States of Jersey Police

Making Jersey Safer

BRITISH STANDARDS SUMMARY 2012

Perimeter

High security information is available from the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guide (UK Edition 2010), and also the Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE) 2010, also referred to as SEAP, (Security Equipment Assessment Panel), on the CPNI Extranet. This document contains a list of vehicle barriers which have been tested to Publicly Available Specification **(PAS) 68: 2010 published by the British Standards Institute (BSI).** If you require further information regarding information at these security levels, please contact the States of Jersey Police CTSA officer.

PAS 68:2010 covers manufacture and testing of vehicle security barriers.
PAS 69:2006 provides guidance for the selection, installation and use of security barriers.

Traffic Calming
Vehicle Barriers
Permanent Barriers
Semi-Permanent Barriers
Fences, Walls, Hedges & Ditches

Ensure that the States of Jersey Planning Department are consulted

BS 1722 (British Standard (parts 10 and 12)), **covers fencing standards**.

There are various types of fence; an ideal height for security purposes is 2.9 metres plus a topping. For domestic purposes, a 1.4 metre fence at the front and 1.8 metre fence at the rear is acceptable. Any fence over 2 metres may need Planning approval. In Jersey, any topping can be considered if the fence is 2 metres or less. However, signage should be considered commensurate to the topping.

Types of basic fencing:-

Chain Link

Small Welded Mesh/Expanded Metal

Steel Palisade

Timber is not generally used in security fencing. Whilst it is initially cheap it has a high maintenance cost and is usually restricted to around 2m in height. Timber fences, fitted with lattice toppings and thorny climbing plants can create a good deterrent for domestic dwellings.

Quickthorn Hedges

Exterior Gates should be of the same height and construction standards as the fence.

Turnstiles controlling authorised access and exit as part of the overall access control system are an excellent way to ensure only authorised personnel are admitted.

Vehicle Gates should be installed to the same build criteria as pedestrian perimeter gates.

Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) systems should conform to a minimum standard of **BS 4737 part 3:1977 (exterior alarm systems)**. There are numerous different systems on the market including fence alarm detectors, electric toppings and beam alarms.

Trees & Shrubs growing in the vicinity of buildings or masking a perimeter fence or wall should be regularly checked to ensure that the branches on them cannot be used as a ladder to gain access to the grounds or upper floors to the building.

Plants. The careful choice of plants, with suitable qualities can, where appropriate, be used to enhance physical protection.

Basement areas should be kept tidy and free

Any doors into under pavement stores should be kept locked when not in use with mortise locks conforming to a minimum of BS 3621 (British Standard) fitted a third from the bottom and top of the frame.

Drainpipes are often used by potential intruders to gain access to upper floors of buildings or even to the roof.

Scaffolding acts like a magnet to potential intruders and affords easy access at higher levels which would not normally have secure locks fitted to them.

Ladders & garden tools are often used to facilitate an entry into buildings, particularly residences.

Building Construction

Doors and Door Hardware

Doors are the obvious point of entry into a building and care should be taken to ensure that they are strong enough to withstand a forcible attack. This includes not only the fabric of the door but also the component parts. Doors should be fitted with a five-lever mortise lock tested to British Standard BS 3621. Doors should ideally be of solid wood construction a minimum of 44 mm thick, but if doors are constructed of thin panelling then this can be protected by installing a metal lining, which when fixed to the inside leaves the panel visible on the outside, however this does not protect the lock.

Doorsets approved to PAS 24-1 Enhanced security requirements for door assemblies - This standard describes a series of test methods and a range of criteria relevant to the general performance of single and double leaf, single swing, hinged external door assemblies for dwellings. The scope of the standard covers inward and outward opening doorsets, with or without integral or coupled side panels and fanlights.

The scope of the standard does not cover the installation of the product nor does it cover sliding doors, folding doors, tilt and slide doors, and pivoted doors, or doors with any frame member over 3m.

The concept of 'enhanced security' in this product standard is based upon a relationship between forced human intervention techniques with basic hand tools and resistance to entry under multi-directional loading and hard and soft body impact tests. The standard provides a means of evaluation of resistance to opportunist attack. The standard does not provide a means of evaluating the protection provided against unauthorised intrusion to the levels of attack or scope of entry methods covered within LPS 1175 Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of intruder resistant building components, strongpoints, security enclosures and free-standing barriers.

