-based restorative justice (eg; referral to a self-funded road safety awareness course)</p>	<p>Under this system, most offenders would receive fixed penalty notices and it would be possible to process more offenders. States of Jersey Police would then be able to develop the potential of LASTEC to help curb abuse of speed limits in Jersey</p> <p>The Parish Hall Enquiry would continue to play an important part in the process by focussing on drivers displaying persistent offending behaviour or is young and inexperienced and may need different interventions.</p> <p>Freeing up the Parish Hall Enquiry system to deal with these specific cases rather than first time offenders might provide opportunities to develop new interventions that effectively divert offenders away from the courts but also influence their driving behaviour.</p> <p>This approach provides a joined up response from all agencies in the criminal justice system to the mandate from the States to improve speed enforcement in Jersey</p>	<p>Option may be misinterpreted by some as an attempt to undermine the Parish Hall Enquiry system. This would divert attention away from the true focus of the debate – which is the development of a joined-up approach to speed enforcement in Jersey. The option is intended to ensure that the Parish hall Enquiry plays an integral part in a new system.</p>