The ability to gain entry by picking the locks, deliberately breaking the glass or by attacking the frame fixing methods is not addressed in PAS 24-1.

It is preferable and more secure to fit door-sets (frame, door, locks and fittings) tested to British Standard BS PAS 24. This is the standard for high-security doors for homes. These are generally adequate for most businesses. Sites that have a medium or high risk should use doors, grilles and shutters tested to Loss Prevention Board Standard LPS 1175.

Points to note for all external doors:

- Doors should be aligned with the plane of the building, avoiding any recesses.
- The door should fit the frame snugly to prevent it from being forced open with a crowbar or similar tool.
- Door frames should be solidly built and as strong as the door itself.
- Wooden doors should have a minimum thickness of 44mm.
- Materials, such as UPVC and certain aluminium sections can be weaker and less durable.
- External hinges should be covered and the pins should be irremovable.
- Only laminated glass should be used in glazed doors to prevent a break in or an accident.
- External and security doors should be fitted with spring loaded door closers. These should always be positioned on the inside face of the door.
- Security doors should be built to British Standard (PAS) 24. For Insurance purposes, the final exit door must be secured by one of the following:
- A mortise deadlock to British Standard 3621 or a deadlock with at least five levers or other lock providing equal security.

BS EN 125 for Panic Escape (required for buildings where the public are present). **Emergency escape proving single handed egress meeting BS EN 179 is for doors in buildings where staff work** and thus any visitors can be escorted out in an emergency).

Locks should be carefully maintained and should be checked to ensure that the throw of the bolt is secured within the striking plate. If there is a large gap between the door and the frame, the bolt may only just enter the striking plate and may not withstand any sustained pressure. **Locks for perimeter doors should at least comply with the requirements of British Standard 3621, a five lever mortise lock as a minimum standard. European Standards BS EN 1125 or BS EN 179 only applies to panic and emergency escape doors.** What should be stressed is that certificated door sets (i.e. door and frame) have to have the locking fitted that they are tested with.

All external doors should comply with BS 8220-3.2004 which is a guide for security of buildings against crime, **and should be used in conjunction with BS 5588-1 that provides fire precautions in the design construction and use of buildings.**

If a letterbox within the door is required (it should be fitted to BS EN 13724: 2002) the occupier should consider fixing a metal letter 'catch box' with an internal heat sensor and fire extinguisher. People at most personal risk should contemplate this option. **A better option would be to have a separate post box fitted to the exterior wall of the premises, to prevent unwanted access to the inside of the building.**

Other standards include:-

PAS 23 / 24 for domestic and hotel locks.
BS 8621 for Easy Escape Ironmongery.
BS EN 1627 that covers windows, doors, shutters for burglary resistance, requirements & classifications.
BS 10621 that covers Alternative Methods of Escape – allows the door to be dead locked from the inside to prevent the door from being opened from the inside by an intruder.

Please note that **LPCB LPS 1175** provides various levels of attack resistance which manufactures submit products for testing, and that the SEAP tests are similar except that the numbers are one down from the LPCB i.e. LPS 1175 SR3 = SEAP Class 2.

Windows And Glazing

These comprise of ground floor & basement opening windows and all other windows (accessible without the use of a ladder), skylights (including windows and skylights accessible from adjoining roofs, walls, downpipes, balconies or external stairs) and garage windows.

These should either be secured by a key operated window lock, a key operated handle, a key operated security bolt or a key lockable multi-point locking system.

Windows in sites that have a low or medium risk should meet British Standard BS 7950. Laminated glass should be used on ground floor windows or accessible upper-floor windows. Window locks that use a key should secure all accessible windows. If a window is easily accessible, it may also be appropriate to limit how wide it can be opened, or to fit bars or a grille. Windows can be protected by roller shutters. However, slotted shutters are often harder to vandalise. Shutters, bars and grilles can be fitted to the inside but this will leave the window or door vulnerable. Remember to check with planning and fire regulations before fitting bars, grilles or shutters.

Casement windows open outwards and are usually secured by arm and lever locking points on the side and bottom. They are easily opened by inserting a screwdriver and prising the lever off its securing pin. The locking points should have additional key operated locks fitted to prevent this.

Sash windows are usually constructed with wooden frames and have two separate sections, the bottom and top halves of the windows open by being raised or lowered respectively.

Pivotal windows are usually metal framed and pivot either side to side or top and bottom. Safety space limiters are normally fitted. Levers secure the window into the frame in the closed position. Additional key operated window locks are not always fitted as standard.

The principal UK standards for safety glass & glazing are;

BS 6262 - Glazing for buildings.

BS 6206 has been superseded by EN 12600 as the recognised impact standard for safety glass. However laminated, toughened glass and other safety glass may well be now marked with their individual European Product Standard.

EN 356: 1999: 'Glass in building - Security glazing - Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack'

BS 5544 - Anti-bandit glazing (glazing resistant to manual attack).

BS 5357 - British Standard Code of Practice installation of security glazing.

BS 5051 (Part 1) - Bullet resistant glazing.

**The European Standard for Bullet Resistant Glazing is:
EN 1063: 200(BS 5051)**

The type of glass panes vary from application to application.

Plain float glass is still primarily used in commercial buildings unless a safety or security requirement was identified at the design stage.

Toughened glass is an impact safety glass that is stronger than float glass and used in commercial buildings and modern shop premises now instead of plate glass (a thicker type of float glass). All these types are very dangerous in an explosion, if not protected by security film and bomb curtains (threat dependant), as they shatter into shards and pieces causing terrible injuries to persons in the vicinity.

Georgian wired glass is normally fitted into fire door vision panels, but can also be used in external glazing in fire doors and escape areas and is not to be considered secure in an explosive situation without being protected by security film. (Georgian wired glass is designed to hold together in a fire and restrict the progress of smoke).

Laminated glass is manufactured by bonding two or more sheets or ordinary glass in the form of a sandwich with **PVB (Poly Vinyl Butyral) interlayers**. When attacked manually or damaged by an explosive device it cracks with the shards remaining attached to the interlayer minimising injury and damage. It normally stays together within the frame, this will depend heavily on the thickness of the PVB layer rather than the glass thickness and how it is rebated (fixed to the frame). The rebate should always relate to the size of the pane (they can vary between 15mm to 30 mm).

BS 5544 specifies the requirements and test methods for anti-bandit glazing.

BS 5051 is the standard defining bullet resistant security glazing and the weapons, ammunition and range used for attack. Different thicknesses will stop various calibres of firearms from 9mm handguns, shotguns and rifles up to 7.62 calibre rounds. Examples of UK ballistic grades under British Standards are G0, G1, G2, R1, R2 & S86.

Blast resistant glazing can be made by combining laminated and annealed panes or laminated and toughened panes.

Anti-shatter film is measured in microns, the thicker the microns the greater the shrapnel protection will be.

Standard protection on normal windows up to the 11th floor is 175 microns and rises to 350 microns for large panes on the ground and first floors on buildings where the pane size is greater than 3 sq metres. For small panes (less than 0.25 sq metres use 100 micron), anti shatter film can be applied to existing panes. If film has been applied at an earlier point, it normally has a warranty period of 10 years but the useful lifetime should be greater.

The use of grilles, bars and shutters will enhance the security of vulnerable windows from burglary and criminal damage. Existing exterior bars if not fitted correctly can easily be defeated. Old bars rust within the concrete fixings and can be levered and snapped off. If the cross members supporting vertical bars are fitted too far apart the intruder can insert a scissor jack and 'wind' the bars apart to allow them to attack the window.

Access Control

For domestic premises or smaller commercial units the following door 'hardware' is also available.

A door viewer, a small glass lens fitted in the middle and a third of the way down from the top of the door will give the occupier a view of who is outside the door. This linked with an audio entry phone system will enable the occupier to speak to the visitor prior to opening the door.

A slightly better system, although more expensive than the door viewer and entry speaker is the **audio-visual unit**. These units have an integral camera, speaker and microphone.

Door chains or restrictors – These reduce forced door entry

Push Button Combination (PBC) locks; manual/mechanical i.e. manually enters a combination of numbers/letters and if it matches the pre-set code the lock opens.

A single electronic access control system can be very flexible and cover a whole building or complex, from perimeter entrance/exit points to internal offices.

Key Control

The security of the keys for a lock is paramount as an unauthorised key could be used to bypass your security measures. If the company has moved into new premises it is recommended that all of the existing locks on the perimeter doors be changed. This may not necessarily mean changing the whole lock, in many cases it will be sufficient to change the barrel of the lock. Master keys should be controlled by the security manager.

Another point to consider is the 'suiting' of locks. This will allow control of the areas to which the members of staff have access. This type of system does not have to be key operated, it could form part of an access control system where swipe cards

or proximity cards are used. For example – the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) could have a key/card which opens all of the locks on the premises, but a junior member of staff will only have access to his/her own office area and certain other parts of the complex. Beware, however, of 'inappropriate exemptions' or unnecessary access rights. A website covering this aspect of security is www.keytracker.co.uk.

Secure key safes, where there is an automatic audit trail as soon as a key is booked out or returned, can keep track of the company's keys 24 hours a day. There are systems which will only release a key to a member of staff who has the access rights to it through their swipe card and PIN.

A key safe should conform to at least LPS Level 1 to provide a sufficient level of security

Guarding

There are usually two types of guard force, in-house employed by the company or contracted from an outside agency. The in-house option can be more efficient, has company loyalty and the personnel are more likely to be familiar with the site, its procedures and vulnerabilities and know all the other employees. Contracted security staff can be detached from the premises and staff they are guarding. They have no corporate loyalty. Different security staff can be drafted in on a regular basis without having worked at the premises before. This can lead to inefficiency in the protection of the building and company assets.

CCTV

UK Police Requirements For Digital CCTV Systems - This document offers guidance to potential users of digital CCTV systems, where the pictures are intended to be used by the police or are likely to be used in an investigation. For CCTV recordings to be effective in detecting and investigating crime they must be fit for purpose and easily accessible by police investigators. For digital CCTV there are four main areas that must be considered:

QUALITY - are the pictures good enough?
STORAGE - are the pictures stored appropriately?
EXPORT - can the pictures be easily exported from the system?
PLAYBACK - can the pictures be easily viewed by authorised third parties?

By ensuring that your digital CCTV system is capable of meeting a few simple requirements, the potential evidential value of the pictures can be greatly increased and the time taken by the police to access and process them greatly reduced.

Code Of Practice & Guidance On The Use Of CCTV - Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005. This is issued by the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner. The definitions in this Law cover the processing of images of individuals caught by CCTV cameras. This Law gives legally enforceable information handling standards for those processing personal data on computer and also cover CCTV. An important feature of the legislation is a power to issue a Commissioner's Code of Practice (Article 51(3)(b) Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005) setting out guidance for good practice.

Lighting

Lighting can enhance or hinder vision. The correct lighting regime is essential for it to complement the other components of an integrated security system.

It is important to understand that in using lighting as a crime deterrent, it is not the lighting per se that is acting as the deterrent but rather the quality of surveillance potentially engendered by the lighting, and the sense of civic pride that the use of the right equipment can enable.

Effective use of lighting will entail:

1. Deploying lighting where it can be effective.
2. Use of appropriate lighting levels, not over bright ones.
3. Concentration on uniformity of light distribution rather than brightness.
4. Careful control of glare to help the observer but hinder the criminal.
5. Use of appropriate equipment to ensure the right visual cues are broadcast to the target community.

Visibility

Lighting is all about seeing and in using lighting as a crime deterrent (as well as using lighting for any purpose) the most important aspect one needs to consider is the visual task. In a potential crime situation there will be, on one hand, the criminal and on the other the potential observers of the crime. Both have their discreet visual tasks. The criminal's visual task is to undertake the crime and to identify the personal risk of detection. The observer's visual task is to observe the crime and identify the criminal. An ideal deployment of lighting as a crime deterrent will minimise the former visual task and maximise the latter.

Different luminaries (lighting units) and LUX settings (strength of illumination) are used for varying the lighting effects. There are many different types of lamps available. It is vital that lighting linked with any CCTV system complements the camera images.

Dusk to dawn lights (units fitted with a light sensor which switches the light on as it gets dark and extinguishes it as it gets light) can be used to light pathways and building entry and exit points. These units are maintenance free and operate automatically.

Tungsten-halogen flood lights fitted with infra-red movement detectors have been a long-time favourite for domestic premises. These units illuminate when the infra-red beam is broken.

Alarms

There are two main types of alarms;

'Bells Only' – when the system is triggered an audible bell/siren sounds and strobe lights may flash. It is not linked to an alarm receiving centre so there will be no guard force or police response unless a separate deliberate notification is made.

'Monitored' - all new monitored systems must be installed to EN 50131 (PD6662) to qualify for a URN and therefore a police response. The alarm receiving centre (which must conform to BS 5979) will inform the police. Three

false alarm activations in a rolling twelve month period will result in the police response being withdrawn. Different police areas may adopt a different cut off point. Read the ACPO security systems policy and consult with the police alarms manager to find out what criteria each force uses.

Post Rooms

Large companies should consider 'standalone' post rooms. If possible they should be in a separate building. Consideration should be given to making the floors, walls and ceilings blast resistant. All post rooms should be separate from reception areas and offices. Windows present a flying glass hazard and should be suitably protected on the inside.

Air conditioning for the room should have shut off controls to mitigate the potential effect of a suspected chemical or biological incident, e.g. white powder, spreading through the system to the rest of the building. Personal protection equipment should be supplied to all post room staff with detailed instructions on mail handling, identifying suspect packages, including reporting & emergency procedures.

Specialist Equipment

Specialist equipment is essential in screening and checking mail. Several companies supply free open days for visits to gain practical experience and use of their products.

There are different types of machines for different applications, from desk top audible metal detectors to airport style colour x-ray machines showing internal details of packages before they are opened. There are now Ioniser units on the market, which enable the operator to detect explosives or drugs. Beware as a lot of these machines do have a high failure rate and give false 'positive' hits.

If a parcel is suspected of being an explosive device, which requires the attendance of the police explosives officer or the bomb disposal squad, a secure area or 'bomb bin' should be available. If it is left within the post room arrangements should be in place to evacuate along with the rooms above, either side and below. Restrictions should also be put on the use of any corridor or access route passing the room.

Protected Spaces

Rather than evacuating personnel into the streets in the event of a bomb alert, consider moving staff to a properly identified Protected Space within the building.

A Protected Space should be located:-

- Away from windows, external doors and walls.
- Away from the 'perimeter structural bay' – i.e. that part of the floor structure, at all levels, between the building's perimeter and the first lines of supporting columns or rooms.
- In areas surrounded by full height masonry or concrete walls, e.g. internal corridors, toilet areas or conference rooms.
- Generally not in stair-wells or in areas with access to lift shafts.

Personnel Procedures

Some external threats, whether from criminals, terrorists, or competitors seeking a business advantage, may rely upon the co-operation of an 'insider'. This could be an employee or any contract or agency staff (e.g. cleaner, caterer, security guard) who has authorised access to the premises. He or she or she may be an existing employee, or may be someone newly joined who has infiltrated the organisation in order to seek information or exploit the access that the job provides.

What is personnel security?

Personnel security is a system of policies and procedures which seek to manage the risk of staff or contractors exploiting their legitimate access to an organisation's assets or premises for unauthorised purposes. These purposes can encompass many forms of criminal activity, from minor theft through to terrorism.

Personnel security seeks to minimise the risks. It does this by ensuring that organisations employ reliable individuals, minimising the chances of staff becoming unreliable once they have been employed, detecting suspicious behaviour and resolving security concerns once they have become apparent.

IT Security

The security of computers is of paramount importance, as information which they often contain may be extremely sensitive or potentially embarrassing if it was to pass into the wrong hands. All buildings containing computers should have an appointed systems manager to carry out a risk assessment of the systems within the premises. He or she should then formulate a security policy and ensure that all users of the system are aware of the policy and their role in making the policy work.

An equipment audit should be carried out recording details such as the make, model, serial number and location of each piece of equipment.

Prevention is better than cure and sites such as www.GetSafeOnline.org can help. This is just a high-level overview, but the site has detailed advice that will explain it all.

Protect your PC

- Get anti-virus software, anti-spyware software and a firewall
- Keep your computer up to date
- Block spam emails
- Use an up to date web browser
- Make regular backups
- Encrypt your wireless network
- Avoid online rip-offs
- When you're shopping online, look for clear signs that you're buying from a reputable company
- On an online auction site, learn how it works and learn to pick good sellers
- Use safe ways to pay, such as PayPal or credit and debit cards
- Use your common sense to avoid scams – if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is
- Take care of your identity and privacy

- Avoid identity theft by using an up to date web browser and blocking bogus emails with a spam filter
- Always use strong passwords
- Don't give away too much personal information on blogs and social networking sites

Security Planning

List details of any police contingency plans or response plans, fire evacuation procedures and any relevant building regulations (communal occupation of premises). Response times are important especially if the site is a 'lock & leave'.

Detailed floor by floor building plans, including surrounding site plans showing utility access points and perimeter areas are essential records, especially for Hazardous Sites and Substances (HSS) sites or Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). Copies of these details should be stored away from the main site they refer to so in the event of a major incident, such as a fire, the emergency services will have access to them. If possible a set of detailed photographs of the site should be included with the plans, covering all access and exit points to the building and all areas of importance within the buildings.

A set of evacuation plans should be in place for every site. There should be a separate set of plans in place for fire, bomb threats, and terrorist attack and at sites carrying pathogens & toxins or radiological materials. The security manager should chair a committee for the formulation of all these plans. Persons selected for the committee should consist of personnel that will contribute to the plans with their expertise of the parts of the site which need the most protection.

All evacuation plans should be regularly tested and reviewed and completed in conjunction with force response procedures.

The company/site should have a business continuity plan in place. If they are attacked, or as is more likely in many cases become a victim of fire, how long will they be able to survive before they are up and running again? Do they have a 'back-up' site to relocate to or a sister company who will accommodate them? Are their computer systems 'backed-up' and the data kept off site?

References

States of Jersey Police
http://www.jersey.police.uk/Pages/Home.aspx

Crime Prevention Website
http://thecrimepreventionwebsite.com/

Secured By Design
http://www.securedbydesign.com/

Secured By Design Toolkit
http://www.securedbydesign.com/toolkit/

Loss Prevention Certification Board
http://www.redbooklive.com/index.jsp

Immobilise
http://www.immobilise.com/

Retainagroup – Security solutions
http://www.retainagroup.com/default.html

BikeRegister
https://www.bikeregister.com/

Centre for Protection of the National Infrastructure
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/

National Counter Terrorism Security Office
http://www.nactso.gov.uk/default.aspx

MI5
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/

GERDA Information Box
http://www.gerdasecurity.co.uk/products/premises_information_system/premises_information_box.htm

Glass and Glazing Federation
www.ggf.co.uk

Lighting – Go to the Secured By Design website – Lighting Against Crime
www.securedbydesign.com

CCTV – Go to the Home Office website - CCTV Operational Requirements Manual
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cast

Code of Practice & Guidance on the Use of CCTV - Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005
www.dataprotection@gov.je

Internet security
www.GetSafeOnline.org

Alarms policy – Go to the States of Jersey Police website - Security Systems Policy 2008
www.Jersey.Police.uk

Alarms information – Go to the Secured By Design website for police security information.
www.securedbydesign.com

Safer Places: The planning system and crime prevention: Safer Places focuses on seven attributes of sustainability that are particularly relevant to crime prevention.
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/saferplaces

Safer Places: A Counter Terrorism Supplement: A supplement to the guidance in 'Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention', which looks to provide practical advice on how 'design in' counter terrorism measures into the built environment. http://designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/safer_places_CT_supp.pdf

By Design - Urban design in the planning system: towards better practice; This UK government design guide aims to encourage better design and to stimulate thinking about urban design.
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/bydesignurban

By Design - Better places to live; This guide focuses on the attributes that underlie successful residential environments in order to provide guidance on implementing the new approach to planning for housing.
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/betterplaces

Manual for Streets: This document provides guidance for practitioners involved in the planning, design, provision and approval of new residential streets, and modifications to existing ones.
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/manualforstreets

Car Parking: What works where, English partnerships: - This toolkit highlights the most appropriate car parking approach according to density of development and housing typology. It takes stock of common car parking treatments and reviews how successful they are in providing adequate levels of safe parking with a high quality environment.
http://www.englishpartnerships.co.uk/qualityandinnovationpublications.htm

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